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THE LAST MINUET: DISPARATE 
TREATMENT AFTER HICKS 
Deborah C. Malamud* 
INTRODUCTION 
It is no secret that the Supreme Court's Title VIP jurisprudence 
cloaks substance in the "curious garb" of procedure.2 When the 
Supreme Court talks about employment discrimination under Title 
VII, it generally does so by creating and refining special proof struc-
tures - different methods of proving discrimination.3 This empha-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A. 1977, Wesleyan University; 
J.D. 1986, University of Chicago. My thanks to Ed Cooper, Rick Pildes, Ted St. Antoine, 
Catherine Fisk, Sam Gross, Marina Hsieh, Rick Lempert, Nick Rine, Ted Shaw, David 
Strauss, Kent Syverud, Chris Whitman, and participants in the University of Michigan Law 
School's Saw's Ear Workshop for their comments at various stages of this project; to Carol 
Banta, Gary Chambon, and Brad Axel for valuable research assistance; and to my friends 
and colleagues in the civil rights community who continue to count me in their number de-
spite what one called this article's "apostasy." · 
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified as 
amended principally at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)). 
2. For "curious garb," see KEES W. BoLLE, THE FREEDOM OF MAN IN MYIH 40 (1968) 
("Myth is not only philosophy in a curious garb; the apparel matters."). For discussions of 
the centrality of procedure in employment discrimination law, see, e.g., Phyllis Trapper Bau-
mann et al., Substance in the Shadow of Procedure: The Integration of Substantive and Proce-
dural Law in ntle VII Cases, 33 B.C. L. REv. 211 (1992). Baumann states: 
The judiciary has redefined basic civil rights and has resolved major social issues by 
manipulating process. Procedure now defines unlawful discrimination and determines 
the outcome of Title VII cases. Thus, without grappling with the nature of discrimina-
tion, theories of equality, or the historical and sociological complexity of employment 
.disparities between African-Americans and whites, the courts have rewritten the law 
and changed workplace behavior using the language of procedure. 
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Miller v. Cigna Corp., 47 F.3d 586, 599 (3d Cir. 1995) (Green-
berg, J., concurring) ("[T]he area of employment discrimination law is cursed with elusive 
terms .•. and with numerous presumptions, inferences and burden-shifting rules [that] histor-
ically often have taken on lives of their own .... "). 
3. The most important distinction in the Title VII case law is the distinction between 
"intentional discrimination" cases and "disparate impact" cases. The distinction has its 
source in Supreme Court case law, but has been codified in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. 
L. No. 102-66, 105 Stat. 1071, which, inter alia, makes damages and jury trials available in 
"intentional discrimination" cases but not in cases challenging "an employment practice that 
is unlawful because of its disparate impact." 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(l) (Supp. IV 1992). 
Over time, the Supreme Court has developed different proof structures for different types 
of intentional discrimination cases. This article is most centrally concerned with the "dispa-
rate treatment" proof structure for proof of intentional discrimination by circumstantial evi-
dence in individual cases. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993); United 
States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983); Texas Dept. of Commu-
nity Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 
(1978); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 {1973). The other special proof 
structures in intentional discrimination cases are the "mixed motive" framework, which ap-
plies to some individual intentional discrimination cases in which multiple motives for the 
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sis on procedure comes at the expense of discussions of what one 
naively might call "substance." Indeed, with the exception of some 
prominent sex discrimination cases,4 the Supreme Court has taught 
us little in the past twenty-five years5 about what discrimination is, 
how pervasive it is, and how we are to recognize it in the world. 
Refining the special proof structures thus constitutes the Supreme 
Court's major mode of discourse on the subject of employment 
discrimination. 6 
The liberal legal community7 has sought - and claims to have 
found - a set of substantive judgments embedded in the Court's 
adverse decision are proven, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (Supp. IV 1992); Price Waterhouse 
v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 {1989), and the "pattern and practice" framework, which is used for 
class-based challenges to intentional discrimination, usually relying on statistical evidence, 
see International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 {1977). There is also what 
one might think of as a "nonstructure" for cases in which the plaintiff puts forward "direct 
evidence" of discrimination - whatever that means, see discussion infra note 290 - and the 
defendant does not attempt to prove that its conduct would have been the same absent a 
discriminatory motive. In those cases, the Court has specified that no special proof structure 
need be followed. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985). 
The proof structure for disparate impact cases was set forth in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 
401U.S.424 (1971), reinterpreted in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 {1989), 
and codified in a modified form in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2{k) 
(Supp. IV 1992). 
4. For example, the Court's major sex discrimination cases have included endorsement of 
the view that hostile-environment sexual harassment constitutes sex discrimination, Meritor 
Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), and have recognized the adverse effects of sex 
stereotyping, Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 228. 
5. I exclude the Court's decision in Griggs, 401 U.S. at 424, from this criticism. 
6. This focus on pro~dure is not unique to employment discrimination cases. See, e.g., 
Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L REv. 1105, 1150 (1989) 
(arguing that in constitutional antidiscrimination doctrine, interest-balancing is done through 
the allocation of proof burdens, a form that "submerges judicial discretion to the level where 
it becomes invisible to those outside the system"). 
7. I use the term "liberal community" in the sense that it is used by critical race scholars 
who distance themselves from it by rejecting the view that any aspect of the Court's inten-
tional discrimination jurisprudence helps plaintiffs. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, 
Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography, 19 VA. L. REV. 461, 462 {1993) ("Most, if 
not all, CRT writers are discontent with liberalism as a means of addressing the American 
race problem."); cf. Roy L. Brooks & Mary Jo Newborn, Critical Race Theory and Classical-
Liberal Civil Rights Scholarship: A Distinction Without a Difference?, 82 CAL. L. REV. 787 
(1994). 
For many critical race scholars, as for many other scholars writing about antidiscrimina-
tion law, the use of an intent standard in discrimination cases is problematic. See Robert 
Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward a Theory of Proce-
dural Justice, 34 V AND. L. REv. 1205, 1230 {1981); Jeffrey S. Brand, The Supreme Court, 
Equal Protection, and Jury Selection: Denying that Race Still Matters, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 511; 
D. Marvin Jones, No Tune for Trumpets: Title VII, Equality, and the Fin de Si~cle, 92 MICH. 
L. REv. 2311, 2317-18 (1994); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protec-
tion: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 {1987); Ortiz, supra note 6; 
David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 935 
{1989); cf. Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri L Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know How 
Legal Standards Work?, 16 CoRNELL L. REv. 1151 {1991). 
It is interesting, however, that even critical race scholars who castigate the Court for its 
use of intent-based standards seem unable to resist the claim that the Court's earlier dispa-
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procedural decisions. What is said to exist is a substantive consen-
sus that the eradication of discrimination is a high societal priority, 
and that discrimination is pervasive but difficult to prove. This con-
sensus claims that th~ Court fashioned Title VII procedure to give 
plaintiffs a significant helping hand, to make sure their prospects 
are better than they would be under the rigors of the ordinary rules 
of litigation.s 
When the Court's procedural decisions take a conservative, pro-
defendant turn; critics decry the departure from this substantive 
consensus. These critiques nostalgically seek a return to what they 
deem the correct, liberal past in which a deep societal commitment 
to the eradication of discrimination shaped a plaintiff-friendly pro-
cedural jurisprudence.9 The calls for reform are essentially restora-
rate treatment cases reflect a pro-plaintiff approach that has been corrupted by subsequent 
decisions. See Jones, supra, at 2355-58 (criticizing Burdine and arguing that Hicks perverts · 
Burdine). Compare id. at 2350 (faulting the Court in McDonnell Douglas for having "as-
sumed a priori that discrimination is a creature of the employer's intent") with id. at 2357 
(insisting that it was only in Hicks that the Court committed itself to requiring intentional 
discrimination). 
8. See, e.g., Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper 
Use of Summary Judgment in Tztle VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REv. 203, 245 (1993} 
("Placing a higher burden on the employer is consistent with McDonnell Douglas's goal of 
eliminating discrimination in the workplace, because the higher burden helps the plaintiff to 
obtain a factual hearing on the question of defendant's intent."); id. at 256 (stating that Mc-
Donnell Douglas and Burdine "established a formula that would make it easier for plaintiffs 
to prove that their employers had discriminated against them"); see also authorities cited 
infra note 28. 
9. Accusations that a conservative Supreme Court was undermining Title VII's original 
plaintiff-friendly vision begin with critiques of McDonnell Douglas itself. See, e.g., Baumann 
et al., supra note 2, at 226-30 (arguing that Griggs was true to the language of Title VII, but 
McDonnell Douglas was not). It continues with critiques of the early cases following Mc-
Donnell Douglas. See, e.g., Joel W. Friedman, The Burger Court and the Prima Facie Case in 
Employment Discrimination Litigation: A Critique, 65 CoRNELL L. REv. 1, 56 (1979) ("The 
unprincipled and contrived reasoning running through these opinions manifests an inten-
tional effort by the Court to impede litigants' ability to secure their rights to equal employ-
ment opportunity by raising the requirements of the prima facie case."). The responses to 
Burdine continue the story. See, e.g., Jerry W. Kennedy, Note, Easing Tztle VII Burdens from 
the Employer, 5 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 337, 344 (1981) (faulting Burdine for having created a 
(new) intent requirement: "Requiring Title VII plaintiffs to show discriminatory intent or 
motive is an almost impossible burden absent a smoking gun."); James F. Mensing, Com-
ment, Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine: The Procedural Subversion of 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.?, 17 NEW ENG. L. REv. 999, 1008 (1982} ("Burdine should put to 
rest any speculation that disparate treatment cases under Title VII are to be treated any 
differently than other civil suits in the federal courts."). But cf. John F. Smith III, Employer 
Defenses in Employment Discrimination Litigation: A Reassessment of Burdens of Proof and 
Substantive Standards Following Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 55 
TEMP. L.Q. 372, 378 (1982} ("Furnco, Sweeney, and Burdine were efforts by the Court to 
restrain misapplications of the McDonnell Douglas formula ..•. "). See generally Theodore 
Y. Blumoff & Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Reagan Court and Tztle VII: A Common-Law Out-
look on a Statutory Task, 69 N.C. L. REv. 1 (1990) (arguing that the Reagan Court was 
motivated by pro-market policy axioms of neutrality and noninterference that are inconsis-
tent with earlier judicial understandings of the motivation behind Title VII}. The reliance on 
a nostalgic view of the Court's early cases reached a climax in the response to the Court's 
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tive: they seek to correct the Court's error of today by going back 
to the liberal consensus of yesterday. So went the intense academic 
and political response to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 10 in 
which that much-maligned political actor, a "bare majority" of the 
Supreme Court, 11 stood accused of reworking the procedures for 
proving Title VII disparate impact claims.12 
Nostalgia also forms the core of the debate over St. Mary's 
Honor Center v. Hicks. 13 In Hicks, a "bare majority" made inten-
tional discrimination more difficult to prove under the special proof 
structure for individual intentional discrimination cases - which I 
shall refer to as "McDonnell Douglas-Burdine," in honor of Mc-
Donnell Douglas Corp. v. Green14 and Texas Department of Com-
munity Affairs v. Burdine,15 the two major cases in which it was set 
forth. Proof of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas-Burdine 
plays itself out in a three-part "minuet."16 The first step is taken by 
1988-1989 Tenn. See, e.g., Mark S. Brodin, Reflections on the Supreme Court's 1988 Term: 
The Employment Discrimination Decisions and the Abandonment of the Second Reconstruc-
tion, 31 B.C. L. REv. 1, 29-30 (1989) (noting that the Justices whose decisions were "disman-
tled during the 1988 Tenn" were "not known for their progressive leanings," but "joined ••• 
in recognizing the compelling necessity for finally resolving what Gunnar Myrdal long ago 
identified as the most persistent of American tragedies: racism"). 
10. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
11. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 661 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). For a sampling of other 
Supreme Court dissents complaining of decisions by "bare majorities," see, e.g., Rust v. Sulli-
van, 500 U.S. 173, 206 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 
489 U.S. 46, 71 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 485 U.S. 
617, 621 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
12. See, e.g., Robert Belton, Causation and Burden-Shifting Doctrines in Employment 
Discrimination Law Revisited: Some Thoughts on Hopkins and Wards Cove, 64 Tux.. L. REv. 
1359 (1990); William B. Gould IV, The Supreme Court and Employment Discrimination Law 
in 1989: Judicial Retreat and Congressional Response, 64 Tux.. L. REV. 1485 (1990). The 
legislative effort to "restore" at least part of the Court's prior jurisprudence started quickly, 
but did not come to fruition until 1991. See generally Reginald C. Govan, Honorable Com-
promises and the Moral High Ground: The Conflict Between the Rhetoric and the Content of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 46 RUTGERS L. REv. 1 (1993). 
13. 113 s. Ct. 2742 (1993). 
14. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
15. 450 U.S. 248 (1981). The McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework has its origins in 
Title VII jurisprudence, but it is used in other areas of antidiscrimination law as well, such as 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988), and 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). For its use in peremptory challenge cases, see infra note 239. 
16. The tenn "minuet" was first used in disparate treatment cases as a way of explaining 
that the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine structure does not require judges to dance a minuet. 
See, e.g., Halsell v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 683 F.2d 285, 291 n.5 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 
459 U.S. 1205 (1983); Sime v. Trustees of the Cal. State Univ. & Colleges, 526 F.2d 1112, 1114 
(9th Cir. 1975). But the term is now often used to describe the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine 
structure. See, e.g., Davis v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 14 F.3d 1082, 1085 nn.7-8 (5th Cir. 1994) 
(per curiam); Holley v. Sanyo Mfg., Inc., 771 F.2d 1161, 1164 (8th Cir. 1985). My favorite use 
of the term is the observation that the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine proof method is "about 
as relevant [to pattern-and-practice cases] as a minuet is to a thermonuclear battle." 
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the plaintiff, who must begin by proving a "prim.a facie case." In 
some legal contexts, the "prim.a facie case" consists of evidence suf-
ficient to prove all required elements of the plaintiff's claim. Not 
so under McDonnell Douglas-Burdine.17 The McDonnell Douglas-
Burdine prim.a facie case merely attempts to "rule out the most 
common reasons for adverse job actions,"18 entitling the plaintiff 
who proves a prim.a facie case to a presumption that intentional 
discrimination has taken place. In order to avoid a directed verdict, 
the employer19 must then meet a burden of production - as op-
posed to a burden of persuasion - by introducing evidence of a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision.20 Once the 
employer has met its rebuttal burden, the presumption of discrimi-
Vuyanich v. Republic Natl. Bank, 521 F. Supp. 656, 661 (N.D. Tex. 1981), vacated and re-
manded on other grounds, 123 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1073 (1984). If the 
"minuet" image does not satisfy, others are available to take its place. See, e.g., Segar v. 
Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1286 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 1115 (1985) ("The analytic 
application of Title VIl's formulaic rules for shifting burdens can come to resemble a furious 
tennis match."). 
17. The Burdine Court stated that: 
The phrase 'prima facie case' not only may denote the establishment of a legally 
mandatory, rebuttable presumption, but also may be used by courts to describe the 
plaintiff's burden of producing enough evidence to permit the trier of fact to infer the 
fact at issue. McDonnell Douglas should have made it apparent that in the Title VII 
context we use 'prima facie case' in the former sense. 
450 U.S. at 254 n.7 (citation omitted); see also Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 9, at 10 (arguing 
that the inference of intentional discrimination from the proven prima facie case "is rather 
weak. The prima facie case, far from establishing with any conviction that intentional dis-
crimination was likely, really only eliminates two or three common nondiscriminatory rea-
sons for the plaintiff's rejection"); Hannah Arterian Furnish, A Path Through the Maze: 
Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
After Beazer and Burdine, 23 B.C. L. REv. 419, 435 (1982) (noting "the ease with which the 
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case" and how "little is required to create the presumption 
of discrimination"); George Rutherglen, Reconsidering Burdens of Proof. Ideology, Evi-
dence, and Intent in Individual Claims of Employment Discrimination, 1 VA. J. Soc. POLY. & 
L. 43, 74 (1993) ("[T]he entire terminology of 'prima facie case' overstates the force of the 
evidence necessary to satisfy the plaintiff's initial burden under McDonnell Doug/a$."). 
18. "The prima facie case serves an important function in the litigation: it eliminates the 
most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiff's rejection." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 
253-54 (citing International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 & n.44 
(1977)). For example, the basic elements in a failure-to-hire case, according to McDonnell 
Douglas, are membership in a protected group; having applied for the job; being minimally 
qualified for the job; being turned down; and the job having remained open (or someone 
outside your protected group having been hired). McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(c)-(d) (1988). Title VII covers discrimination not only by employ-
ers, but also by labor unions and employment agencies. I shall refer to defendants as "em-
ployers" for the sake of simplicity, but what is said applies to the other categories of potential 
defendants as well. 
20. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255. All that matters is that the reason articulated by the em-
ployer be "legally sufficient" to support a judgment for the defendant, 450 U.S. at 255 (i.e., 
that the stated reason in fact be "legitimate" and "nondiscriminatory"), and that the evidence 
"rais[e] a genuine issue of fact as to whether [the employer] discriminated against the plain-
tiff," 450 U.S. at 248. "The defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually moti-
vated by the proffered reasons." 450 U.S. at 248. 
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nation created by the prim.a facie case "drops from the case,"21 and 
the plaintiff must prove that the employer's stated justification was 
pretextual in order to prevail. In a much-cited dictum in Burdine, 
the Court stated that pretext could be proven by either direct or 
circumstantial evidence, and that, more specifically, pretext "may" 
be proven by showing that the employer's stated reason was "not 
worthy of credence."22 
For at least ten years after Burdine, the circuits disagreed as to 
whether a plaintiff who proves a prim.a facie case and convinces the 
factfinder to reject the employer's stated justification is entitled, on 
that basis alone, to judgment as a matter of law.23 The Court ad-
dressed this question for the first time in Hicks and, by a 5-4 vote, 
held that judgment for the plaintiff is not required in such a case. 
The Supreme Court's decision in Hicks is viewed by many as 
reminiscent of Wards Cove and the other conservative civil rights 
decisions of the Supreme Court's 1988-1989 Term.24 Indeed, the 
21. 450 U.S. at 255 n.10. 
22. "(The plaintiff] may succeed in this [i.e., in persuading the court that she has been the 
victim of intentional discrimination] either directly by persuading the court that a discrimina-
tory reason more likely than not motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the 
employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." 450 U.S. at 256. 
23. Some courts took the position that a plaintiff who proves a prima facie case and dis-
proves the employer's stated reason is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Johnson v. 
Group Health Plan, Inc., 994 F.2d 543, 546 (8th Cir. 1993); Dister v. Continental Group, Inc., 
859 F.2d 1108, 1113 (2d Cir. 1988); King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Thorn-
brough v. Columbus & G.R.R., 760 F.2d 633, 647 (5th Cir. 1985); Duffy v. Wheeling Pitts-
burgh Steel Corp., 738 F.2d 1393, 1396 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.1087 (1984); Lanphear 
v. Prokop, 703 F.2d 1311, 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Other courts held that the factfinder in such 
a case would be permitted but not required to find for the plaintiff. See, e.g., MacDissi v. 
Valmont Indus., Inc., 856 F.2d 1054, 1059 (8th Cir. 1988); Benzies v. Illinois Dept. of Mental 
Health, 810 F.2d 146, 148 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1006 (1987); White v. Vathally, 732 
F.2d 1037, 1043 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 933 (1984); Clark v. Huntsville Bd. of Educ., 
717 F.2d 525, 529 (11th Cir. 1983); Miller v. WFLI Radio Inc., 687 F.2d 136, 139 (6th Cir. 
1982). Still other courts seemed to go further, expressing the view that if all the plaintiff had 
done was to prove a prima facie case and disprove the employer's stated reason, the evidence 
would be insufficient as a matter of Jaw to sustain a judgment for the plaintiff. See, e.g., 
Bienkowski v. American Airlines, Inc., 851F.2d1503, 1508 & n.6 (5th Cir. 1988). The courts 
did not always state their positions with great clarity, and, as some of the citations above 
reflect, conflicts existed within, as well as, between circuits. For early law review commentary 
on the courts' disagreement on this issue, see Marina C. Szteinbok, Note, Indirect Proof of 
Discriminatory Motive in 1itle VII Disparate Treatment Claims After Aikens, 88 CoLUM. L. 
REv. 1114 (1988). The leading study of the issue is Catherine J. Lanctot, The Defendant Lies 
and the Plaintiff Loses: The Fallacy of the "Pretext-Plus" Rule in Employment Discrimination 
Cases, 43 HAsnNos LJ. 57 (1991). 
24. See, e.g., Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., The Michael Jackson Pill: Equality, Race, and 
Culture, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2613, 2621-22 (1994). CUip states that: 
In a series of decisions starting with Watson and culminating in Patterson and Wards 
Cove, the Court has suggested that the claims that black people were making were not 
remediable. Despite recent congressional chastisement of part of that trend, in Hicks 
the Court has again made the point that Title VII should not be too effective or reach 
too much of the real discrimination. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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Court's action in Hicks appears to be a particularly extreme case of 
conservative judicial activism because the Hicks majority conceded 
that its decision directly contradicted the Burdine dictum.25 The 
Court's explanation - that one need not, "where holdings of the 
Court are not at issue ... dissect the sentences of the United States 
Reports as though they were the United States Code"26 - reads to 
many as a declaration of war, given the fact that the Court had con-
sistently developed the Title VII special proof structures through 
quasi-legislative "tests" set forth in dicta to guide future decision-
making. Further fueling the charge of judicial activism was the fact 
that the position rejected by the Court in Hicks was embraced not 
only by the Clinton Justice Department in its amicus brief, but also 
by the Bush Justice Department in an earlier Supreme Court case 
that was not heard on its merits.27 The criticism of Hicks was imme-
diate, as was the cry for restorative legislation.2s 
25. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2752 (1993). 
26. 113 S. Ct. at 2751. 
27. Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as 
Amicus Curiae supporting Respondent, Harbison-Walker Refractories v. Brieck, 488 U.S. 
226 (1988) (No. 87-271). Brieck is discussed infra at note 152. It is also noteworthy that 
Justice White, who was consistently with the conservatives in the 5-4 civil rights decisions of 
the 1988-1989 Term, joined the dissent in Hicks. 
28. See, e.g., Deborah A. Calloway, St Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: Questioning the 
Basic Assumption, 26 CONN. L. REv. 997, 1038 (1994) (calling for legislative reform); Jerome 
McCristal Culp, Jr., Neutrality, the Race Question, and the 1991 Civil Rights Act: The "Impos-
sibility" of Permanent Reform, 45 RUTGERS L. REv. 965, 1008 (1993) (stating the view that 
became the majority position in Hicks was previously taken only by "the radical fringe of the 
legal establishment"); Jones, supra note 7, at 2356-58 (critiquing Hicks); Juan F. Perea, 
Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating "National Origin" Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 
WM. & MARYL. REv. 805, 841-42 {1994) (claiming that Hicks reflects the Court's "persistent 
hostility toward civil rights plaintiffs"); The Supreme Court, 1992 Term - Leading Cases, 107 
HARv. L. REv. 144, 347 (1993) (arguing that the Court ''misread established precedent and it 
disregarded the intent of the legislature" and that the majority opinion "hinged tenuously on 
isolated phrases, stripped from their contexts and refashioned into a reading that contradicts 
both the spirit and the letter of settled case law"); Sherie L. Coons, Comment, Proving Dis-
parate Treatment after St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: ls Anything Left of McDonnell 
Douglas?, 19 lowA J. CoRP. L. 379 (1994) ("[T]he Court's holding conflicts with established 
precedent, is illogical, inconsistent, and furthers unsound policy .... "); Shannon R. Joseph, 
Note, Employment Discrimination: Shouldering the Burden of Proof After St. Mary's Honor 
Center v. Hicks, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 963, 995 (1994) (stating that Hicks manifests the 
Court's willingness "to twist the words of its prior decisions in order to extract a result that 
subverts the intended result of civil rights legislation"); Louis M. Rappaport, Note, St Mary's 
Honor Center v. Hicks: Has the Supreme Court Turned Its Back on Title VII by Rejecting 
"Pretext-Only?," 39 VIT.L. L. REv. 123, 164 {1994) {calling for legislative action); Robert J. 
Smith, Note, The Title VII Pretext Question: Resolved in Light of St. Mary's Honor Center v. 
Hicks, 70 IND. L.J. 281 {1994). 
For the response of the plaintiffs' civil rights bar, see, e.g., Management, Civil Rights At-
torneys Differ on Effect of Hicks Decision, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 126, at C-1, C-2 {July 
2, 1993) (quoting a representative of the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., 
as stating: " 'There may well be a need for some restorative legislation .... We think the 
decision is a blow to effective civil rights enforcement,'" and that "McDonnell-Doug/as set 
up an effective method for dealing with discrimination cases that was used for decades"). See 
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The strategic importance of nostalgic critiques and restorative 
rhetoric makes it difficult for liberals, of which I am one, to aban-
don them. Thus, before undertaking a close analysis of the issue in 
Hicks, my sympathies were with the dissent. I wanted to be on the 
side of those who proclaim with moral confidence that the 
landmark Title VII cases of the early 1970s represented a clear, pro-
plaintiff consensus, and that only a Court that no longer believes 
that race discrimination against nonwhites is - or ever was - a 
problem in our society29 would destroy it. But when it comes to 
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine, I have reluctantly concluded that the 
nostalgic critique must fail. 
The purpose of this article is to explain why the Court's much-
maligned decision in Hicks was correct, and to further argue that in 
the aftermath of Hicks, the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine proof 
structure ought to be abandoned. 
I begin in Part I by analyzing the Court's prior disparate treat-
ment decisions and conclude that the Supreme Court never suc-
ceeded in setting the prima facie case threshold high enough to 
permit the proven prima facie case to support a sufficiently strong 
also Thomas A. Cunniff, Note, The Price of Equal Opportunity: The Efficiency of 1itle VII 
After Hicks, 45 CASE W. REs. L. REv. SITT, 508 (1995) {discussing reactions of the civil rights 
bar). 
Restorative legislation was introduced in late 1993, in the form of the Civil Rights Stan-
dards Restoration Act, S.1776, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., 139 CONG. REC. S16,948 {daily ed. Nov. 
22, 1993). The Act was introduced and spearheaded by Senator Howard Metzenbaum, 
whose opening words on the Senate floor were that this was a case of "deja vu," and that "the 
Supreme Court is at it again." Id. He continued: "The Civil Rights Standards Restoration 
Act will overturn Hicks and restore the legal framework Federal courts have used in 
thousands of cases to resolve claims of intentional discrimination. Notably, the text of the 
bill is drawn directly from the language of the Supreme Court's McDonnell Douglas and 
Burdine decisions." Id. at S16,950. The proposed Act provided: 
Sec. 1979A. Standards for Proving Intentional Discrimination in Certain Circumstances. 
(a) Standards. - In a case or proceeding brought under Federal law in which a 
complaining party meets its burden of proving a prima facie case of unlawful intentional 
discrimination and the respondent meets its burden of clearly and specifically articulat-
ing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for the conduct at issue through the in-
troduction of admissible evidence, unlawful intentional discrimination shall be 
established where the complaining party persuades a trier of fact, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that -
{l) a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the respondent; or 
(2) the respondent's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. 
{b) Rule of Construction. - This section shall apply only to those cases and proceed-
ings in which the method of proof articulated in McDonnell Douglas ••• and ••. Burdine 
••• applies and shall not be construed to specify the exclusive means by which the com-
plaining party may establish unlawful intentional discrimination under Federal law. 
Id. The statute, which adopted the position of the Hicks dissent, never made it out of 
committee. 
29. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 662 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing). My initial sympathies were shaped in part by the fact that I served as a law clerk to 
Justice Blackmun during the 1988-1989 Term and agreed with his stark assessment of the 
Court's conservative tum. 
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inference of discrimination to mandate judgment for the plaintiff 
when combined only with disbelief of the employer's stated justifi-
cation. It is, of course, possible to argue that the Court interpreted 
the policies of Title VII to require a framework in which a 
mandatory inference of discriminati<;m must be drawn even when 
the evidence itself is not strong enough to warrant it. But I fail to 
find in McDonnell Douglas-Burdine a sufficiently strong pro-
plaintiff substantive consensus to support this result - a result that 
must, in all honesty, be viewed as a kind of affirmative action, in 
that it protects members of protected groups from discharge with-
out just cause in any case in which a minimal showing can be made 
that discrimination could have been the cause, without proof that it 
was the cause. Instead, I conclude that the major thrust of the 
Court's disparate treatment jurisprudence is the attempt to insulate 
disparate treatment cases from the radical innovations of the dispa-
rate impact standard. There is a marked conservative overtone to 
the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine line of cases - and against its 
background, the nostalgic critique of Hicks is unacceptable. 
If Hicks is correct, however, there remains what might well be 
thought of as a problem of judicial economy: McDonnell Douglas-
Burdine is reduced to nothing but an empty ritual. If McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine does nothing the normal rules of civil procedure 
cannot do, if it neither aids nor constrains judicial decisionmaking, 
one must ask whether it makes sense to continue to use the Mc-
Donnell Douglas-Burdine proof structure at all. 
In Part II, this article questions the continued utility of McDon-
nell Douglas-Burdine by reviewing how district courts use McDon-
nell Douglas-Burdine at the pretrial stage, where it matters the 
most. A review of district court summary judgment cases demon-
strates that to accord legal significance to the plaintiff's satisfaction 
of the "requirements" of the prima facie case "stage" and the pre-
text "stage" of McDonnell Douglas-Burdine is to engage in an act 
of misplaced concreteness. The world of practice under McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine remains a disorderly one, in which the assignment 
of categories of facts to "stages" of the case is unstable. Further-
more, to the extent that McDonnell Douglas-Burdine does con-
strain factfinding, it tends to discourage the kind of holistic 
factfinding that is most likely to reveal the truth about discrimina-
tion in the workplace. 
On the basis of this review, I suggest $at it would be better to 
abandon McDonnell Douglas-Burdine than to repair it. Aban-
doning McDonnell Douglas-Burdine would leave courts with a less 
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structured approach to disparate treatment cases, in which the only 
question would be whether the plaintiff has proved intentional dis-
crimination by a preponderance of the evidence, both direct and 
circumstantial. It is not only intellectual honesty that would be 
gained from abandoning McDonnell Douglas-Burdine. There is 
also a possibility that abandoning McDonnell Douglas-Burdine will 
draw the attention of the courts - and of that sector of legal 
academia that still has some faith in the educability of the courts -
to the substantive problem that McDonnell Douglas-Burdine tried, 
but failed, to answer in procedural terms: the problem of proving 
- rather than preaching - the reality of discrimination to the un-
converted, on the level of the individual case. 
I. THE HICKS CASE 
Melvin Hicks, who is black, worked as a shift commander at St. 
Mary's Honor Center, a minimum security prison. Hicks had a 
good performance record until January 1984, when John Powell be-
came his supervisor. Between January 1984 and mid-April 1984, 
Hicks was involved in a series of rule infractions that provided the 
occasion for his discipline, demotion, and eventual discharge. Hicks 
was eventually replaced by a white male. Hicks's case went to full 
trial with the judge as factfinder.3o The district court found for St. 
Mary's notwithstanding the fact that it did not believe St. Mary's 
explanation of why it fired Hicks. The Eighth Circuit reversed, 
clearly embracing the view that a plaintiff who proves a prima facie 
case and disproves the employer's stated justification for its actions 
is thereby entitled to judgment as a matter of law31 - which I shall 
call the "judgment for plaintiff required" position. The Supreme 
Court, in turn, reversed the Eighth Circuit, rejecting the "judgment 
for plaintiff required" position.32 
In Hicks, as in many disparate treatment cases, evidence nar-
rowly tailored to prove the prima facie case and disprove the em-
ployer's stated justification - which I shall call the "combined 
evidence" - was not the only evidence at issue. Hicks presented 
the further complication that key evidence supported potentially 
dispositive inferences not argued for by either party. Analysis of 
Hicks's path to the Supreme Court, then, serves the dual purpose of 
explicating the case and of providing an example of how McDon-
30. The district court's opinion is reported. See Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. 
Supp. 1244 (E.D. Mo. 1991). 
31. Hicks v. St Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1992). 
32. 113 s. Ct 2742 (1993). 
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nell Douglas-Burdine works in practice in factually complex cases. 
This Part will then address the legal issue before the Supreme 
Court, and explain why the Court's much-criticized rejection of the 
"judgment for plaintiff required" position was correct - for rea-
sons that c~ the coherence and utility of McDonnell Douglas-
Burdine into question. 
A. Hicks in the District Court 
In Hicks, the district court analyzed the facts under the McDon-
nell Douglas-Burdine proof structure.33 First, the district court held 
that Hicks had made out a prima facie case of discrimination. As a 
black man, Hicks was a member of a protected class, he performed 
his job satisfactorily until 1984, was fired, and was replaced by a 
white man. This, the district court held, was all Hicks needed to 
show to make out the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine prima facie 
case.34 
Once the court found that Hicks had made out a prima facie 
case of race discrimination, the next question was whether St. 
Mary's had satisfied its burden of articulating, through evidence, a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for firing Hicks. St. Mary's 
witnesses testified that Hicks's on-the-job misconduct caused his 
discipline and ultimate termination. The district court held that this 
testimony fulfilled St. Mary's production burden under McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine. 35 
Moving on to the "pretext" phase of the case, the first question 
for the district court was whether it believed St. Mary's explanation. 
It did not. The district court, agreeing with Hicks, found that 
33. I note that fact because, as we shall see, the Court's decision in United States Postal 
Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983), casts doubt on the appropriateness of 
using McPonne~ Douglas-Burdine as a method for organizing the facts after trial. See infra 
text accompanying notes 132-136; see also infra note 238. 
34. The facts of Hicks help to demonstrate that the standard McDonnell Douglas-Bur-
dine prima facie case does not go very far on its own to create an inference of intentional 
discrimination. The district court held without comment that Hicks had performed satisfac-
torily until 1984. But there was a serious question in the case as to the sufficiency of the 
standards against which Hicks was being judged prior to 1984. In 1983, the state correctional 
agency did an undercover investigation of conditions and procedures at St Mary's, and found 
them sorely inadequate. Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at 1246. The results of the study led to the 
major personnel changes that are part of the setting for Hicks's discharge. Then again, Hicks 
argued, as we shall see, that the study was itself racially motivated, and that the personnel 
changes it prompted showed a pattern of race discrimination. 756 F. Supp. at 1252. As often 
happens in Title VII cases, see infra Part II, the question whether Hicks had met the require-
ments of his job prior to 1984 was answered in an overly simplistic way during the prima-
facie-case stage, and much of the evidence that was in fact relevant to that determination was 
left to the later stages of the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine analysis. 
35. 756 F. Supp. at 1750. 
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"[a]lthough plaintiff committed. several violations of institutional 
rules, plaintiff was treated much more harshly than his coworkers 
who committed equally severe or more severe violations. "36 Thus, 
the district court held, Hicks had "carried his burden in proving that 
the reasons given for his demotion and termination were pretex-
tual"37 - in other words, Hicks convinced the court that his rule 
infractions were not in fact the reason for his discharge. 
But Hicks's demonstration that St. Mary's proffered reason was 
pretextual did not end the district court's inquiry. Implicitly re-
jecting the "judgment for plaintiff required" position, the court 
went on to evaluate all the evidence to decide whether discrimina-
tion was in fact the reason for Hicks's discharge. There were two 
major threads in the district court's analysis of the evidence: con-
sideration of "personal animosity" as a possible alternative motive, 
and review of plaintiff's additional evidence of discrimination. 
It was clear to the district court that Hicks's supervisor was on a 
"crusade" to terminate Hicks, but the racial basis for the crusade 
was less clear. The evidence raised an alternative possibility that 
the crusade may have been motivated by personal animosity rather 
than by discrimination. The defendants never pressed the view that 
Powell fired Hicks because of "personal motivation" or "personal 
animosity." Instead, the theme entered the case by inference from 
disputed facts.38 That fact did not deter the district court from con-
36. Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at 1251. St. Mary's claimed to have a policy that officers would be 
punished for the infractions of their subordinates, but the district court agreed with Hicks 
that this policy was applied solely to Hicks. St. Mary's demoted Hicks for his subordinate's 
failure to log a fellow staff member's use of a vehicle, but other officers either were not 
punished or merely were reprimanded for far more serious offenses - for example, negli-
gently permitting an inmate to escape. 
37. 756 F. Supp. at 1251. 
38. Hicks's final infraction was making threats to his supervisor Powell during a confron-
tation that, the district court found, Powell manufactured in order to provoke Hicks to act 
irrationally. 756 F. Supp. at 1251. After that confrontation, Hicks was called into a meeting 
and told that he was being demoted. Hicks asked for and was granted the rest of the day off. 
Instead of allowing him to leave, Powell followed him to the locker room, insisted that he had 
not in fact been given the day off, started an argument, and demanded that Hicks open his 
locker and return his shift commander manual to Powell. Hicks testified on direct examina-
tion that Powell admitted at the time that he had followed Hicks to the locker room in order 
to provoke a physical fight. Respondent's Brief, Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2742 (No. 92-602}, avail-
able on LEXIS, (Genfed library, briefs file}. The district court was prepared to infer from 
Powell's behavior that it was personal animosity against Hicks that caused Powell to pursue 
Hicks to the locker room, with the hope that Hicks would misbehave and get himself fired. 
There were contrary facts in the trial record, because Powell himself, during his testimony, 
denied that there were personal difficulties between himself and Hicks. Id., LEXIS page 130 
(citing Joint Appendix at 46): "I can't say that there was difficulties between he and I. At no 
time was there any kind of personal ...• " But Powell also denied that he had instigated the 
final confrontation with Hicks, id., and the district court did not believe him. In light of 
Powell's lack of credibility on the latter score, the district court was not persuaded by Pow-
ell's denial of any personal animosity toward Hicks. 
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eluding that "[i]n essence, although plaintiff has proven the exist-
ence of a crusade to terminate him, he has not proven that the 
crusade was racially rather than personally motivated."39 
Hicks went beyond the "combined evidence" by introducing ev-
idence to demonstrate that his discharge was part of a long-term 
campaign to alter the racial balance of the staff at St. Mary's. He 
alleged that this campaign began in 1981 with a study that con-
cluded that St. Mary's had too many black managers and that it 
ended with racially based firings, including his own, in 1984.40 In 
addition, Hicks pointed to differential disciplinary treatment he re-
ceived in comparison to similarly situated white employees. The 
district court was unpersuaded.41 
Having rejected plaintiff's additional proof of discrimination, 
and having concluded that the facts might well support the infer-
ence that personal animosity rather than race discrimination was 
the reason for Hicks's termination, the district court entered judg-
ment for St. Mary's. 
B. Hicks on Appeal 
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit embraced the "judgment for 
plaintiff required'' position. In so doing, the court held that because 
the "combined evidence" mandated judgment for Hicks, it was le-
39. 756 F. Supp. at 1252 (emphasis added}. The question whether the district court 
"found" that the crusade was in fact personally motivated - as opposed to using the possi-
bility of personal animosity on these facts to further underscore the conclusion that Hicks 
had failed to prove that discrimination was the real motive - became an important question 
in later stages of the litigation. See infra note 42 and text accompanying notes 145-47. 
40. In 1980 and 1981, the state performed a study of minimum-security prisons, and one 
of its conclusions was that the racial composition of St. Mary's managemept - a white super-
intendent with a program staff that was 64.64% black - created the potential for racial 
subversion of the superintendent's authority. Respondent's Brief, Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2742, 
available on LEXIS (Genfed library, briefs file}, LEXIS p. 128, citing Joint Appendix at 85. 
There was evidence that copies of the study were circulated to superintendents. Id. The state 
investigated St. Mary's again in 1983, and the trial record contained testimony that the 1983 
investigation was triggered by the complaints of St. Mary's employees, including those of two 
white correctional officers who complained that they were being denied the opportunity for 
promotion because "blacks were in the way." Id. In the aftermath of the 1983 investigation, 
St. Mary's saw major personnel changes in January of 1984. Four black supervisors were 
removed and replaced by whites; of the thirteen other employees terminated in 1984, twelve 
were black. Hicks claimed that the supervisors who made the personnel changes in 1984 
knew about the 1981 report's warning that the racial composition of the St. Mary's staff 
carried with it the threat of racial subversion. He argued that the pattern of personnel 
changes in 1984 - including his own discharge in June of 1984 - reflected a commitment to 
changing the racial balance at St. Mary's by firing blacks and hiring whites. 
41. The court concluded that the supervisors involved in Hicks's discharge were unaware 
of the 1980-81 report, that the 1984 discharges did not change the racial balance at St. 
Mary's, and that Hicks was disciplined more harshly than some of his black subordinates, 
casting doubt on whether race motivated the differential discipline. 756 F. Supp. at 1252. 
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gaily erroneous for the district court both to evaluate the sufficiency 
of Hicks's additional discrimination evidence and to entertain the 
possibility that personal animosity was the motive behind Hicks's 
discharge. Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit took issue with the dis-
trict court's approach to the record on the issue of personal animos-
ity, on both factual and legal grounds. The Eighth Circuit 
interpreted the district court's decision as containing a finding that 
"personal motivation" was the cause of the discharge,42 and stated 
that the record was "without evidence to support the assump-
tion. "43 In addition, the circuit court held that the defendants were 
not legally entitled to have the factfinder consider personal animos-
ity as an alternative theory because "defendants simply never stated 
that personal motivation was a reason for their actions or offered 
evidence to substantiate such a claim."44 According to the Eighth 
Circuit, the only theories the district court is permitted to consider 
are those "dearly set forth [by the defendants], through the intro-
duction of admissible evidence [as a reason] for the plaintiff's rejec-
tion."45 In other words, if a theory has not properly been put 
forward by the defendant at the rebuttal stage of the case, the the-
ory is not relevant to the case, even if there is evidence of record to 
support it.46 
C. Hicks in the Supreme Court 
When Hicks reached the Supreme Court, the case produced two 
emphatic - and at times caustic - opinions: Justice Scalia's for 
the majority, and Justice Souter's for the dissent.47 The majority 
42. The district court's opinioµ need not be so read. It seems far more likely that the 
district court thought that personal animosity was an alternative explanation consistent with 
the evidence, the existence of which weakened the inference of intentional discrimination 
that would otherwise arise from the proven facts. 
43. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 492 (8th Cir. 1992). 
44. 970 F.2d at 492 (quoting Texas Dept. of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 
(1981)). 
45. 970 F.2d at 492 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255). 
46. That was not St. Mary's only problem. The Eighth Circuit also cast doubt on whether 
"personal animosity" could ever count as a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory" reason for firing 
an employee under McDonnell Douglas-Burdine. The court questioned whether "a ••• rea-
son based on personal motivation even could be stated and still be 'legitimate' and 'nondis-
criminatory.'" 970 F.2d at 492. But see Purkett v. Elem, 115 S. Ct. 1769 (1995), discussed 
infra at text accompanying notes 238-41. 
47. For example, the majority began its critique of the dissent by "noting the utter im· 
plausibility that we would ever have held what the dissent says we held [in McDonnell Doug-
las-Burdine]," Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2750, and insisted that "[o]nly one unfamiliar with our 
case-law will be upset by the dissent's alarm that we are today setting aside 'settled prece· 
dent.' " 113 S. Ct. at 2750. The dissent in tum accused the majority of "destroy[ing] a frame-
work carefully crafted in precedents as old as 20 years" in order to help "employers who are 
too ashamed to be honest in court." 113 S. Ct. at 2766. 
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rejected the "judgment for plaintiff required" position.48 The dis-
sent strongly disagreed. The major arguments between the two 
opinions centered on the weight of the evidence, precedent, neces-
sity, and economy.49 The majority was correct, on all fronts. 
1. Weight of the Evidence 
The strongest support for the "judgment for the plaintiff re-
quired" position would be to demonstrate that the "combined evi-
dence" (proof of the prima facie case and disproof of the 
employer's stated justification), standing alone, is invariably suffi-
cient as an evidentiary matter to create an inference of discrimina-
tion that is strong enough as an evidentiary matter to withstand the 
contrary claims of all other possible evidence in the case. The dis-
sent took the position that each element of the "combined evi-
dence" standing alone points strongly to the occurrence of 
discrimination, and that therefore the combination of the two ele-
ments is sufficient proof of discrimination to mandate judgment for 
the plaintiff, even in the face of contrary evidence. For the major-
ity, neither element standing alone supports a strong inference of 
discrimination, and together they are, at most, sufficient merely to 
permit judgment for the plaintiff.so 
a. The Evidentiary Value of the Proven Prima Facie Case. 
The evidentiary value of the proven prima facie case must be ana-
48. The Court also created considerable ambiguity as to which alternative position it in-
tended to embrace. For a discussion of this issue, see infra text accompanying notes 248 to 
264. 
49. Another argument against the Court's decision in Hicks is the argument from moral-
ity. Thus, to the dissent, the Court rewards employers who "have given false evidence in a 
.court of law," Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2763, "favor[s] these employers by exempting them from 
responsibility for lies," 113 S. Ct. at 2763, and creates an incentive for employers to lie, 113 S. 
Ct. at 2764. These arguments overplay the ''morality" card. "Employers" are often corpo-
rate entities, and as a result face serious evidentiary problems in proving their "intent." Fur-
thermore, the incentive to commit perjury is well checked by the significant risk of getting 
caught in a "lie" on the witness stand. Even if the lie does not guarantee the plaintiff judg-
ment as a matter of law, it does place the employer at the mercy of a factfinder, who is 
permitted to - and likely to - rule against the employer on other credibility-related issues 
- including the ultimate issue of intentional discrimination. See 3 EowARD J. DEVITT ET 
AL, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 73.04 (4th ed. 1987); JOHN J. Ross, THE 
EMPLOYMENT LAW YEAR IN REvraw (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Se-
ries No. H4-5163, 1993), available on WESTLAW, PLI database, No. 475 PLI/Lit. 7, at *46-47 
("Rarely can it be envisioned that a jury, as fact-finder, will hold for a lying defendant-em-
ployer, except in that exceptional case where it is established at trial that the pretextual rea-
son is a cover-up for say an embarrassing one, rather than a discriminatory one."). 
50. It is not clear whether the Court in Hicks intended to signal that the "combined evi-
dence" is always sufficient as a matter of law to support a pro-plaintiff verdict (and therefore 
to defeat a defense motion for summary judgment). See infra text accompanying notes 248-
64. 
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lyzed in light of the acknowledged legal consequence to the em-
ployer of silence in the face of the proven prinia facie case: namely, 
a pro-plaintiff directed verdict. There is intuitive appeal to the ar-
gument that if the proven prima facie case can support a judgment 
for the plaintiff, such a case must be worthy of doing so as an evi-
dentiary matter. But it is equally important to recognize that there 
might be reasons other than the evidentiary weight of the proven 
prima facie case that would justify directing a verdict against the 
silent employer. The Hicks majority claims that "the McDonnell 
Douglas presumption is a procedural device, designed only to estab-
lish an order of proof and production,"51 a procedural device that 
need not be - and, in this case, is not - justified by the weight of 
the evidence. The Hicks dissent, in contrast, argues that the prima 
facie case carries sufficient evidentiary weight to support a finding 
for the plaintiff. The majority's view of the prima facie case is by 
far the more accurate, and it is largely for this reason that the ma-
jority is correct in Hicks. 
Whatever the initial appeal of the notion that the proven prima 
facie case is sufficient as an evidentiary matter to support a directed 
verdict for the plaintiff, the appeal is not long-lasting. The minimal 
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine prima facie case does no more than 
identify the plaintiff's case as one in which discrimination might 
conceivably have been operating.52 An analysis of the cases in the 
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine line - including review of the 
Court's internal debates as reflected in the papers of Justice 
Thurgood Marshall53 - reveals that the Court has consistently at-
51. 113 s. a. at 2755. 
52. See supra note 17. 
53. Justice Marshall's papers are available at the Library of Congress, James Madison 
Building, Manuscript Reading Room. The Marshall Papers have not yet been used to ana-
lyze McDonnell Douglas-Burdine. For other examples of scholarly use of the Marshall Pa-
pers, see, e.g., JoHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JusnCE LEWIS F. PoWELI., JR. (1994); David C. Baldus 
et al., Reflections on the "Inevitability" of Racial Discrimination in Capital Sentencing and the 
"Impossibility" of its Prevention, Detection, and Correction, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 359, 
371 n.46 (1994); Samuel Jssacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review 
of Political Fairness, 71 TEXAS L. REv. 1643, 1646 n.18 (1993); Mark Tushnet, Why the 
Supreme Court Overruled National League of Cities, 47 V AND. L. REv. 1623, 1631 nn.60-61 
(1994). Appellate opinions often reflect "incompletely theorized agreements" among judges 
who are able to converge on outcomes without reaching full agreement on the reasons for, or 
scope of, their judgments. Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. 
L. REv. 1733 (1995). The rhetoric of opinion writing, in contrast, often feigns certainty in the 
face of doubt. The availability of the Marshall Papers makes it possible for scholars to go 
behind a Court opinion by identifying both the disagreements that members of the Court 
discussed with each other and the specific opinion language that was intended to address 
them. In the specific case of McDonnell Douglas-Burdine, the Marshall Papers underscore 
the spirit of intellectual seriousness with which members of the Court approached the issues, 
for all that their efforts often failed to resolve them. Cf. John N. Jacob, The Lewis F. Powell, 
Jr. Archives and the Contemporary Researcher, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 3, 5 (1992) (the 
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tempted to sidestep the problem of the evidentiary weakness of the 
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine prima facie case. The problem re-
mains, however, and the prima facie case's evidentiary weakness 
undermines any attempt to draw a strong inference of discrimina-
tion from the proven prima facie case as a matter of law. 
i. Problem Dodging, Step One: "Flexibility" in McDonnell 
Douglas. The plaintiff in McDonnell Douglas challenged an em-
ployer's failure to hire - or, more accurately, to re-hire - him 
after he had been fired for interfering with his employer's business 
and property in connection with a civil-rights protest. The Court 
held - in general terms - that "[t]he complainant in a Title VII 
trial must carry the initial burden ... of establishing a prima facie 
case of racial discrimination," which "may be done by showing" 
four enumerated elements.54 But in setting out the elements of the 
prima facie case, the Court immediately made clear that despite the 
appearance that it had just set out a general rule, it had not done so. 
The Court, instead, observed: "The facts necessarily will vary in 
Title VII cases, and the specification . . . of the prima facie proof 
required from [the plaintiff] is not necessarily applicable in every 
respect to differing factual situations."55 
The Court did not, however, attempt to give any meanip.gful gui-
dance as to how the specification of the required prima facie proof 
would be determined for cases with other facts - or even any gui-
dance about what it meant for the "facts" to vary. Was the proof 
requirement set out in McDonnell Douglas to apply to all failure-
to-hire cases, with other standards to apply to cases involving dis-
charges, promotions, and so on? Or could the required proof be 
made to vary within categories of cases as well?56 The Court in 
McDonnell Douglas did not answer these questions. As a result, 
McDonnell Douglas created a "prima facie case" with a fixed legal 
author, the archivist of the Powell Papers, observes: "Let us not make the mistake of trying 
to defend Justice Powell by keeping too tight a hold on his papers."). 
54. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The elements the 
Court specified were: 
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for 
which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was 
rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer 
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications. 
411 U.S. at 802. 
55. 411 U.S. at 802 n.13. 
56. For example, it might be that the plaintiff in a failure-to-hire case would not always 
have to demonstrate that the employer continued to try to fill the position, or the plaintiff 
might in some cases be required also to show that the job was filled by an applicant outside 
the plaintiff's protected group. 
2246 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 93:2229 
consequence in litigation, but the actual strength of the inferences 
that can be drawn from the prim.a facie case vary depending on the 
strength of the evidence that supports it.57 
ii. Problem Dodging, Step Two: The Stealth Evidentiary Re-
quirement in Burdine. The Court undertook to restate the McDon-
nell Douglas prim.a facie case standard in Burdine, a sex 
discrimination case brought by a woman who challenged her em-
ployer's failure to promote her. The lack of clarity that McDonnell 
Douglas left in its wake as to the content and evidentiary weight of 
the prim.a facie case emerged in the Court's internal deliberations in 
Burdine. For our purposes, what is most significant is an in-
terchange between Justice Powell, who wrote for Court in both Mc-
Donnell Douglas and Burdine, and Justice Stevens. Their exchange 
led to an alteration in the Court's final Burdine opinion that further 
increased the ambiguity as to the intended content and evidentiary 
weight of the prim.a facie case. 
In Justice Powell's original draft opinion, the discussion of the 
prim.a facie case.was as follows: 
The burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is 
not onerous. In the instant case, respondent had only to show that 
she was a qualified woman who sought an available position, but was 
rejected in favor of a man. The prima facie case serves an important 
57. Nor did the Court make clear in McDonnell Douglas what the consequence would be 
if the employer remained silent in the face of a proven prima facie case. The United States' 
brief as amicus curiae in McDonnell Douglas did not seek a structure under which the plain-
tiff would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the employer remained silent: 
If such a plaintiff [makes out a prima facie case], it is then appropriate to look to the 
employer to come forward with an explanation for its rejection of the qualified minority 
applicant, since whether the defendant had a nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting the 
applicant would ordinarily be a matter within its own, and not the applicant's, peculiar 
knowledge. If the employer then fails to come forward with a non·discriminatory reason 
for rejecting the applicant, that fact, together with the showing made by the applicant, 
would, in our view, constitute an adequate basis to permit, although not to compel, the 
trier of fact to draw an inference of discrimination. 
Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 11, McDonnell Douglas, No. 72-
490. 
It appears from the transcript of the oral argument in Hicks that Justice Scalia would have 
preferred that approach: 
JUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. Gardner [counsel for the employer], what is the effect of the 
prima facie case? I mean, maybe we could avoid the dilemma that the other side says 
exists if the effect of the prima facie case is not to entitle the employee to judgment if 
there's no response from the employer, no other reason given, but rather just to entitle 
the employee to get to the factfinder. In other words it survives your motion to dismiss 
••• which means the factfinder may find in favor of the employee, but perhaps the prima 
facie case does not mean that the factfinder must find in favor of the employee. MR. 
GARDNER: That's interesting, Your Honor. I don't believe that has been the position 
of the Court, however. JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, I understand that, but we wouldn't be 
faced with this dilemma, would we? 
Oral Argument in Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Center, available on WESTLAW, SCT-oralarg 
database at *12-13. 
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function in the litigation: it eliminates the most common nondiscrimi-
natory reasons for the plaintiff's rejection. [T]he prima facie case 
'raises an inference of discrimination only because we presume these 
acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the 
consideration of impermissible factors.' Establishment of the prima 
facie case in effect creates a presumption that the employer unlaw-
fully discriminated against the employee.58 
In a memorandum to Justice Powell dated January 19, 1981, Justice 
Stevens expressed broad, fundamental concerns about Powell's in-
terpretation of the prim.a facie case. 
Do you intend to lessen the plaintiff's burden of making a prima facie 
case? As I had understood McDon[n]ell Douglas, it required evi-
dence on behalf of the plaintiff that gave rise to an inference that an 
employment decision had been made for a discriminatory reason. 
The second full sentence [in the above-quoted passage], however, im-
plies that every time two qualified applicants for a vacancy are of a 
different race or sex, the one who does not get the job automatically 
has a prima facie case. It would seem to me that there might be two 
qualified applicants who sought employment at the same time and the 
employer simply took one rather than the other. In that situation, I 
would not think a prima facie case would have been made out be-
cause there would be no basis for an inference that the gender of the 
applicant had anything to do with the employment decision. In the 
McDon[n]ell Douglas hypothesis, on the contrary, the fact that a 
qualified applicant was rejected and thereafter the employer contin-
ued to interview other persons and ultimately hired one of the oppo-
site sex would give rise to such an inference. In other words, I think 
an element of the plaintiff's prima facie case is some fact giving rise to 
an inference that the employment decision was not made on neutral 
criteria.s9 
Clearly, Justice Stevens was not prepared to allow the prim.a facie 
case to carry the legal weight accorded to it in the McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine proof structure unless, as an evidentiary matter, 
the elements of the prim.a facie case did in fact give rise to an infer-
ence of discrimination. Justice Stevens was convinced that the min-
imal prim.a facie case described in Burdine would not satisfy this 
evidentiary requirement. 
After Justice Powell circulated a second draft of what had al-
ready become a majority opinion6o without responding to the 
58. Justice Powell, Draft Opinion 5 (Burdine) (Jan. 14, 1981) (citations omitted), in 
Thurgood Marshall Papers, Library of Congress, box 274, file 2 [hereinafter Burdine Case 
File]. 
59. Memorandum from Justice Stevens to Justice Powell (Jan. 19, 1981), in Burdine Case 
File, supra note 58. All memoranda discussed herein bear the notation "Copies to the Con-
ference" - meaning that copies were sent to all of the Justices. 
60. Justices White, Rehnquist, Stewart, and Blackrnun had already joined Justice Powell's 
opinion by the time the second draft was circulated. See Memoranda from Justices White 
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above-quoted p~ssage 4J. Justice Stevens's memorandum,61 Justice 
Stevens wrote Justice Powell another letter raising the same con-
cerns in slightly different form: 
[T]he facts (1) that an applicant is qualified and (2) that a person of 
the opposite sex was hired, do not in my judgment give rise to an 
inference of discrimination. 1\vo years ago I rejected a qualified male 
applicant and hired a female as a law clerk; this year I rejected two 
qualified females and hired two qualified males. I do not believe that 
those facts as applied to either year viewed separately were sufficient 
to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, yet under your opin-
ion they are sufficient.62 
Justice Stevens argued that taking a single hiring decision out of the 
context of the employer's pattern of hiring creates an inference of 
discrimination only through a distortion of the facts. The fact that 
the employer would have the opportunity to rebut the plaintiff's 
inference of discrimination by raising the other evidence as part of 
its own rebuttal case was not sufficient to quiet Justice Stevens's 
concerns. Justice Stevens did not want the employer to bear the 
burden of rebutting a prima facie case that did not create an infer-
ence of discrimination on its own merits. 
Justice Powell responded to Justice Stevens's second letter by 
making changes in his opinion draft. Justice Powell changed the 
critical second sentence of the earlier version, adding the italicized 
language: "The plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that she applied for an available position for which she was 
qualified, but w~s rejected under circumstances which give rise to an 
inference of discrimination. "63 Justice Powell also added a footnote, 
quoting the key language from McDonnell Douglas, reiterating that 
the McDonnell Douglas standard "is not inflexible," and explaining 
that in the instant case "the position was left open for several 
months before [the plaintiff] finally was rejected in favor of a male 
(Jan. 15, 1981), Rehnquist (Jan. 15, 1981), Stewart (Jan. 15, 1981), and Blackmun (Jan. 19, 
1981), in Burdine Case File, supra note 58. This means that Justice Powell already had a 
majority by the time he circulated his second draft. 
61. Justice Powell, Draft Opinion (Jan, 22, 1981), in Burdine Case File, supra note 58. 
The second circulated draft did contain a change that was responsive to a separate concern 
raised by Justice Stevens. The new version clarified that for the plaintiff to make out a prima 
facie case, she had to "persuade the court" of the existence of the elements of the prima facie 
case "by evidence" - thereby resolving whatever ambiguity would have been caused by 
saying that the plaintiff merely need "show" a prima facie case. See id. at 5. 
62. Memorandum from Justice Stevens to Justice Powell (Jan. 22, 1981), in Burdine Case 
Ftle, supra note 58. 
63. Justice Powell, Draft Opinion 5 (Feb. 5, 1981) (emphasis added), in Burdine Case File, 
supra note 58. 
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who had been under her supervision. "64 Both changes appear in 
Justice Powell's unanimous published opinion for the Court.65 
These changes accomplish nothing if they were meant to guide 
courts as to the necessary content of the prima facie case. How are 
the lower courts to determine whether a case presents "circum-
stances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination"? 
Are courts to infer that those circumstances would not have been 
present in Burdine if the position had not been left open for several 
months? Even on slight factual variations from Burdine, the opin-
ion gives no guidance; a fortiori, it gives no assistance to courts de-
ciding cases raising widely divergent facts. Thus, if Justice Stevens 
joined the final opinion with the expectation that as modified it cre-
ated a reliably strict prima facie case standard, he joined in error. 
iii. Problem Dodging, Step Three: The Issue Never Decided in 
Aikens. The Court's next opportunity to give operational signifi-
cance to the requirement that a prima facie case "give rise to an 
inference of unlawful discrimination" came in United States Postal 
Service Board of Governors v. Aikens. 66 Aikerzs. presented the 
question of whether a black candidate for internal promotion to an 
upper management position stated a prima facie case merely by 
proving that he was minimally qualified for the position and that a 
white candidate was promoted instead of him. Thtough the process 
of trying to reach a decision, it became clear to a majority of the 
Court that the minimal prima facie case was insufficient to support 
an inference of intentional discrimination on the facts. Instead of 
addressing this problem, however, the Court sidestepped the issue. 
Because no single rationale for the position that the prima facie 
case was insufficient emerged, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the 
Court, abandoned any attempt to discuss the adequacy of the prima 
facie case, and resolved Aikens on an alternate ground that left the 
central question unanswered. 
In a sense, the facts of Aikens presented the Court with Justice 
Stevens's law clerk hypothetical. In a series of instances, the Postal 
Service announced a vacancy in an upper-level position and a 
number of minimally qualified individuals within the Postal Service 
asked to be promoted to the vacant position. In eaqh instance, the 
64. Id. at 5 n.6. 
65. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 253-54 n.6. For the Court's achievement of unanimity, see 
Memoranda by Justice Brennan (Feb. 10, 1981), Justice Stevens (Feb. 11, 1981), Chief Justice 
Burger (Feb. 20, 1981), and Justice Marshall (Feb. 27, 1981), in Burdine Case Fiie, supra note s . 
66. 460 U.S. 711 (1983). 
2250 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 93:2229 
plaintiff, a black male, was denied the position. In its petition for 
certiorari, the United States, appearing as a party, took the position 
that the minimal Burdine prim.a facie case is not sufficient in 
promotion cases to show that Aikens " 'was rejected under circum-
stances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimina-
tion.' "67 The United States argued that "[i]n the promotion 
context, where many applicants may be minimally qualified for a 
single vacancy," the fact that an employee is able to "show[] only 
that he belongs to a minority group and was not selected for a posi-
tion for which he met the minimum qualifications" is not sufficient 
to warrant a presumption of discrimination. 68 Something more is 
required - although the United States was quite unclear as to what 
that "something more" must be.69 
By the time the United States filed its brief on the merits, it 
recognized that its argument against the minimal prim.a facie case 
could not be confined to promotion cases. In its merits brief, the 
United States argued that the minimal prim.a facie case was in-
adequate in any case in which an employer makes an employment ' 
decision "by selecting from a heterogeneous group of qualified ap-
plicants" - which can occur in both hiring and promotion cases.10 
The United States' brief was not the only condemnation of Bur-
dine in front of the Court, nor was it the most sweeping. The AFL-
CIO, as amicus curiae, argued that the minimal Burdine prim.a facie 
case could not support an inference of intentional discrimination 
even in the relatively straightforward case of entry-level industrial 
employment because even there selection criteria are not generally 
"rigid and mechanical."71 The AFL-CIO took the position, in es-
sence, that any effort to retain McDonnell Douglas-Burdine for 
seemingly routine cases would fail because employment decision-
67. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 6, Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983) (No. 81-1044) (quot-
ing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253). 
68. Id. at 7. 
69. In the text of its petition for certiorari, the United States stated that "[s]uch a pre-
sumption can be created only if the employee shows that his qualifications are at least equal 
to those of the person selected or if he adduces other proof (which, of course, may be avail-
able through discovery) that suggests discrimination." Id. As to the first, however, the 
United States immediately takes it back in a footnote: since under Burdine the employer is 
not required to hire the most qualified candidate, "a showing that the complainant and the 
person selected were equally qualified arguably would not in itself create a presumption of a 
violation." Id. at 7 & n.5. This means that the prima facie case would require an undefined 
quantum of "other proof," and could likely not be made out without "discovery" - meaning 
that any pretense that the function of the prima facie case is to allow the plaintiff to plead 
facts available to him prior to discovery is destroyed. 
70. Petitioner's Brief at 9, Aikens, 460 U.S. at 711 (No. 81-1044). 
71. Brief of the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae at 11, Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983) (No. 81-
1044). 
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making is intrinsically nonroutine. Hence, the AFL-CIO argued 
that "the cause of reliable factfinding would be best served were the 
Court to remove all mediating constructs from the factual analysis 
in disparate treatment cases and simply to mandate a straightfor-
ward inquiry into the question of discriminatory intent, based on all 
relevant evidence in whatever form it may come. "72 
In his initial opinion draft in Aikens, Justice Rehnquist 
presented his own definition of the class of cases at issue: he as-
serted that the question before the Court was "the assessment of 
proof of racial discrimination when an employer has selected 
among applicants for a higher managerial position."73 As to that 
class of cases, his draft opinion followed the advice of the AFL-
CIO, eliminating the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine proof structure 
from the litigation. In a case like Aikens, he wrote, the minimal 
prima facie case is not sufficient to create a presumption of discrimi-
nation, because "we simply do not think that Aikens' showing that 
he is black, that he was sufficiently qualified to be seriously consid-
ered, and that he was not chosen, 'eliminates the most common 
non-discriminatory reasons' for his rejection."74 Furthermore, the 
draft stated, in such a case "no standardized prima facie case can be 
made out,"75 in large part because "there may be no totally objec-
tive measure of who is 'qualified.'" In such a case, "[t]he District 
Court should decide ... in the same manner as it decides questions 
of fact in the myriad other kinds of litigation before it[,]" by 
"evaluat[ing] all the admissible evidence and then decid[ing] the 
factual question of discrimination."76 The McDonnell Douglas-
Burdine proof structure was simply "[n]ever meant to apply to a 
situation so far removed from [the] factual context" in which the 
structure arose. 
Justice Rehnquist circulated his draft opinion on December 9. 
By December 28, Justices Stevens and White and Chief Justice Bur-
ger joined it. That left Justice Rehnquist one vote short of a major-
ity. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun dissented from the 
start. The only two possible votes to form a majority were those of 
Justice Powell, the author of McDonnell Douglas and Burdine, and 
Justice O'Connor. On January 3, Justice Powell announced that 
72. Id. at 2. 
73. Justice Rehnquist, Draft Opinion 1 (Aikens) (Dec. 9, 1982), in Thurgood Marshall 
Papers, Library of Congress, box 317, file 5 [hereinafter Aikens Case Ftle]. 
74. Id. at 8 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254). 
75. Id. at 9. 
76. Id. at 7, 9. 
2252 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 93:2229 
"we can't be together" - that he would need to write separately -
and, the next day, Justice O'Connor informed Justice Rehnquist 
that she would await Justice Powell's opinion. 
On January 11, Justice Marshall circulated a dissent arguing -
as had the AFL-CIO, but with different consequence - that there 
is no coherent way to distinguish between "managerial" and 
"nonmanagerial" positions,11 for "employers commonly rely on 
subjective considerations in making employment decisions outside 
the 'higher managerial' context."78 Justice Marshall viewed the 
minimal prima facie case as sufficient in all such cases, and ex-
plained that the employer could defend any "subjective" elements 
on rebuttal. By January 13, Justices Brennan and Blackmun joined 
this dissenting opinion. 
Justice Powell circulated his opinion concurring in the judgment 
on February 17. He agreed with Justice Rehnquist that the minimal 
prima facie case set forth in McDonnell Douglas "is insufficient to 
raise an inference of discrimination where a single executive posi-
tion is to be filled from a pool of qualified applicants."79 But Jus-
tice Powell, unlike Justice Rehnquist, felt that this fact alone did not 
make the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework irrelevant to 
cases involving executive or managerial hiring. Instead, Justice 
Powell argued that under McDonnell Douglas and Burdine, "the 
proof necessary to establish a prima facie case will vary ... depend-
ing on the particular facts and circumstances of each case," and that 
the particular factors mentioned in McDonnell Douglas exist 
merely to "provide a rough guide to the type of evidence that a 
plaintiff must introduce."80 Several days later, Justice O'Connor 
circulated her own separate concurrence in which she also joined 
Justice Powell's opinion. 
At the end of this round of opinion drafting, there were six 
votes in favor of the proposition that the minimal prima facie case 
described in McDonnell Douglas is inadequate in a category of 
cases vaguely definable as involving "managerial" or "executive" 
positions. Four Justices wanted to abandon the McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine proof structure for those cases, and two wanted to 
retain the structure but strengthen the required prima facie show-
77. Justice Marshall, Draft Opinion 1 (dissenting) (Jan. 11, 1983), in Aikens Case File, 
supra note 73. 
78. Id. at 5. 
79. Justice Powell, Draft Opinion 5 (concurring in the judgment) (Feb. 17, 1983), in Aik-
ens Case File, supra note 73. 
80. Id. at 6. 
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ing. Having failed to obtain a majority for a single approach, Jus-
tice Rehnquist circulated an "alternate draft" on March 13, which 
declared it unnecessary to answer the question upon which certio-
rari had been granted - the adequacy of the plaintiff's prima facie 
showing - because the question was no longer relevant in light of 
the procedural posture of the case. The draft stressed the fact that 
once a McDonnell Douglas-Burdine case has proceeded through 
trial and the ultimate question of intentional discrimination is 
before the court, that question is to be decided "just as district 
courts decide disputed questions of fact in other civil litigation."81 
The draft also made clear that the burden-shifting scheme of Mc-
Donnell Douglas-Burdine was not relevant at all to the decision on 
the ultimate question of discrimination.82 
Justice Rehnquist's alternate draft eventually commanded a ma-
jorityB3 precisely because it avoided the problem of the eVidentiary 
weakness of the prima facie case. In Aikens, then, the Court had 
the opportunity to give meaning to Justice Powell's attempt to 
strengthen the prima facie standard in cases in which a minimal 
prima facie case does not sufficiently support the inference that in-
tentional discrimination is "more likely than not." That opportu-
nity was lost. 
The Court's eventual "alternate" resolution of the Aikens case 
further supports the correctness of the Hicks majority's view of the 
evidentiary value of the prima facie case. Aikens held that once a 
case has gone to trial and the employer has produced evidence to 
satisfy its rebuttal burden, the factfinder should not have the occa-
sion to determine whether or not the plaintiff has "proven" his 
prima facie case. It is difficult to say that courts should accord the 
"proven" prima facie case great evidentiary weight if it may not be 
a "proven" case at all. 
This review of the cases leading up to Hicks demonstrates that 
the plaintiff's prima facie case is not a "proven" case that invariably 
81. Justice Rehnquist, Draft Opinion (March 13, 1983) {labeled "1st Draft"), in Aikens 
Case File, published as 460 U.S. at 715-16. 
82. Id.; see Szteinbok, supra note 23, at 1119, which states: 
[S]ince McDonnell Douglas prescribed an analytical rather than a procedural frame-
work, the Court reasoned, its stages of proof must not be reified. The Aikens majority 
opinion clearly did not say what Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Brennan, appended 
in concurrence: The plaintiff's ultimate burden is carried if "he demonstrates that the 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason given by the employer is in fact not the true reason 
for the employment decision." 
Id. {footnotes omitted) (quoting Aikens, 460 U.S. at 718 {Blackmun, J., concurring)). 
83. Justice Blackmun wrote a separate concurrence that was joined by Brennan. Justice 
Marshall concurred in the result, without writing or joining an opinion. 460 U.S. at 716. 
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supports a directed verdict for the plaintiff as an evidentiary matter. 
The Court has never clearly articulated what a prima facie case 
must prove, and its deliberations reinforce the sense that the mini-
mal prima facie case is inadequate in many, if not most, cases. It is 
thus impossible to say that the proven prima facie case can bear the 
weight placed upon it by the "judgment for plaintiff required" 
position. 
b. The Evidentiary Value of the Employer's Disproven Justifica-
tion. The prima facie case is only one part of the evidence from 
which the Hicks dissenters sought to construct a mandatory pre-
sumption of discrimination. The other evidentiary element is the 
inference of discrimination that arises out of the factfinder's disbe-
lief of the employer's stated justification. To the dissent, the fact-
finder who disbelieves the employer's stated justification has a very 
strong basis for inferring discrimination from that fact alone. The 
dissent draws its argument on this point from Fumco Construction 
Corp. v. Waters, 84 which states that " 'common experience' tells us 
that it is 'more likely than not' that the employer who lies is simply 
trying to cover up the illegality alleged by the plaintiff."85 
The claim that "absent explanation, adverse treatment of statu-
torily protected groups is more likely than not the result of discrimi-
nation" is central to the debate over Hicks, and it has the character 
of an ideological litmus test. Take this statement by Professor 
Deborah Calloway as an example: 
Rejecting the basic assumption that unexplained adverse conduct to-
wards women and minorities is the result of discrimination denies the 
continued existence of discrimination itself. Denying the continued 
existence of discrimination is analogous to denying, in the 1950s, that 
the separate schools maintained for black children were unequal, or 
denying, today, that the Holocaust ever occurred.86 
The central problem with this rhetoric - and with any effort to rely 
heavily on the "basic assumption" it identifies - is that it is by no 
means certain that any particular unexplained adverse act toward a 
woman or a member of a minority group is the result of discrimina-
tion. The question is whether, in the face of uncertainty, the legal 
system should use a mandatory presumption instead of requiring 
individualized proof. My conclusion - one I reach with great dif:fi-
84. 438 U.S. 567 (1978). 
85. St Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2763 {1993) {Souter, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Fumco, 438 U.S. at 577). 
86. Calloway, supra note 28, at 1036. One might do well to pause a moment to catch 
one's breath after reading this passage - how swiftly it moves from rejection of an eviden-
tiary presumption to Holocaust denial! 
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culty - is that the uncertainty is sufficiently great to render the use 
of a mandatory presumption unwise. I reach it for four reasons. 
First, the "basic assumption" that discrimination is the cause of 
unexplained employment actions against women and members of 
minority groups is built in part upon the expectation that absent 
discrimination, employment decisions are - and can be proven to 
be - fair and reasonable. The argument for a finding of discrimi-
nation is akin to res ipsa loquitur: nothing bad happens in the 
workplace without a provable reason; discrimination is a possible 
reason; no alternative reason has been proven; therefore discrimi-
nation must be the answer. If the premise that "nothing bad hap-
pens in the workplace without a provable reason" is true, then the 
"basic assumption" rests on a strong foundation. But all of my in-
stincts as a practitioner and teacher of labor ~d employment law 
cause me to reject this premise. It is impossible to know the pro-
portion of adverse employment decisions that are in some sense 
"wrongful" (in that they are arbitrary or based on incorrect assess-
ments of the facts) or "undefendable" (in that the employer cannot 
demonstrate that its actions were correct). But we are not entirely 
without data. Data from three spheres - union-sector grievance 
arbitration, merit-system adjudications in public employment, and 
common law wrongful discharge cases - strongly suggest that 
wrongful, or at least undefendable, employer actions are significant 
problems in the American workplace, even outside of the setting of 
actionable discrimination.87 I cannot accept the "basic assumption" 
if it requires me to assume otherwise. 
In the union sector, collective bargaining agreements govern 
terms and conditions of employment, and employees are able to 
challenge a wide range of employer actions through the filing and 
arbitration of grievances.88 No data are available on the proportion 
'07. For debates as to whether the competitive market can be relied upon to control arbi-
trary discharges, see PAUL c. WEILER, GOVERNING nm WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LA-
BOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAw (1990); Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract At Wil~ 
51 U. CHI. L REv. 947 (1984); Sherwin Rosen, Commentary: In Defense of the Contract at 
Wil~ 51 U. CHI. L REv. 983 (1984); Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating 
Just Cause and Employment at Wil~ 92 MICH. L. REv. 8 (1993). 
88. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 17.5% of American workers over the 
age of 16 were "represented by unions" in 1994, meaning that they either were members of 
unions or were covered by collective bargaining agreements. Union representation in 1994 
was 19.4% for full time workers, 12% for private nonagricultural workers, and 44.7% for 
government workers. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYMENT 
AND EARNINGS (January 1995) tbls. 40 & 42. Of the employees represented by unions, 81 % 
are men; 48.5% are white men. Union representation as defined by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics is not a perfect measure of coverage under collective bargaining agreements, be-
cause employees are defined as union-represented if they are union members, even if they 
are not presently covered by a collective bargaining agreement. Id. Collective bargaining 
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of disputed employer decisions in the union sector that are wrong· 
ful or undefendable. Indeed, many grievances are resolved infor· 
mally, without any adjudication or confession of guilt on the part of 
the employer. Data are scarce even on the question of how fre· 
quently employer decisions are overturned through arbitration.s9 
But data published by the American Arbitration Association of a 
sample of over 29,000 arbitrations conducted between September 
1981 and May 1991 reveal that employees were at least partially 
successful in 49% of the cases.90 This is a substantial rate of em· 
ployee success, given the likelihood that the union and the em· 
ployer will reach an informal resolution of cases in which employer 
error is obvious.91 
Another source of information on the incidence of wrongful or 
undefendable employer conduct is civil service employment in the 
public sector.92 In the federal sector, where data are most readily 
available, the overwhelming majority of employees have some form 
of civil service protection against wrongful termination.93 The 
United States Merit Systems Protection Board, which has jurisdic· 
tion over civil service challenges, reports that employees prevailed 
at least in part in 25% of the cases adjudicated on the merits.94 
agreements almost universally contain "just cause" protection - protection against wrongful 
discharge - as well as a mechanism for grievance arbitration. See 2 Collective Bargaining 
Negot & Cont (BNA} 40:1 (1995) (92% of collective bargaining agreements in BNA's 400-
agreement sal}lple have "cause" or "just-cause" provisions); id. at 51:1 (all have grievance 
provisions); id. at 51:5 (99% have arbitration provisions). 
89. Neither the American Arbitration Association nor the Federal Mediation and Concil-
iation Service reports statistics on the success rates of employees in arbitrating grievances 
under collective bargaining agreements. 
90. A Look at Labor Arbitration Trends of the '80s, STUDY T™E, No. 3, 1991 at 1, 2. 
91. It is difficult to extrapolate from arbitration to litigation for a number of reasons, one 
of which is that arbitral law places the burden of proving just cause on the employer. But see 
Howard S. Block, Decisional Thinking: West Coast Panel Report, in Decisional Thinking of 
Arbitrators and Judges: Proceedings of the Thirty-Third Annual Meeting, National Academy 
of Arbitrators 33 l'Roc. NATL ACAD. ARB. 119, 139-40, 157-58 (1981} (explaining why and 
how arbitrators depart from strict "burden of proof" rules; quoting one arbitrator as saying 
that "[i]n my experience there can be few more dangerous or damaging concepts, in labor 
arbitration at least, than this business about the burden of proof"}. 
92. As of 1994, government workers comprise 16.8% of all nonagricultural workers. Bu. 
REAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 88, at 222-23. 
93. As of 1978, 93% of federal employees had civil service protection. S. REP. No. 969, 
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2723, 2724. 
94. 1994 U.S. MERIT SvSI"EMs l'RoTECilON Bo., ANN. REP., 26. When settlements are 
included, employees received relief in 62% percent of the cases that were not dismissed for 
jurisdictional reasons or because one of the parties withdrew from the case. Id. at 25-26. 
Public employers often complain that they are unable successfully to defend what they per-
ceive to be correct termination decisions, and that this deters them from terminating employ-
ees. See S. REP. No. 969, supra note 93, at 2725, 2731; U.S. FED. LAB. REL. AUTH. & U.S. 
MERIT Svs. l'RoTECilON Bo., THE Civn. SERVICE REFORM Ac:r OF 1978: TENTH ANNlvER-
August 1995] Disparate Treatment After Hicks 2257 
Some information is also available on the success rate of 
common law challenges to wrongful terminations. Although the 
employment-at-will doctrine provides that employers may fire their 
employees for any reason or no reason at all, the common law of 
many states has been interpreted to permit tort- and contract-based 
claims for a limited form of just-cause protection.9s A RAND Cor-
poration study of common law wrongful discharge cases in Califor-
nia revealed that approximately 68% of plaintiffs whose wrongful 
discharge claims reached a jury prevailed.96 
These data are far from perfect, but they serve to demonstrate 
the instability of the empirical foundation· underlying the "basic as-
sumption" that employment decisions are correct and defensible 
absent discrimination. 
The "basic assumption" that discrimination explains otherwise 
unexplained adverse employment decisions against members of 
protected groups is flawed in a second respect as well. The "basic 
assumption" is a unitary "credo," but discrimination is not a unitary 
phenomenon in American society. The likelihood of discrimination 
depends on a number of factors, including the protected group at 
issue,97 the sector of the economy, the type and size of employer, 
the degree to which the workplace is integrated, and the stage of 
the employment relationship.98 Some employers ignore their TI.tie 
SARY REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT, 62, 67-68, 85 (Elaine Goldberg ed., 1988). This suggests 
that employees are most likely to be discharged only if the records against them are ex-
tremely strong - in light of which the 25% employee success rate appears quite substantial. 
95. For helpful discussions, see authorities cited supra note 87. 
96. JAMES N. DERTOUZOS ET AL, THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC CoNSEQUENCES OF 
WRONGFUL TERMINATION at vii (1988). The RAND study has been convincingly challenged, 
on the ground that "[ w]hen all reported cases are considered rather than just those that reach 
a jury ••• the proportion of cases won by employees is quite low." Lauren B. Edelman et al., 
Professional Construction of Law: The Inflated Threat of Wrongful Discharge, 26 LAW & 
SoCY. REv. 47, 58 (1992). The Edelman study concentrates on cases under an "implied con-
tract" theory, and concludes that "even in the states most receptive to the implied contract 
theory, employees were found to have been wrongfully discharged in only 15% of the cases." 
Id. at 57. The problem with the Edelman study for our purposes is that when plaintiffs Jose 
dispositive motions in implied contract cases, their losses cannot all be attributed to findings 
that the terminations were proper. It is equally if not more likely, given the constraints on 
dispositive motions, that plaintiffs fail because they fail to meet the legal requirements for 
asserting an implied contractual right to just-cause protection. 
97. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2410 (1994). For a 
useful consideration of these issues in the context of affirmative action in higher education, 
see Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom?, 41 STAN. L. REv. 855, 900 
(1995) (concluding that "no other group compares to African Americans in the confluence of 
the characteristics that argue for inclusion in affirmative action programs" and that when it 
comes to other groups, "policymakers may reasonably come to different conclusions"). 
98. See Alfred W. Blumrosen, Society in Transition II: Price Waterhouse and the Individ-
ual Employment Discrimination Case, 42 RUTGERS L. REv. 1023, 1028 (1990). Blumrosen 
states that: 
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VII responsibilities, while others aggressively pursue affirmative ac-
tion. It might well be that some workplaces are integrated suffi-
ciently successfully that employees of different races or genders can 
come to like or dislike each other - albeit for reasons they cannot 
explain - without race or gender figuring centrally in the personal 
equation.99 The assumption that discrimination is the cause of all 
unjustified actions against members of protected groups is unlikely 
to be equally justified in all of these varied circumstances.100 
We are in transition from the old system of suppression of minorities and women toward 
a more flexible society in which race and sex no longer constitute the 'built-in 
headwinds' of the past. We have not yet arrived at a new balance of social conditions. 
Progress is ragged and uneven. [Some] employers ... have contributed to the emer-
gence of this new and better society. . . . [Other] employers ... are 'living in the 1960's' 
and have not contributed to improved minority/female opportunity .••• But the justices 
have not recognized this new and diverse situation. 
Id. For an acknowledgment of this fact, albeit in the context of a very different argument, see 
Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Small Numbers, Big Problems, Black Men, and the Supreme Court: A 
Reform Program for Title VII After Hicks, 23 CAP. U. L. REv. 241, 251 (1994) ("[M]y real 
concern with ... much of the jurisprudence on Title VII and other antidiscrimination legisla-
tion, is that there is no recognition that it is possible race may matter in some jobs and not 
others."). Here the author is arguing - and I agree - that in Hicks the employer's toler-
ance for low-level black employees should not negate a finding of discrimination against 
Hicks as a black supervisor. But the broader point is that a "uni-dimensional" view of dis-
crimination, id., is an oversimplification of the contemporary picture. 
99. The notion that a nondiscriminatory "disliker" can always point to "undesirable char-
acteristics peculiar to" the person she dislikes, Calloway, supra note 28, at 1022, seems a bit 
optimistic about our ability to understand and articulate our likes and dislikes in the area of 
interpersonal relationships. 
100. The growing literature of the critical race theory movement is built upon, and stands 
witness to, the perception by legal scholars from "outsider" groups that "racism is normal, 
not aberrant, in American society," Richard Delgado, Introduction to CrunCAL RACE THE-
ORY: THE CUTIING EDGE at xiv (Richard Delgado ed., 1995) - a perception that would 
support the conclusion that "arbitrary" decisions that are adverse to "outsiders" are in fact 
discriminatory. I value many of the insights critical race theorists have to offer, and I agree 
that we {by which I mean members of all races, ethnicities, and genders) are rarely if ever 
completely race- or gender-blind in our social interactions. Nonetheless, I cannot follow the 
critical race theory literature to any clear conclusions about the extent of intentional discrimi-
nation in the workplace. This is in part because of the specific legal standard in McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine. Evidence that race or gender was one of the factors motivating a decision 
is not sufficient to prove liability under McDonnell Douglas-Burdine - although it is suffi-
cient to establish liability under a mixed motive theory, see infra notes 288-91. But I hesitate 
to place heavy reliance on the insights of critical race theory for other, broader reasons as 
well. 
The claim underlying critical race theory is not merely that "outsiders" are the best narra-
tors of a generalizable story of how racism is experienced by its victims - a claim that is 
itself subject to challenge. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out 
of School: An Essay on Legal Na"atives, 45 STAN. L. REv. 807 (1993); Mark Tushnet, The 
Degradation of Constitutional Discourse, 81 GEO. L.J. 251 (1992) (questioning both the truth-
fulness and the generalizability of academics' narratives); cf. Angela P. Harris, Race and Es-
sentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581 (1990) (challenging the feminist 
claim of a single female "voice" - an antiessentialist challenge that would apply as well to 
the claimed "voice of color" in critical race theory literature). Instead, much critical race 
scholarship is predicated on a far stronger claim of epistemic privilege: a claim that "out-
sider" scholars are in the best position to perceive, describe, and analyze white racism itself 
- including its motivational structure. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Opposl-
tionists and Others: A Plea for Na"ative, ~MICH. L. REv. 2411 (1989) (privileging the voice 
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Third, it is important to remember that the McDonnell Douglas-
Burdine proof structure is not satisfied by mere proof that discrimi-
nation played a role in a challenged employment decision. When an 
employer acts arbitrarily toward an employee of a different race or 
gender, one might well believe that discrimination is sufficiently 
pervasive that there is good reason to suspect that race or gender 
played some part in the decision. But that would create, at best, a 
mixed motive case, not a disparate treatment case under McDon-
nell Douglas-Burdine.101 Belief that issues of race or gender are 
likely to play a role in arbitrary actions against members of pro-
tected groups does not entail the belief that such issues are likely to 
be the "but for" cause of arbitrariness across race and gender lines 
- which is the standard of proof generally required under McDon-
nell Douglas-Burdine.102 
of color); Lawrence, supra note 7 (probing the white subconscious); Mari J. Matsuda, Look-
ing to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323 
(1987) (privileging the voice of color). Strong claims of epistemic privilege have been more 
clearly theorized in feminist literature than in critical race theory, and they are intensely 
debated in feminist circles. See, e.g., Sandra Harding, Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: 
''What is Strong Objectivity?," in FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGIES 49 (Linda Alcoff & Elizabeth 
Potter eds., 1993) (examining claims of epistemic privilege in feminist standpoint theory); 
Bat-Ami Bar On, Marginality and Epistemic Privilege, in FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGIES, supra, 
at 83 (critiquing feminist standpoint theory). I find the critique far more persuasive than the 
claim. Claims of intersubjective understanding always need to be questioned, regardless of 
the identity of the claimant. See generally CHARI.Es TAYLOR, Interpretation and the Sciences 
of Man, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 15 (1985). Furthermore, the critical race 
theory claim of epistemic privilege ignores social class, a significant axis of domination and 
marginality in American society that stands in the way of the claim that outsiders defined by 
race and gender have perfect counter-hegemonic vision. White working class men - the 
actors whose motivations are often at issue in employment discrimination cases - have their 
own claim to marginality in the greater scheme of things. After all, modem "standpoint 
theory" has its origins in Marxism, where it is the perspective of the working class that is 
accorded epistemic privilege. See Harding, supra. To borrow the language of the critical race 
scholars, the field of cultural studies is largely oriented toward hearing the "voice" of class in 
popular culture - a voice that is itself subject to being "silenced" by narratives grounded 
solely in race or gender. Compare Laura Kipnis, (Male) Desire and (Female) Disgust: Read-
ing Hustler, in CULTURAL STUDIES 373 (Lawrence Grossberg et al. eds, 1992) with CATIJA-
RINE A. MAcK!NNoN, ONLY WoRDs (1993); for a general discussion of cultural studies, see 
DAVID HARRls, FROM CL.Ass STRUGGLE TO THE POLlTICS OF PLEASURE: THE EFFECTS OF 
GRAMSCIANISM ON CULTURAL STUDIES (1992). I do not see how feminist scholars or schol-
ars of color at elite postgraduate institutions are in a privileged position to hear that voice, 
particularly when their constituencies stand the most to gain from its silence - as is the case 
with antidiscrimination remedies. See also Alan D. Freeman, Race and Class: The Dilemma 
of Liberal Reform, 90 YALE LJ. 1880, 1895 (1981) (book review) ("To remedy racism in a 
class society with a stagnant or dwindling economy means necessarily that burdens of dis-
placement will fall heavily on powerless whites."). 
101. I say "at best" because the mixed motive framework is generally interpreted as re-
quiring "direct evidence" of discrimination, not merely circumstantial evidence that discrimi-
nation was one of the motivating factors in the decision. For a discussion and critique of this 
position, see infra notes 288-91. 
102. See Miller v. Cigna Corp., 47 F.3d 586 (3d Cir. 1995). 
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There is also a fourth, related problem with the "basic assump-
tion." Professor Calloway acknowledges that what "judges, juries, 
and members of this culture believe about the existence of discrimi-
nation in the workplace and perhaps in society in general" does not 
in fact conform to the factual premise of the "basic assumption. "103 
Indeed, she contends that the Hicks decision is dangerous precisely 
for this reason: the courts must, she argues, continue to proclaim 
and dispositively rely upon the "basic assumption" precisely be-
cause factfinders cannot be counted on to agree with it.104 But what 
she fails to acknowledge is that deciding cases on the basis of a 
mandatory presumption that is inconsistent with contemporary be-
liefs about the nature of discrimination raises important questions 
about the perceived legitimacy of the enterprise. 
The current political debate on affirmative action underscores 
that antidiscrimination law is at risk when its premises deviate from 
public perceptions of discrimination.105 This is by no means to say 
that the judiciary cannot effectively take - and even maintain -
103. Calloway, supra note 28, at 1008. 
104. Id. 
105. One need only consider the current attack on affirmative action to recognize that 
courses of action pursued without sufficient regard to their perceived legitimacy will eventu-
ally be challenged. In the months prior to the publication of this article, affirmative action 
has been at the center of political debate. The debate has two major loci: California and the 
federal government. California voters will have the opportunity in 1996 to vote on the Cali-
fornia Civil Rights Initiative, which amends the state constitution to read: "Neither the state 
of California nor any of its political subdivisions shall use race, sex, color, ethnicity or na-
tional origin as a criterion either for discriminating against, or granting preferential treatment 
to, any individual or group in the operation of the state's system of public employment, pub-
lic education or public contracting." Patrick Buchanan, The Quota Busters from the Bay 
Area, SAN DIEGO UNioN-TRIB., Feb. 1, 1994, at B-7. The initiative is central to the Republi-
can presidential primary campaign of California governor Pete Wilson; it is opposed by the 
California Democratic Party, California Democrats Back Affirmative Action, DALLAS MORN-
ING NEws, Apr. 10, 1995, at llA. Under Governor Wilson's leadership, the Regents of the 
University of California voted on July 20, 1995 to end the use of racial preferences in admis-
sions, hiring, and contracting. UC Scraps Affirmative Action: Regents' Vote Gives Wilson 
Major Victory, S.F. CHRoN., July 21, 1995, at Al. Initiatives similar to California's are on the 
ballot or being considered in a number of other states. Assessing Affirmative Action: Debate 
Grows Serious over Direction of Programs Giving Racial Preferences, ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
NEWS, July 23, 1995, at 94A. On the federal side, President Clinton ordered a review of 
federal affirmative action programs, which began with hints that he was amenable to scaling 
back federal affirmative action programs. While his review was pending, the Supreme Court 
held for the first time that "strict scrutiny" applies to constitutional challenges to federal 
affirmative action programs. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.' Peila, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995). 
President Clinton gave a speech on July 19, 1995 at the National Archives, in which he fully 
endorsed affirmative action. Todd S. Purdum, President Gives Fervent Support to Fighting 
Bias, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1995, at Al. The President took the position in a memorandum to 
federal agencies that Adarand does not require a sharp scaling back of affirmative action 
programs. Paul Richter, Clinton Declares Affirmative Action is "Good For America," L.A. 
TIMES, July 20, 1995, at Al, A12. The Clinton administration is reviewing the anti-affirma-
tive-action decision of the California Regents for compliance with federal law. UC's Grants 
in Jeopardy?: White House, Justice Review Requirements on Affirmative Action, SAN Dmoo 
UNioN-TRIB., July 24, 1995, at Al. Some Justice Department officials have questioned 
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the lead in educating the society on issues of racial and gender jus-
tice. Rather, it is to acknowledge that forms of leadership vary in 
their effectiveness. If the problem is that courts and members of 
our society no longer believe that discrimination is a major prob-
lem, the Supreme Court can do little by simply declaring the oppo-
site to be the case.106 What is far more effective is for courts and 
advocates to bring facts to the fore and convincingly portray them 
as instances of prohibited discrimination. For example, just as 
courts have learned and taught that "personal animosity" toward a 
woman can be the result of sex discrimination when the animosity is 
due to the woman's being "too aggressive, not feminine enough,"101 
we need to learn to recognize the operation of stereotypes in race 
discrimination settings.108 Similarly, we as a society would benefit 
from demonstrations, through litigation, of the subtle ways in which 
discrimination takes place even in seemingly well-integrated work-
places.109 But at this stage, it is unlikely that we will learn much 
from a legal regime that instructs us to ignore precisely the kinds of 
evidence most likely to enrich our sense of the different contexts 
and forms in which intentional discrimination occurs. 
In light of these considerations, I conclude that the weight of the 
evidence does not support the conclusion that all unexplained ad-
verse decisions should be treated as discriminatory once a prima 
facie case of discrimination has been proven. I am concerned that 
members of protected groups will bear the costs of the absence of a 
whether a federal challenge to the California action is possible after Adarand. UC Affirma-
tive Action Stance Draws Federal Review of Grants, S.F. CHRoN., July 24, 1995, at Al. 
106. For a subtle discussion of "orthodoxy" as appearing only at the point at which 
"doxa" (a more truly pervasive world view) has fallen apart, see PIERRE BouRDrau, OUT-
LINE ON A THEORY OF PRAcnCE 159-71 (Richard Nice trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1977) 
(1972). 
107. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (Brennan, J., plurality 
opinion). 
108. The need for greater subtlety in discrimination theory and factfinding does not, of 
course, stop with the issue of stereotyping. See, e.g., Richard Lempert & Karl Monsma, Cul-
tural Differences and Discrimination: Samoans Before a Public Housing Eviction Board, 59 
AM. Soc. REv. 890 (1994). There, the authors raise the issue of the legal status of discrimina-
tion against members of minority groups because behaviors valorized by that group are in-
consistent with the cultural norms of those in power - which they term "cultural 
discrimination." Id. (In their article, the issue was the tendency of Samoan public housing 
tenants to share income with members of the community instead of using it to pay rent.) The 
authors correctly point out that teaching decisionmakers to recognize cultural discrimination 
will not necessarily lead to a political judgment that it should be legally actionable. Id. at 908. 
What is most important in my view, as in theirs, is that decisionmakers come to realize that 
the phenomenon exists and that action or inaction with respect to it represents a political 
judgment. Id. 
109. It is my expectation that the most innovative of such cases would require the use of 
expert testimony, at least at first. 
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mandatory presumption: it is inevitable that some discriminatory 
employers will not be held liable for their actions. But the "basic 
assumption" is sufficiently weak, and the perceived legitimacy of 
antidiscrimination law is so much at risk, that I cannot see clear to 
any other conclusion. 
c. A Note on Public Policy and Evidentiary Weight. In conclud-
ing the discussion of whether there is a sound evidentiary basis for 
the "judgment for plaintiff required" rule, it is important to note 
that, notwithstanding the Hicks majority's view to the contrary, the 
Court had the authority to conclude both that the "combined evi-
dence" is not always sufficient as an evidentiary matter to support a 
pro-plaintiff directed verdict and that the "judgment for the plain-
tiff required" rule should be adopted nonetheless.11° Courts rou-
tinely take into account the policy concerns animating a body of 
substantive law when deciding sufficiency-of-the-evidence ques-
tions, both on the level of the-individual case and in the making of 
proof rules to govern categories of cases.111 Thus, if the McDonnell 
110. The majority relied upon Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence for the proposi-
tion that it "ha[s] no authority to impose liability upon an employer for alleged discrimina-
tory employment practices unless an appropriate factfinder determines, according to proper 
procedures, that the employer has unlawfully discriminated." Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2751. Rule 
301 does not, however, dictate a result in Hicks. 
Rule 301 adopts the "bursting bubble" approach to presumptions. Under that approach, 
as applied to McDonnell Douglas-Burdine, the proven prima facie case creates a presump-
tion of discrimination; once the employer meets its production burden, that presumption of 
discrimination "bursts," and the plaintiff is left only with whatever inference of discrimina-
tion is factually supported by the proven prima facie case. In Hicks, however, no one denied 
that the presumption created by the proven prima facie case bursts (as required by Rule 301) 
once the employer has met its intermediate presumption burden. What Hicks argued, and 
what the dissent endorsed, is that a new situation exists once the plaintiff persuades the fact-
finder that the employer's stated reason is false. Once falsity is proven, that proven fact, 
together with the permissive inference of discrimination that remains in the case after the 
prima-facie-case presumption has burst, newly combine to create a conclusive presumption 
that intentional discrimination took place. A conclusive presumption of this sort is not really 
a presumption at all: it is a rule of substantive law that courts remain free to adopt notwith-
standing Rule 301. See 21 CHARLES ALAN Wrumrr & KENNErn W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL 
PRAcnCE AND PROCEDURE § 5124, at 588 {1977). In this analysis, then, Rule 301 controls 
only the issue decided in Burdine: namely, the question of whether the burden of persuasion 
shifts to the plaintiff upon proof of the prima facie case. It does not control the issue in 
Hicks. 
111. See Edward H. Cooper, Directions for Directed Verdicts: A Compass for Federal 
Courts, 55 MINN. L. REv. 903, 967 (1971) ("[D]irected verdict standards are properly framed 
to allow or deny jury disposition of inferential uncertainties on the basis of criteria other than 
the reasonableness of a determination that the legally required findings are more probable 
than not."). For the view that McDonnell Douglas-Burdine was based on such a policy judg-
ment, see Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 9, at 56 (acknowledging that the McDonnell Douglas-
Burdine prima facie case "only begins to assay the employer's intent and therefore provides 
marginal justification for reversing the ordinary burdens of persuasion"); id. at 10-11 (argu-
ing that it is central to the normative judgments inherent in Title VII policy that the prima 
facie case nonetheless support a pro-plaintiff presumption); Candace S. Kovacic-Fleischer, 
Proving Discrimination After Price Waterhouse and Wards Cove: Semantics as Substance, 39 
AM. U. L. REv. 615, 640 (1990) ("Unfortunately, the disparate-treatment cases do not ex-
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Douglas-Burdine proof structure indeed expresses the Court's pol-
icy judgment to look the other way when faced with the insuffi-
ciency of the "combined evidence," there would be good reason to 
adopt the "judgment for plaintiff required" position. 
The view that McDonnell Douglas-Burdine heralds a policy de-
termination to give the plaintiff's evidence more weight than it is 
due at the final stage of the case is, however, inconsistent with a 
conservatism that pervades the Court's disparate treatment juris-
prudence. To explain why, it is necessary to say a word about an-
other "special proof structure" - the "disparate impact" structure. 
Griggs v. Duke Power .Co.112 was the Supreme C9urt's first major 
Title VII case, and it constitutes the high-water mark of judicial cre-
ativity in discrimination cases. In Griggs, the Court identified a cat-
egory of cases in which proof of intentional discrimination would 
not be required: cases in which employers rely on facially neutral 
practices that disparately affect members of protected groups, and 
that are not "demonstrably a reasonable measure of job perform-
ance. "113 As developed over the years, the disparate impact ap-
proach placed considerable burdens on the employer once the 
plaintiff established that the practice in question had a disparate 
effect on members of a protected group. The employer then had to 
demonstrate not merely that the disputed practices were "legiti-
mate" in the sense of being rationally related to the job, but that 
they bore some closer relationship to the job. The Court used dif-
ferent phrases to describe this required relationship, one of which 
was "business necessity."114 Further, it was the employer's burden 
to persuade the fact:finder of this close relationship between the se-
lection criterion and the job. 
The impact of Griggs was enormous, and the Court's subse-
quent decisions are best read as a stalwart effort to give full effect 
to Griggs within its proper sphere while simultaneously barring the 
spread of Griggs-type innovations to other areas of antidiscrimina-
tion law.us The most obvious instance of the Court's limiting 
plain their allocation of proof in tenns of statutory policy needs. Burdine recognized that the 
plaintiff had a light burden in establishing a prima facie case of disparate-treatment, but did 
not explain the reasoning.") (footnote omitted}. 
112. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
113. 401 U.S. at 436. 
114. 401 U.S. at 431. Other fonnulations in the Griggs opinion were weaker: "related to 
job perfonnance," 401 U.S. at 431; "[related] to measuring job capability," 401 U.S. at 432; 
"must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question," 401 U.S. at 432, "demon-
strably a reasonable measure of job perfonnance," 401 U.S. at 436. 
115. See also Alan Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: The View From 1989, 64 TUI.. L. 
REv. 1407, 1422-23 (1990} (calling the years 1974-1984 an "era of rationalization," in which 
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Griggs's penetration was Washington v. Davis, 116 in which the Court 
held that disparate impact theory is unavailable in constitutionally 
based discrimination cases.117 What is not often recognized is that 
the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine line of cases is an instance of this 
pattern as well. For all that the liberal reading of McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine attempts to characterize the disparate treatment 
special proof structure as a plaintiff-friendly innovation, McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine in fact em~rged out of a practice of boundary 
maintenance that was aimed at protecting defendants from what 
the Court saw as the liberal federal courts of appeal's unwarranted 
application of core elements of the Griggs vision to individual dis-
crimination litigation. The essential conservatism of McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine is revealed by understanding it in light not only of 
what the Supreme Court said in its quasi-legislative creation of a 
special proof structure, but also in light of what the Court did in 
adjudicating the individual cases in the McDonnell Douglas-Bur-
dine line. 
In McDonnell Douglas, the Court overturned a pro-plaintiff de-
cision by a court of appeals, a decision that relied heavily on 
Griggs-based principles. The court of appeals, "appear[ing] to rely 
on Griggs," held that Green's past participation in unlawful conduct 
against McDonnell Douglas while he was not a McDonnell Douglas 
employee did not bear a close enough relationship to "job perform-
ance" to constitute a legally acceptable basis to refuse to rehire 
him.11s The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning, and did so in 
ways expressly intended to limit the strict Griggs "business neces-
sity" standard to Griggs-type cases.119 In the next major case in the 
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine line, Fumco Construction Corp. v. 
"the court •.. employed a method of containment" in order "[t]o deal with the subversive 
Griggs decision" by "arbitrarily declin[ing] to extend its logic to other areas"). 
116. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
117. In Washington v. Davis, plaintiffs brought a disparate impact claim to challenge the 
use of a civil service test that had not been validated as related to job performance. Neither 
party disputed the applicability of Griggs to testing cases brought under the Equal Protection 
Clause, but the Court, sua sponte, held that the Griggs standard was inapplicable to litigation 
under the Equal Protection Clause - even to employment discrimination claims identical to 
Griggs but for their constitutional basis. 426 U.S. at 238 & n.8. 
118. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805-06. 
119. The McDonnell Douglas Court explained: 
Griggs differs from the instant case in important respects .••• [P]etitioner does not seek 
his exclusion on the basis of a testing device which overstates what is necessary for com-
petent performance, or through some sweeping disqualification of all those with any past 
record of unlawful behavior, however remote, insubstantial, or unrelated to applicant's 
personal qualifications •••• 
411 U.S. at 806. 
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Waters, 120 the Court again stepped in to 'reverse a decision that 
would have had the effect of applying the Griggs standard of "busi-
ness necessity" to the employer's justification in a disparate treat-
ment case.121 
Similarly, the major holding of Burdine was aimed at maintain-
ing the boundaries between individual intentional discrimination 
claims and disparate impact claims. The Court in Burdine over-
turned the pro-plaintiff decision of a court of appeals that, the 
Court held, had gone too far in shifting to the defendant the burden 
of proving that its stated reason was the true reason for its adverse 
decision. The Court emphasized that Title VII "was not intended 
to 'diminish traditional management prerogatives' " or to "require 
the employer to restructure his employment practices to maximize 
the number of minorities and women hired"122 - notwithstanding 
the fact that the heightened .proof standards and shifted proof 
burdens in disparate impact cases went far in precisely those 
directions.123 
120. 438 U.S. 567 (1978). 
121. In Furnco, the defendant was a contractor whose work was the installation of fire-
brick in steel furnaces. Fumco did not employ bricklayers on a permanent basis; instead, its 
job superintendents hired bricklayers on an individual-job basis, and chose bricklayers they 
knew personally or who were recommended to them. It was impossible to get a job with 
Fumco by applying "at the gate." The black bricklayers failed in their Griggs claim because 
the Court found that there was no evidence that this practice had a disparate impact on black 
bricklayers. But they argued - and the court of appeals agreed - that "Fumco's hiring 
procedures not only must be reasonably related to the achievement of some legitimate pur-
pose, but also must be the method which allows the employer to consider the qualifications 
·of the largest number of minority applicants." Furnco, 438 U.S. at 576. In disparate impact 
cases, well before Furnco, the Court established as a standard element of the disparate im-
pact proof structure that an employer who has proven business necessity can still be called 
upon to defend its employment practices against the charge that less discriminatory methods 
existed that would have been adequate to meet the employer's goals. See Albemarle Paper 
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). But when it came to adopting the same reasoning in 
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine cases, the Furnco Court saw nothing but "dangers." Furnco, 
438 U.S. at 578. It held that "courts are generally less competent than employers to restruc-
ture business practices, and unless mandated to do so by Congress they should not attempt 
it." Furnco, 438 U.S. at 578. The obvious fact that there was also no congressional mandate 
for the attempt in disparate impact cases seems to have escaped the attention of the Court as 
it continued its practice of boundary-maintenance between disparate impact and disparate 
treatment cases. 
122. Texas Dept of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981) (quoting 
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 207 (1979)). 
123. Another clear example of the Court working to keep Griggs-type reasoning out of 
disparate treatment cases is Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 113 S. Ct. 1701 (1993). In Hazen 
Paper, the Court held that an age discrimination plaintiff cannot prove intentional discrimina-
tion by proving that an employer acted on the basis of a factor that is empirically correlated 
with age. So long as the factor the employer relied upon (in Hazen Paper, proximity to 
vesting in a pension) is "analytically distinct" from the prohibited factor (in Hazen Paper, 
age), and the employer therefore "can take account of one while ignoring the other," 113 S. 
Ct at 1707, a disparate treatment claim fails - unless the plaintiff can prove that the em-
ployer intentionally used the correlated factor as a surreptitious method of discriminating on 
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In each of these cases, then, the courts of appeal - the courts 
with frontline responsibility to teach the district courts to recognize 
and eradicate discrimination - had determined that the district 
courts would need closely to scrutinize employer business practices. 
Their position, albeit not explicitly stated, seemed to be that indi-
vidual discrimination cases had much in common with disparate im-
pact cases: in both kinds of cases, there was sufficient reason to 
suspect discrimination to warrant placing employers' business prac-
tices under close scrutiny, lest they operate as artificial barriers to 
employment opportunity. In rejecting the position of the courts of 
appeal, what the Supreme Court seemed to be saying was that dis-
parate treatment cases are, unlike disparate impact cases, unworthy 
of extraordinary judicial intervention. The view that emerges from 
the Court's rejection of the courts of appeal's approach is that indi-
vidual discrimination cases are of less societal significance than are 
disparate impact cases, and that the plaintiff's prima facie showing 
in a disparate treatment case is too weak to justify Griggs-type in-
terference with employers' managerial discretion. 
In short, whatever the Supreme Court was saying in the McDon-
nell Douglas-Burdine line of cases, what the Court was doing 
reveals that McDonnell Douglas-Burdine rests on an essentially 
conservative foundation. Seen from this perspective, it is difficult 
to read McDonnell Douglas-Burdine as embodying the strong pro-
plaintiff policy orientation needed to justify a mandatory pro-
plaintiff presumption that is insufficiently supported by the weight 
of the evidence. 
2. Precedent 
An important part of the uproar against the Hicks decision is 
that it appears fatally inconsistent with a key passage from Burdine. 
the basis of the prohibited factor, 113 S. Ct. at 1707. In so holding, the Court recited the 
differences between disparate impact cases and disparate treatment cases - stressing that, in 
the latter, "liability depends on whether the protected trait (under the ADEA, age) actually 
motivated the employer's decision." 113 S. Ct. at 1706. 
The line drawn in Hazen Paper is particularly problematic for categories of cases in which 
disparate impact analysis is unavailable - constitutional cases and perhaps, depending upon 
how the Court eventually decides what it identified as an open issue in Hazen Paper, 113 S. 
Ct. at 1706, age discrimination cases. (Indeed, the Court first held that correlations cannot 
form the basis for an intentional discrimination claim in Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 
352 (1991), a constitutional case involving the exclusion of Spanish-speaking jurors, where 
the rejected correlation was between Hispanic national origin and Spanish-English bilingual-
ism.) However, the fact that disparate impact analysis is clearly available under Title VII 
does not neutralize the effect of Hazen Paper on those cases, because jury trials and damages 
are unavailable in disparate impact cases under the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 
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Burdine states that after the employer satisfies its intermediate bur-
den, the plaintiff's proof is to proceed as follows: 
The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion. She now must have the 
opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true 
reason for the employment decision. This burden now merges with 
the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the 
victim of intentional discrimination. She may succeed in this either 
directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more 
likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the em-
ployer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.124 
This language is undoubtedly dictum, 125 but it is dictum written in 
the mode of judicial rulemaking.126 As both the majority and the 
dissent read this passage, there are two routes the plaintiff can fol-
low, and the plaintiff "may succeed" through either - meaning 
that the plaintiff must succeed, must win the case, if the plaintiff 
satisfactorily follows either of the routes.121 
124. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 (emphasis added), relied on by Justice Souter, dissenting in 
Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2760. 
125. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2751-52. In Burdine, the Court held only two things: first, that at 
the intermediate stage of the case, the employer has a burden of production, but that the 
burden of persuasion remains at all times with the plaintiff, Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256·58 (Part 
III-A), and, second, that the employer is not obligated to prove that the person hired or 
promoted was more qualified than the plaintiff, Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258·59 (Part III-B). See 
also id. at 259-60 (Part IV, summarizing holdings). The language relied upon and disputed in 
Hicks all derives from Part II of Burdine. In Part II, the Court restates the McDonnell Doug-
las framework, and does so in order better to explain its holdings in Parts III and IV: "The 
nature of the burden that shifts to the defendant should be understood in light of the plain-
tiff's ultimate and intermediate burdens." 450 U.S. at 253. The Hicks majority is correct that 
this contextualizing of the defendant's burden is not necessary to the holding of the case. 
126. The dissent in Hicks treats this language in Burdine not as dictum but as "settled 
precedent." 113 S. Ct. at 2757. "Cases, such as McDonnell Douglas, that set forth an order 
of proof necessarily go beyond the minimum necessary to settle the narrow dispute 
presented, but evidentiary frameworks set up in this manner are not for that reason subject 
to summary dismissal in later cases as products of mere dicta." 113 S. Ct. at 2765. 
127. The Hicks majority chooses to concede that the quoted words "bear no other mean-
ing but that the falsity of the employer's explanation is alone enough to compel judgment for 
the plaintiff." 113 S. Ct. at 2752. I say "chooses" because the Burdine dictum is not so crystal 
clear that one can say with certainty that the Court had thought ahead to all of the fine points 
of proof of pretext. Furthermore, an alternative reading is available that renders the Burdine 
dictum consistent with a rejection of the "judgment for plaintiff required" position. The ma-
jority could have argued that "may" means "may," not "must" - and that while the plaintiff 
"may" succeed with indirect proof, the plaintiff also "may not" succeed, depending on the 
factfinder's willingness to infer discrimination from the proven facts. Of course, one must 
deal with the fact that the phrase "may succeed" is used to describe the outcome in cases in 
which there is direct proof; it would make no sense to say that the plaintiff who has persuaded 
the court "that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer" may succeed 
but also may not succeed depending upon the circumstances. But perhaps it is as much of a 
stretch to assume an intent to be completely consistent in the use of the term "may" as it is to 
tolerate inconsistency, given the fact that nothing in Burdine as it stood before the Court 
turned on the meaning of the word. 
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The argument that Hicks departs from past precedent seems 
strong. But it is undermined by the context of the Burdine opinion 
as a whole, and by later Supreme Court cases. 
First, if the Burdine dictum in fact endorses the "judgment for 
plaintiff required" position, it conflicts with the central holding of 
the case. Burdine holds that the employer bears no burden of per-
suading the factfinder of the truthfulness of its stated justification; 
instead, the "ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has 
been the victim of intentional discrimination" remains at all times 
with the plaintiff.128 Similarly, if the plaintiff is using the indirect 
method, she must prove that the employer's stated reason was a 
"pretext for discrimination"129 (in the language of Burdine), a 
"coverup for a racially discriminatory decision" (in the language of 
McDonnell Douglas).130 Burdine contemplates that once the case 
has moved to the final stage, the plaintiff will win only if the fact-
finder is actually convinced that intentional discrimination more 
likely than not took place.131 It would be odd if after clearly hold-
ing that the plaintiff carries the burden of proof of intentional dis-
crimination at the last stage of the case, the Court had meant to 
provide in dicta that the plaintiff's proof burden is met, as a matter 
of law, by something less than proof of intentional discrimination by 
a preponderance of all the evidence at trial. 
The Court's subsequent decision in United States Postal Service 
Board of Governors v. Aikens132 strengthens this interpretation of 
Burdine. Aikens holds that once all of the evidence is in, the three-
step McDonnell Douglas-Burdine proof structure "is no longer rel-
evant. "133 The Court identified "the ultimate factual issue in the 
case" as "[whether] the defendant intentionally discriminated 
against the plaintiff,"134 and instructed the district courts that once 
all the evidence is in, they must decide that issue "just as [they] 
decide disputed questions of fact in other civil litigation"13S - with-
out applying the "legal rules" of McDonnell Douglas-Burdine.136 It 
128. 113 S. Ct. at 2752 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256). 
129. 113 S. Ct. at 2752 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253). 
130. 113 S. Ct. at 2753 (quoting McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805 (1973)) 
(emphasis omitted). 
131. I leave aside for now any consideration of "mixed motive" discrimination. For dis-
cussion of this issue, see infra notes 288-91. 
132. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983). 
133. 460 U.S. at 715. 
134. 460 U.S. at 715 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253). 
135. 460 U.S. at 715-16 (citation omitted). 
136. 460 U.S. at 716. Admittedly, the Aikens Court quoted the Burdine dictum and did 
so approvingly. But this might well mean that the Aikens Court embraced a view of the 
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is difficult to see how the "judgment for plaintiff required" position 
could be implemented after trial in a manner consistent with Aik-
ens. In order to determine whether the plaintiff was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law on the basis of the "combined evi-
dence," the court would be required to find that the plaintiff had 
made out a prim.a facie case, that the employer had met its rebuttal 
burden by offering evidence of a specific alternative explanation of 
its actions, and that the employer's explanation had failed. But 
making such findings would require the court to do precisely what 
Aikens holds it should not do - namely, to focus on the technicali-
ties of the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework in analyzing the 
evidence after the case is fully tried. 
There is admittedly something disturbing about allowing Aikens 
to undermine the "rule" stated in the Burdine dictum. The Court's 
opinion in Aikens arose in an odd posture, as a compromise aimed 
at avoiding the issue on which the Court had granted certiorari.137 
But the very purpose of the compromise was to avoid addressing a 
fundamental flaw of the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine proof struc-
ture: the inadequacy of the prim.a facie case standard in a substan-
tial category of cases. If the result was the Court's decision 
systematically to minimize the importance of the McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine structure by declaring it irrelevant to cases that 
have gone to trial, that is no mere accident. It is, rather, a sincere 
expression of a collective unwillingness to allow a flawed proof 
structure to determine the outcome of cases. In that sense, Aikens 
speaks clearly - albeit awkwardly - to the central question in 
Hicks. 
3. Necessity 
The "judgment for plaintiff required" position is often defended 
as a necessary mechanism for narrowing the scope of the factual 
inquiry at trial.138 In this view, once the employer tenders a legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, "the very point of 
the McDonnell Douglas rule" is to permit the plaintiff to focus the 
meaning of Burdine that is consistent with what became its position in Hicks. It is also true 
that Justices Blackmun and Brennan, concurring in Aikens, saw fit to assert that even after 
Aikens, "the McDonnell Douglas framework requires that a plaintiff prevail when at the 
third stage of a Title VII trial he demonstrates that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 
given by the employer is not in fact the true reason for the employment decision." 460 U.S. 
at 718. But the fact remains that the Aikens majority gave no assurances that its opinion 
meant what Justices Blackmun and Brennan said it meant. 
137. See supra text accompanying notes 66-83. 
138. See authorities cited supra note 28; see also Lanctot, supra note 23. 
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evidence on rebutting that specific reason, with the guarantee that 
the factfinder will not be able to "keep digging" for alternative ex-
planations the plaintiff could not or did not anticipate.139 Arguing 
from necessity, however, ignores the existence of an apparatus of 
federal procedural rules - particularly the rules of pleading and 
discovery140 - that exist for the very purpose of narrowing issues 
for trial.141 McDonnell Douglas-Burdine is not a set of formal 
pleading rules, and the framework does not by its terms require the 
employer to plead a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its ac-
tions.142 Employers often do plead their reasons, however, so as to 
139. The Hicks majority takes the contrary position - namely, that the necessities of the 
litigation process require rejection of the "judgment for plaintiff required" rule. For the ma-
jority, the dissent's crucial mistake is its understanding of what it means under McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine for an employer to "articulate" its reasons. For the majority, a reason be-
comes "articulated" through the introduction of admissible evidence that would tend to sup-
port it. The articulation of the reason does not take place "apart from the record - in some 
pleading, or perhaps in some formal, nontestimonial statement made on behalf of the defend-
ant to the factfinder." St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2755 (1993). Further-
more, the majority argues, all explanations "suggested, no matter how vaguely, in the 
record," 113 S. Ct. at 2755-56, must be treated as equal, - because there is no "device for 
determining which particular portions of the record represent 'articulated reasons' set forth 
with sufficient clarity to satisfy McDonnell Douglas" and which do not. 113 S. Ct. at 2756. 
140. As amended in December 1993, Rule 26 interweaves pleading and discovery. 
Amended Rule 26(a) provides that parties are required to disclose certain types of evidence 
regarding "disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings," without awaiting dis-
covery requests. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(l)(A). The degree to which amended Rule 26(a) will 
alter civil discovery practice remains uncertain for a number of reasons. For example, the 
rule does not specify whether the required disclosure pertains to all facts alleged with partic-
ularity, regardless of which party's pleadings contain the allegation. The rule also does not 
specify what it means for a fact to be "alleged with particularity," nor does the rule by its 
terms require parties to plead any matters with particularity. Finally, Rule 26(a) expressly 
permits district courts to opt out of the rule by creating contrary local rules, and many have 
done so. See Donna Stienstra, Implementation of Disclosure in United States District Courts, 
With Specific Attention to Courts' Responses to Selected Amendments to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26, available in WESTLAW 1995 US ORDER 95-9. 
141. Placing a production burden on the defendant on the basis of a weak prima facie 
case has also been defended as a discovery device that is required because the employer has 
the benefit of both superior information and superior resources. See, e.g., Elizabeth 
Bartholet, Proof of Discriminatory Intent Under Title VII: United States Postal Service 
Board of Governors v. Aikens, 70 CAL. L. REv. 1201, 1216 (1982). The chief problem with 
this argument is that the Burdine burden on the employer is a weak one: the requirement 
that the employer "articulate" a reason through admissible evidence falls far short of provid-
ing the kind of information a well-counseled plaintiff would seek through civil discovery. If 
the concern is that employers will respond to discovery requests with "colorable claims that 
the requests call for information that is unnecessary, or that would be unduly burdensome to 
produce, or that is privileged," id., the same employers will surely reveal the minimum infor-
mation necessary to meet their weak production burden. 
142. As will be discussed at length; infra, the cases in which the McDonnell Douglas-
Burdine framework was formulated were fully tried cases; the Court spoke in terms of the 
presentation of evidence and of proof, not in terms of pleading - or, for that matter, of any 
other aspect of pretrial procedure. This does not stop many courts from treating McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine as if it were a doctrine of pleading. See, for example, Alexander v. Fujitsu 
Bus. Com. Sys., 818 F. Supp. 462, 473 (D.N.H. 1993), where after stating that the defendant 
must articulate its reason only after the plaintiff proves a prima facie case, the court states 
that the defendant's articulation burden arises once the plaintiff adequately pleads a prima 
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create the impression that their actions were reasonable. Whether 
or not the employer identifies its reasons in early pleadings, the 
plaintiff can always use interrogatories to require the employer to 
identify any and all nondiscriminatory reasons relied upon in decid-
ing to fire the plaintiff, and can follow up on the reasons given with 
requests for admissions. The judge will almost certainly insist that 
the parties present pretrial memoranda that identify the parties' 
theories of recovery and defenses, to serve as a basis for ruling on 
the relevancy of evidence to the issues to be presented at triaJ.143 If 
these procedural mechanisms are adequate for other categories of 
cases, 144 it is difficult to use "necessity" as an argument in favor of 
the "judgment for plaintiff required" rule in disparate treatment 
cases. 
facie case. See also Johnson v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 819 F. Supp. 578, 581 (E.D. Tex. 
1993), affd., 22 F.3d 1094 (5th Cir. 1994). The assertion that McDonnell Douglas-Burdine 
establishes a pleading requirement seems to be in error under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure as well. Rule 8(b) specifies only that a defendant "shall state in short and plain 
terms [its] defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments upon which 
the adverse party relies." FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b). The employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason is not a "defense" to the plaintiff's claim; rather, the absence of such a reason is an 
element of the plaintiff's claim, on which the plaintiff has the burden of persuasion. A dispa-
rate treatment defendant would thus seem to be under no obligation affirmatively to plead 
the reasons for its actions; it need only deny that they were discriminatory. See 4 ARTIWR 
LARSON & LEX LARSoN; EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION Form IV-4, at Prac-46 to Prac-47 
(1995) (providing a model answer that contains no explanation of the employer's reasons for 
its actions). Even if the employer did bear the pleading burden on this issue, there is no 
requirement that the issue be plead with specificity under Rule 9. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9. 
As explained in text, however, many employers do plead their reasons. Ironically, the 
new initial disclosure procedure under Rule 26(a), see supra note 140, will give employers 
who seek to slow the pace of litigation an incentive not to plead their reasons, so as not to 
have to make early disclosure of the evidence supporting their reasons. This incentive will be 
strongest if Rule 26(a) is interpreted to require a party to disclose evidence only as to facts it 
itself alleged. 
143. Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit amendments to conform to 
the evidence, see FED. R. CIV. P. 15(b), it is unlikely that an employer would knowingly cast 
itself upon the discretion of the district court by leaving important facts out of its presenta-
tion of the case in court-ordered pretrial memoranda. 
144. Ronald J. Allen, Presumptions in Civil Actions Reconsidered, 66 low AL. REv. 843, 
860-61 (1981). Allen states that: 
[I]t is difficult to imagine a case today in which the sanction of possible dismissal would 
generate more evidence than discovery schemes. Thus, reliance on a presumption to 
shift a burden of production in order to generate evidence is not only doing indirectly 
what can be done directly, but no longer serves the stated purpose 
Id. (citation omitted); see also Ronald J. Allen, Presumptions, Inferences and Burden of Proof 
in Federal Civil Actions: An Anatomy of Unnecessary Ambiguity and a Proposal for Reform, 
76 Nw. U. L. REV. 892, 897 (1982) ("If the sanctions available to implement modern discov-
ery rules are inadequate to generate information, shifting a burden of production certainly 
will have no greater effect."); Edward W. Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on 
Juristic Immaturity, 12 STAN. L. REv. 5, 18 (1959) (stating that the only possible use for 
"bursting-bubble" presumptions is ''that of discovery device for extracting evidence from an 
opponent," but "the notion that discovery was ever a serious factor is destroyed by the ap-
parently complete lack of any impact by modern discovery procedures upon presumptions"). 
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It is possible that the Court assumed when it created McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine that there is something unique to disparate treat-
ment cases that makes these mechanisms inadequate. That "some-
thing specific" may well be the need to constrain not the parties 
themselves but the factfinder. When parties give interrogatory an-
swers or submit pretrial briefs, they constrain themselves and the 
evidence they can introduce. The factfinder, :fiowever, remains free 
to draw inferences from the evidence that is presented. If the plain-
tiff is to have the fullest possible opportunity to prove discrimina-
tion, and if - as plaintiffs and federal courts of appeal had reason 
to suspect in the early days of Title VII - factfinders are likely to 
be hostile to discrimination claims, the plaintiff will want to con-
strain not only the defendant, but also the factfinder. One cannot, 
therefore, reject the necessity argument without also rejecting the 
view that McDonnell Douglas-Burdine is needed as a constraint -
more specifically, a proper constraint - on the discretion of the 
factfinder to draw inferences from the evidentiary record. 
The Hicks majority implicitly rejected the use of McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine to constrain the factfinder, and it was right to do 
so. Take the facts of Hicks as an example. The dissent argued that 
any reliance on the notion that Powell was on a personal rather 
than racial crusade against Hicks would violate norms of fair notice 
because St. Mary's did not claim that "personal animosity" caused 
Hicks's discharge. But Hicks must have been on notice that a "cru-
sade" would be at issue. Hicks wanted to prove that there was a 
race-based crusade against him. He chose to do so, in essence, by 
presenting evidence on two separate points: first, that there was a 
crusade against him, and, second, that the institution was being op-
erated in a race-conscious manner, from which he asked the fact-
finder to infer that the crusade was race-based. That the factfinder 
would find for Hicks on the first issue, the crusade, and for the em-
ployer on the second, the discriminatory motive, was a risk that 
Hicks had to take. It is not in the nature of litigation that the pro-
ponent of the evidence is guaranteed that its evidence will .be used 
only in its favor.145 
145. While "evidence is always offered on specific issues, and relevance is judged with 
respect to the issue on which it is offered," Richard Lempert, The New Evidence Scholarship: 
Analyzing the Process of Proof, 66 B.U. L REv. 439, 447 n.29 (1986), factfinders are gener-
ally left free to draw whatever reasonable inferences they wish to draw from the evidence. 
See 3 DEvrrr ET AL., supra note 49, at § 72.01; see also id. at 72.04: 
In determining whether any fact in issue has been proved by a preponderance of the 
evidence in the case, the jury may, unless otherwise instructed, consider the testimony of 
all witnesses, regardless of who may have called them, and all exhibits received in evi-
dence, regardless of who may have produced them. 
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The problem for Hicks, then, was that the district court came 
away convinced that there was a crusade against him, but was also 
convinced that the crusade was explainable neither by Hicks's job 
performance nor by his race. The legal questions this situation 
raises are quite complex. Is the factfinder ever permitted to inter-
pret the evidence in a way that leads it to reject both parties' pre-
ferred theories of the events?146 If so, when is such a course of 
[I]n your consideration of the evidence you are not limited to the bald statements of the 
witnesses. In other words, you are not limited to what you see and hear as the witnesses 
testify. You are permitted to draw, from facts which you find have been proved, such 
reasonable inferences as seem justified in the light of your experience. 
Parties are free to request limiting instructions, but there is reason to question the effective-
ness of an instruction not to conclude that a pink elephant was present when the evidence 
suggests otherwise. Cf. REID lIAsTIE ET AL, INSIDE THE JURY 232 (1983) (stating that 
stricken testimony "may tend to be rejected in open discussion but have an impact, perhaps 
even an unconscious one, on the individual juror's judgment"). 
146. An ongoing debate in the evidence literature takes as its premise that the civil trial 
system should limit the factfinder to deciding between the theories of the case put forth by 
the competing parties - and should deny the factfinder the freedom to deviate from them in 
favor of what one might call a "rogile" theory, in other words, a theory supported by the 
evidence but that neither party supports, In this debate, Professor Ronald Allen takes the 
position that achieving this result would reqtµre a "reconceptualization of civil trials," be-
cause the present civil trial system does not limit sufficiently the factfinder to the parties' 
competing theories. See Ronald J. Allen, A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66 B.U. L. 
REv. 401 (1986); Ronald J. Allen, The Nature of Juridical Proof, 13 CARDozo L. REv. 373, 
381-82 (1991); see also Ronald J. Allen, Comment, Rationality, Mythology, and the 'Accepta-
bility of Verdicts' Thesis, 66 B.U. L. REv. 541, 551 (1986). 
In response to Allen, Professor Richard Lempert suggests that reform is unnecessary, 
because even under current law, factfinders in civil trials will usually only be aware of the 
theories argued for by the parties, see Lempert, supra note 145, at 473. Furthermore, 
Lempe rt contends that rogue stories may be kept away from juries through the use of instruc-
tions on the "spoliation inference" - the inference that if a party could have produced cer-
tain evidence but did not do so, the evidence goes against that party - and that reform is 
therefore not necessary. Id. 
If spoliation instructions were adequate to keep rogue stories away from juries, adopting 
the "judgment for plaintiff required" rule as a kind of spoliation rule would seem consistent 
with general practice. But it is not, for a number of reasons. The main reason the analogy 
between the "judgment for plaintiff required" position and spoliation instructions is flawed is 
that the spoliation inference is a permissive inference. The fact finder ''may rationally rely" 
on the spoliation inference, but it need not do so. See 1 DEvrrr ET AL, supra note 49, at 
§ 14.14 ("If a party offers weaker or less satisfactory evidence when stronger and more satis-
factory evidence could have been produced at trial, you may, but are not required to consider 
this fact in your deliberations."); Richard D. Friedman, Generalized Inferences, Individual 
Merits, and Jury Discretion, 66 B.U. L. REv. 509, 518 (1986) ("[T]he jury may consider a 
failure to present evidence apparently within a party's control, and it may draw an inference 
that the evidence withheld was unfavorable to that party ...• " (emphasis added)). Another 
reason is that "a spoliation inference is permitted only when a party is shown to have been in 
possession or control of relevant information and fails to produce it at trial," a circumstance 
that will not necessarily exist in all cases in which the existing evidence suggests a rogue story 
to the factfinder. Ronald J. Allen, Epilogue: Analyzing the Process of Prooft A Brief Re-
joinder, 66 B.U. L. REv. 479, 482 (1986). (In Hicks, for example, Powell may well have 
denied to defense counsel, just as he denied on the stand, that he had any personal animosity 
against Hicks.) 
In my view, Professor Allen is correct that the current civil trial system does not prevent 
factfinders from embracing rogue stories. But in my view, that is a good thing. It may well 
be that a rogue story is the one that best accounts for the facts, but the parties may have their 
own strategic reasons for not embracing it. See John Leubsdorf, Stories and Numbers, 13 
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action appropriate? Is the factfinder's option of rejecting both par-
ties' theories limited to circumstances in which sufficient evidence 
exists to prove a specific alternative theory by a preponderance of 
the evidence? Is it limited to circumstances in which some evidence 
exists in the record suggesting a specific alternative theory, albeit 
insufficient evidence to prove the theory? Or is the factfinder free 
to reject both parties' theories solely on the basis of the weakness of 
each party's evidence, even without an evidentiary basis for an al-
ternative theory? 
These questions can only be answered in light of the law gov-
erning burdens of persuasion and the drawing of inferences from 
proven historical facts, an area in which the law of civil procedure 
and evidence intersect.147 It is the dissent's unspoken suspicion in 
Hicks that what the district court did is consistent with this body of 
law - a suspicion I share - that ultimately propels it to insist that 
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine was designed to circumvent the nor-
mal workings of the law. But Aikens dictates to the contrary: its 
core holding is that factfinding on the ultimate issue of discrimina-
tion under McDonnell Douglas-Burdine follows no special rules.148 
The argument from "necessity" comes down, therefore, to an 
argument about the extent to which the normal rules of civil proce-
dure and evidence ensure the fairness of disparate treatment litiga-
tion. Reading Burdine and Aikens together compels the conclusion 
that whatever special provisions McDonnell Douglas-Burdine 
makes for plaintiffs apply only in the earliest stages of proof. No 
special rules exist to control how the ultimate factual decision in the 
case is to be made. 
4. Economy 
The final question, then, is a question of economy. In the Hicks 
dissent's view, "the Court ... transforms the employer's burden of 
production from a device used to provide notice and promote fair-
ness into a misleading and potentially useless ritual. "149 Why did 
the Court bother to create a special proof structure for disparate 
CARDozo L. REv. 455, 459 {1991). I find it hard to see why it would add to the legitimacy of 
the civil trial system for the factfinder to be deprived of the right to infer the obvious, simply 
because the inference was in neither party's interest. 
147. For an excellent general treatment of these issues in the context of directed verdict 
motions, see Cooper, supra note 111. 
148. See supra text accompanying notes 66-83. 
149. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2761 {1993). 
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treatment cases if it was to have no effect at all on ultimate 
factfinding? 
An excellent question indeed, but not one that can serve the 
function of reviving McDonnell Douglas-Burdine. If the only justi-
fication for McDonnell Douglas-Burdine is to serve a purpose it 
cannot serve, then the correct answer is to abandon it. McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine should remain only if it serves a purpose consis-
tent with its limits, and if the general rules of civil litigation do not 
serve that purpose equally well. 
As originally envisioned, McDonnell Douglas-Burdine probably 
functioned as a primitive quasi-discovery device, aimed at "smoking 
out" the employer's evidence as to why it acted adversely to the 
plaintiff.150 We have seen, however, that there is no need for Mc-
Donnell Douglas-Burdine as a smoking-out device. McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine was also presented as a device to organize the 
court's factfinding process. But Aikens indicates that McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine no longer has a role in factfinding at trial. 151 
The answer to the "economy" question must be found, then, in 
an analysis of whether McDonnell Douglas-Burdine makes a posi-
tive contribution to the district court's treatment of the factual rec-
ord at the pretrial stage. That is the question to which I now turn. 
If, as I conclude in Part II, McDonnell Douglas-Burdine does not 
and cannot meaningfully aid and shape the district court's under-
standing of the pretrial factual record, then, as I contend in Part III, 
the only sensible choice is to abandon it. 
II. THE PRACTICAL MEANING OF McDONNELL DOUGLAS-
BURDINE: THE VIEW FROM SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Whether the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine proof structure con-
tinues to have any practical meaning after Hicks depends upon its 
utility at the pretrial stages of the case. Because all of the Court's 
disparate treatment cases, like Hicks, arose after full trial, 152 the 
150. See Bartholet, supra note 141, at 1210-11 (defending the creation of a presumption 
by a weak prima facie case in McDonnell Douglas-Burdine as a discovery device). 
151. See supra text accompanying notes 66-83. 
152. The Supreme Court has in fact never considered the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine 
structure in a summary judgment case. Judge Posner is thus incorrect when he states that the 
"original setting" of McDonnell Douglas-Burdine was the "setting of summary judgment" 
EEOC v. G-K-G, Inc., 39 F.3d 740, 747 (7th Cir. 1994). 
The exception, had certiorari not been dismissed as improvidently granted, would have 
been Harbison-Walker Refractories v. Brieck, 822 F.2d 52 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed as 
improvidently granted, 488 U.S. 226 (1988) - which would have been decided during the 
Court's controversial 1988-89 Term. The Court granted certiorari in Brieck to answer the 
following question: "Can plaintiff who alleges intentional discrimination survive summary 
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Court's jurisprudence offers no guidance as to the pretrial use of 
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine. Thus, our inquiry must turn on the 
actual pretrial practices of the lower courts. A number of questions 
can and should be asked about the effect of McDonnell Douglas-
Burdine on the course of pretrial litigation. Does McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine benefit Title VII plaintiffs by ameliorating the 
otherwise harsh rules that generally apply to plaintiffs in civil litiga-
tion? Does it benefit Title VII defendants, by creating legal obsta-
cles for plaintiffs? Or is McDonnell Douglas-Burdine essentially a 
wash, adding little or nothing to the manner in which the case 
would proceed if the question were simply the ultimate question of 
intentional discrimination vel non? 
A review of cases at the pretrial stage reveals that McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine figures most centrally in summary judgment prac-
tice.153 Summary judgment is an increasingly important tool for dis-
parate treatment defendants.154 First and foremost, the Supreme 
judgment merely by questioning employer's business judgment, without presenting evidence, 
direct or indirect, that employer's judgment in fact was motivated by intent to discriminate?" 
56 U.S.L.W. 3638 (U.S. Mar. 22, 1988) (No. 87-271). The case was argued on October 31, 
1988 - the same day as Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
There has been some speculation in the literature as to the reasons for the Court's dismis-
sal of certiorari in Brieck. See, e.g., Lanctot, supra note 23, at 79-80 (suggesting that the 
argument revealed too many disputes about the state of the factual record); Matthew D. 
O'Leary, Note, St. Mary's v. Hicks: The Supreme Court Restricts the Indirect Method of 
Proof in Title VII Claims, 13 ST. Lams U. PUB. L. REv. 821, 847, n.157 (1994) (suggesting 
that counsel for the defendant restated the issue for review during argument in a form less 
interesting to the Court). The Marshall Papers are too vague to be helpful here, except to 
suggest that there was no consensus on how Brieck could be resolved on its merits. Thurgood 
Marshall Papers, Library of Congress, box 467, file 9. 
153. My research revealed that there was far more reliance on McDonnell Douglas-Bur-
dine in summary judgment opinions than in opinions regarding other pretrial stages, for ex-
ample, motions for judgment on the pleadings (FED. R. Civ. P. 12(c)), motions for Rule 11 
sanctions, and motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim (FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). Cf. 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (noting the diminished role of motions to 
dismiss "with the advent of 'notice pleading,' " and the increased importance of summary 
judgment). But see Baumann et al., supra note 2, at 247-51 (describing movement by many 
courts away from notice pleading in intentional discrimination cases); Eric K. Yamamoto, 
Efficiency's Threat to the Value of Accessible Courts for Minorities, 25 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REv. 341, 367 (1990) (arguing that increased use of Rule 11 sanctions "undercuts notice 
pleading standards"). 
154. See, e.g., McGinley, supra note 8, at 221 n.68 (describing this trend); Thomas J. Pis-
korski, The Growing Judicial Acceptance of Summary Judgment in Age Discrimination Cases, 
18 EMPLOYEE REr.. LJ. 245 (1992) (celebrating the trend); see also John V. Jansonius, The 
Role of Summary Judgment in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 4 LAB. LAW. 747 
(1988); Gale K. Busemeyer, Comment, Summary Judgment and the ADEA Claimant: 
Problems and Patterns of Proof, 21 CoNN. L. REv. 99 (1988); Jana E. CUellar, Comment, The 
ADEA: Handling the Element of Intent in Summary Judgment Motions, 38 EMORY L.J. 523 
(1989); cf. Joe S. Cecil, Trends in Summary Judgment Practice: A Summary of Findings, FJC 
DIRECTIONS, Apr. 1991, No. 1, at 11 (showing that data reflect that the percentage of civil 
rights cases in which summary judgment is used is higher than the percentage of tort, con-
tract, and miscellaneous other cases in which summary judgment is used). 
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Court's 1986 trilogy of summary judgment cases1ss made summary 
judgment easier for defendants to obtain.156 Under these cases, 
neither the fact that the ultimate issue in the case is motive or in-
tent1s1 nor the fact that there is evidence on both sides of the is-
sueiss is sufficient to bar summary judgment. Defendants generally 
Much of the commentary on summary judgment in discrimination cases has focused on 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. I suspect that this is because jury trials have 
always been available under the ADEA (whereas they are only now available in Title VII 
disparate treatment cases pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1991). Although summary 
judgment is always desirable to defendants a5 a way of avoiding the' expense of trial, sum-
mary judgment has an added advantage when the jury is to be the factfinder: the advantage 
of having the judge rather than the jury evaluate the facts. See Frank J. Cavaliere, The Re-
cent 'Respectability' of Summary Judgments and Directed Verdicts in Intentional Age Discrimi-
nation Cases: ADEA Case Analysis Through the Supreme Court's Summary Judgment 
'Prism,' 41 CI.Ev. ST. L. REv. 103, 104 (1993) ("[F]ear of juror sympathy toward displaced 
older workers leads employers and their attorneys to believe that ADEA cases often are won 
or lost at the motion stage."); William L. Kandel, Pretext in Discrimination Defenses: A One-
Step or 'Ilvo-Step Test?, 18 EMPLOYEE REr.. L.J. 637, 638 (1993) ("the factfinder at the end of 
the ADEA proceeding is a jury," which provides strong motivation for the defendant to seek 
and the plaintiff to avoid summary judgment); Piskorski, supra, at 245 (arguing that "the jury 
factor" in ADEA cases "has a profound impact" on strategy, and is the best argument for the 
use of summary judgment). 
155. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 
U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Blee. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
156. For the role of the trilogy in making it easier for defendants ~o obtain summary 
judgment, see WIILIAM w. SCHWARZER ET AL., THE ANALYSIS AND DECISION OF SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT MonoNs 8 (1991) (stating that the trilogy "clarified the summary judgment pro-
cedure and increased its utility"); Edward Brunet, The Use and Misuse of Expert Testimony 
in Summary Judgment, 22 U.C. DA VIS L. REv. 93, 125-26 (1988) ("Courts now use rule 56 to 
dispose of specific types of cases formerly thought to be particularly inappropriate for rule 56 
treatment."); Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary 
Judgment, 100 YALE LJ. 73 (1990). For the argument that the trilogy has caused an increase 
in the use of summary judgment in disparate treatment cases, see McGinley, supra note 8, at 
208 ("Following the trilogy, the lower courts have granted summary judgment more aggres-
sively in civil rights cases ...• "). McGinley hesitates to support this claim empirically, id. at 
208 n.19, in part because "[p]robably due to the political composition of the federal bench, 
even before the trilogy, a number of courts seemed headed toward the improper use of sum-
mary judgment in discrimination cases." Id. It seems fair to say that the trilogy supported 
those courts already making aggressive use of summary judgment, and that it did not in-
stantly change the practice of those courts historically hesitant to use summary judgment. 
See Cecil, supra note 154 (arguing, based on a study of six courts, that although the rate of 
summary judgment filings increased during the 11-year period preceding the trilogy, the tril-
ogy did not result in a statistically significant increase in summary judgment filings); see also 
Gregory C. Parliman & Jonathan E. Hill, Third Circuit Law on Summary Judgment in the 
Area of Employment Discrimination, 20 SETON HALL L. REv. 786, 803 (1990) (arguing that 
the Third Circuit's traditional hostility to summary judgment has continued to affect its post-
trilogy jurisprudence). For a description of the Third Circuit's longstanding opposition to 
summary judgment, see Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra, at 77 n.26. 
157. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256 (rejecting the claim that summary judgment is inappropri-
ate where the defendant's state of mind is at issue); Stephen Calkins, Summary Judgment, 
Motions to Dismiss, and Other Examples of Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, 
74 GEO. LJ. 1065, 1118 (1986) ("Anderson explains that Rule 56 applies in a 'state of mind' 
case just as in any other."). For a critique of Anderson, see Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted 
Mirror: The Supreme Court's Shimmering View of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and 
the Adjudication Process, 49 Omo ST. LJ. 95, 145-46 (1988). 
158. The Court in Anderson held that the standard for summary judgment 
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need only "point out" the weaknesses in the factual record in their 
motion for summary judgment,159 and the fact that the plaintiff has 
the ultimate burden of proof is critical in measuring the defendant's 
summary judgment burden.160 
Disparate treatment cases have not been immune from the pro-
summary judgment trend, for all the academic protest that sum-
mary judgment in disparate treatment cases violates the spirit of 
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine.161 Furthermore, the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991 increases employers' incentives to use summary judgment 
as a way of avoiding trial. Prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the 
judge was generally the factfinder in disparate treatment cases. 
Under the new legislation, jury trials are now available in disparate 
treatment cases, as are compensatory and punitive damages.162 The 
mirrors the standard for a directed verdict, under which "judges [are no] longer required 
to submit a question to a jury merely because some evidence has been introduced by the 
party having the burden of proof, unless the evidence be of such a character that it 
would warrant the jury in finding a verdict in favor of that party." 
477 U.S. at 250-51 (quoting Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. {14 Wall.) 442, 448 {1872)); 
see also 477 U.S. at 252 (stating that in a "run-of-the-mill civil case" on a preponderance of 
the evidence standard, "the judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence un-
mistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict 
for the plaintiff on the evidence presented"). The Matsushita decision presents even stricter 
evidentiary requirements for the nonmovant seeking to avoid summary judgment. See 415 
U.S. at 587 ("If the factual context renders respondents' claim implausible •.• respondents 
must come forward with more persuasive evidence to support their claim than would other-
wise be necessary."). There is some question, however, whether the requirement that the 
nonmovant convince the court of the plausibility of the theory supported by its evidence is 
unique to certain antitrust claims. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 600-01 {White, J., dissenting); 
SCHWARZER ET AL, supra note 156, at 62 (treating Matsushita as a case in which the substan-
tive law limits the range of permissible inferences from ambiguous evidence); see also \Vil-
liam W. Schwarzer & Alan Hin:.:h, Summary Judgment After Eastman Kodak, 45 HASTINos 
LJ. 1, 7 (1993) (emphasizing substantive law as at issue in antitrust summary judgment 
cases). Notwithstanding these doubts, it is not unusual for the Matsushita "plausibility" stan-
dard to be used in discrimination cases. See, e.g., Chambers v. TRM Copy ars. Corp., 844 F. 
Supp. 183, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Dash v. Equitable Life Assurance Socy., 753 F. Supp. 1062, 
1065 (E.D.N.Y. 1990); Gavie v. Stroh Brewery Co., 668 F. Supp. 608, 613 (E.D. Mich. 1987); 
see also Stempel, supra note 157, at 175 n.393 (arguing that the "plausibility" requirement is 
being misused in discrimination cases); Yamamoto, supra note 153, at 375. 
159. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-25 (holding that if the moving party does not have the 
total burden of persuasion, "the burden on the moving party may be discharged by 'showing' 
- that is, pointing out to the district court - that there is an absence of evidence to support 
the nonmoving party's case"). 
160. Id. at 324 (noting the significance of the circumstance that "the nonmoving party will 
bear the burden of proof at trial"); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252 ("[T]he inquiry involved in a 
ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict necessarily implicates the 
substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits."). 
161. See, e.g., McGinley, supra note 8; Busemeyer, supra note 154, at 100 (concluding 
"that summary judgment is an inappropriate tool for the resolution of age discrimination 
claims"). See generally Yamamoto, supra note 153. 
162. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 1981a {Supp. N 1992)), amended 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to provide that in intentional 
discrimination cases brought under Title VII in which "the complaining party cannot recover 
under section 1981," compensatory damages and punitive damages are available up to a com-
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increased incentive to seek summary judgment is obvious: sum-
mary judgment now allows defendants to avoid juries and damages 
awards.163 
Given the prevalence of summary judgment motions in dispa-
rate treatment cases, it is important to ask whether McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine functions well as a method for analyzing the facts 
when the case is at the summary judgment stage. It is equally vital 
to know whether McDonnell Douglas-Burdine is in fact used in the 
adjudication of summary judgment motions and whether it aids or 
hinders coherent analysis of the evidence. Those questions will be 
asked and answered in this section. 
My analysis will proceed through the three stages of the Mc-
Donnell Douglas-Burdine proof structure, and will show that 
although district courts purport to use McDonnell Douglas-
Burdine, the proof structure actually does little to aid their analysis 
of the facts at summary judgment. Indeed, in practice courts are 
left largely to their own devices when it comes to determining 
which factual questions are to be addressed at which stage of the 
proof structure. Some courts simply collapse the stages of the in-
quiry together without admitting they are doing so. Collapsing the 
proof structure creates results hardly different from abandoning it. 
Furthermore, to the extent that McDonnell Douglas-Burdine does 
shape decisionmaking, its effects are often detrimental to plaintiffs 
bined limit ranging from $50,000 to $300,000, depending on the size of the employer. 42 
U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (1992). Punitive damages require a showing of "malice or .•• reckless 
indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual." 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981a(b)(l) (1992). A jury trial is available in any case in which the complaining party 
seeks compensatory or punitive damages. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (1992). 
163. Employment discrimination plaintiffs are far more successful in cases tried to juries 
than in cases in which the judge is the factfinder. Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and 
Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights and Prisoner Cases, 77 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1591, tbl. II (1989) 
(reporting a 19.2% national success rate for bench trials, versus a 42.6% success rate for jury 
trials). Of course, since jury cases were overwhelmingly age-discrimination cases, the data 
may reflect a jury sympathy for claims of older employees that might well not exist for race 
or gender claims. Cf. Visser v. Packer Engg. Assoc., 924 F.2d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 1991) (Flaum, 
J., dissenting) ("[E]mployers and their counsel may well conclude that ADEA cases are won 
or lost on summary judgment, because jurors find it difficult to close their hearts to the plight 
of the terminated older employee but easy to open the purse strings of his employer."); see 
also supra note 154. Nonetheless, the data suggest that employers who fear jury trials do so 
for good reason. 
It is not only the incentive to seek summary judgment that increases in jury cases. In a 
review of antitrust cases, Calkins, supra note 157, found that summary judgment is more 
frequently granted in jury cases. He observes: "Courts appear more willing to grant defense 
motions for summary relief when the costs of erroneous plaintiff verdicts are relatively high," 
id. at 1138, despite the fact that "[c]onventional wisdom would predict a decline with increas-
ing complexity, and complexity should be associated with high damage requests and class 
status. Apparently, some courts want to prevent finders of fact from deciding high-stakes 
cases." Id. 
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- the very people it supposedly helps - because McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine renders courts less .able to recognize forms of dis-
crimination that do not straightforwardly mater. the proof struc-
ture's template. 
My analysis has both a normative and a descriptive component. 
I am concerned both with what courts should do and with what 
courts do in fact. The descriptive component of my analysis draws 
on a sample of federal district court cases: specifically, a sample 
consisting of all of the federal district court disparate treatment 
summary judgment cases available on WESTLAW with decision 
dates between Dec. 15, 1993 and May 31, 1994.164 Three method-
ological points are in order regarding this sample and the manner of 
its use. 
First, I make no representation that any of the cases I discuss 
are "lead cases"165 - quite the contrary. Most of the cases I am 
analyzing were not reported in Federal Supplement or by the lead-
164. The sample is based on a search in WESTLAW's federal district court database, 
conducted on June 13, 1994, of district court summary judgment opinions in which the court 
cited the Supreme Court's decision in Hicks and identified the case as involving "intentional 
discrimination," "disparate treatment," "Burdine," "McDonnell Douglas," or "pretext," and 
which were decided between mid-December of 1993 and late May of 1994. The search 
yielded 70 cases. I recognize that such a sample is not truly representative of the most "rou-
tine" district court cases - because such cases are likely to be disposed of without any writ-
ten opinion, or at least without an opinion of sufficient specificity or interest to be worthy of 
electronic publication. See Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, Studying the Iceberg 
from Its Tip: A Comparison of Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination 
Cases, 24 LAw & SoCY. REv. 1133 (1990). As a matter of research methodology, however, it 
is difficult to envision a study of the role of McDonnell Douglas-Burdine in judges' analysis 
of the factual record on summary judgment that did not tum, at the very least, on the analysis 
of written opinions that contain enough of the factual background of the case to make it 
possible to look behind the legal conclusions stated in the opinion. Thus, even a sample 
constructed from the files of district court cases rather than from the WESTLAW database 
would be subject to the criticism that it ignored the most "routine" cases: namely, those that 
settled prior to the filing or disposition of a summary judgment motion, or which were re-
solved by the judge without written opinion. The search for "routineness" inevitably con-
flicts, then, with the need to analyze expressions of judicial reasoning. For all that my sample 
is likely underrepresentative of the most routine disparate treatment cases, however, the 
cases are "routine" in the sense that the opinions are overwhelmingly fact-bound and are 
written in a tone that belies no pretention as to the broader precedential value of the cases. 
I recognize also that the use of the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework by judges 
does not exhaust the potential or actual uses of the framework: specifically, it may well be 
used by parties and their lawyers in evaluating the case. There is, however, no reason to 
believe that if the framework is ill-suited to the decision-writing process, it is any better suited 
to any of its other potential or actual uses. If, as I argue, the typical disparate treatment case 
turns on the evaluation of the plaintiff's performance or job qualifications, and judges do not 
find it helpful to have to decide which specific McDonnell Douglas-Burdine "stage" that 
evaluation "belongs in," there is no reason to think that parties and lawyers assessing the 
settlement value of their cases would find it any more helpful to make use of the framework. 
165. For a different approach, see Schwab, supra note fr/, at 11-12 (discussing method of 
examining "lead cases" rather than "the hidebound mass of cases" to demonstrate that the 
seeming disorder in wrongful termination litigation is actually reaching economically efficient 
results). 
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ing looseleaf services, let alone identified through subsequent deci-
sions as pivotal cases in the field. My interest is in whether 
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine aids or constrains decisionmaking in 
ordinary cases. The federal district courts are a community of prac-
tice in which McDonnell Douglas-Burdine is the established meth-
odology for deciding disparate treatment cases. My interests are in 
the everyday life of that community. In it, courts recite the McDon-
nell Douglas-Burdine framework at all of the appropriate occa-
sions, and treat it as noncontroversial. My question is whether the 
courts that recite it do so with any consistency; whether, once re-
cited, courts use it with any consistency; and, perhaps most central, 
whether the courts manifest any measure of self-reflection about 
the extent to which they deviate from it in practice.166 
Second, for all my talk of "samples," I make no quasi-scientific 
claims for my selection of cases. My approach is qualitative rather 
than quantitative.167 Frirthermore, my "sample" of cases did not 
exhaust all of the issues that need to be considered in determining 
whether McDonnell Douglas-Burdine is a worthwhile method for 
analyzing facts in the summary judgment context. I have thus 
reached outside my sample on a number of occasions, and, as 
noted, some of the analysis that follows is normative rather than 
descriptive. 
Finally, my analysis does not aim at determining whether the 
courts correctly grant or deny summary judgment motions. It 
would be impossible to determine "correctness" from the face of 
the decision, in that the manner in which the district court states the 
"facts" depends upon its subjective judgments of materiality and 
166. I am interested in the role that McDonnell Douglas-Burdine plays as an "officializ-
ing strategy," a strategy "aimed at producing 'regular' practices." BOURDIEU, supra note 106, 
at 40. Such a strategy produces the same results when it is used by social actors who stand in 
very different relationships to the society's official rules. "The responsible man" produces 
results "immediately in line with the official rule, because produced by a regulated habitus," 
and is therefore well suited to serving as "delegate and spokesman" for the official rule. Id. 
In sharp contrast in method if not in result is the "well-meaning rule-breaker who by conced-
ing the appearances or intent of conformity, that is, recognition, to rules he can neither re-
spect nor deny, contributes to the - entirely official - survival of the rule." Id. From my 
standpoint, it is important to know whether district court judges who affirm the McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine proof structure in their daily practice do so as "responsible men" or "well-
meaning rule-breakers." 
167. My original plan had been to look at a larger number of decisions and to "code" 
them for whether and how they deviated from the strict application of the McDonnell Doug-
las-Burdine framework. Experience proved that the judgment of whether a court was "fol-
lowing" or "fudging" the framework was too nuanced to quantify. I determined that it would 
be better to describe the most richly illustrative cases than to attempt a quantitative 
approach. 
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relevance.16s Furthermore, one need not believe that "plaintiffs are 
losing cases they should win and it's all the fault of McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine" to be concerned about how McDonnell Douglas-
Burdine functions in practice. The conclusion that the McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine proof structure creates a kind of false conscious-
ness, a belief that decisionmaking is meaningfully channeled by the 
law when it in fact is not, generates a sufficient basis for concern 
irrespective of the legal results the structure produces. The lion's 
share of the analysis of individual intentional discrimination cases, 
both in the Supreme Court and in academia, has focused on estab-
lishing, repairing, and fine-tuning the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine 
structure. If the product of over twenty years of that effort is an 
"official" methodology that does riot in fact govern practice, then 
perhaps it is time to stop thinking that one can improve practice by 
improving the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine structure. 
A. The Prima Facie Case on Summary Judgment 
We saw in Part I that the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine line of 
cases failed to resolve major problems in the nature of the required 
prima facie case. The district court cases directly reflect that fail-
ure. The district courts have been left to struggle with the question 
of where issues of "qualification" and "performance" fall among 
the stages of the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework, and with 
whether plaintiffs must provide evidence beyond the bare elements 
of the prima facie case to further support an inference of inten-
tional discrimination. The district court cases show all of the signs 
of strain that one would expect to result from an obligation to use a 
doctrine that is empty at its core. 
1. The Pervasive Problem of "Qualifications" 
The lack of conceptual clarity shows up most clearly and dis-
turbingly in the treatment of the prima facie case requirement that 
the plaintiff be "qualified" for the job at issue. More than twenty 
years after McDonnell Douglas, the lower courts have not reached 
168. Carol Banta, my research assistant for this phase of the project, was surprised (given 
her liberal bent) to see how often she agreed with the decision to grant summary judgment to 
the defendant. Part of her acquiescence in the pro-defendant results was certainly the weak-
ness of many of the cases or at least the weakness of how they were litigated by plaintiffs' 
counsel. On the latter problem, see KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE ClvIL RIGHTS SOCIETY (1988). 
But part of her willingness to agree with the case outcomes was likely a response to the 
inevitable rhetorical force of the written opinion, achieved in no small measure by the judge-
author's control over the presentation of the facts. Cf. CLIFFORD GEERlZ, WoRKS AND 
LlvEs: THE ANTHROPOLOGIST AS AUTHOR 49-72 (1988); JAMES B. WHITE, THE LEOAL IM· 
AGINATION 858 (1973). 
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consensus on an issue that pervades all of the major postures in 
which disparate treatment cases arise: hiring, promotion, and 
termination. 
a. The "Qualifications" Issue in Hiring Cases. McDonnell 
Douglas itself addressed a case of discriminatory failure to hire. 
But despite the fact that McDonnell Douglas set forth the content 
of the prima facie case in hiring cases, there is little conceptual co-
herence in the district courts as to how to handle the issue of "quali-
fications" in hiring cases. 
Recall that in McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff met the stan-
dard qualifications for the job, except for one . minor problem: 
while on layoff status, the plaintiff, who was a civil rights activist, 
had allegedly engaged in a "stall-in" and "lock-in" that interfered 
with the employer's business. In lay terms, an applicant who has a 
track record of sabotaging the employer's business is not generally 
viewed as "qualified" for the job - he lacks appropriate character 
or trustworthiness. The Court so acknowledged, noting that the 
employer might reasonably predict that " 'an applicant's past par-
ticipation in unlawful conduct directed at his prospective employer 
might indicate the applicant's lack of a responsible attitude toward 
performing work for that employer.' "169 Nonetheless, the Court 
did not deem the unlawful conduct relevant to the question of 
"qualifications" for purposes of the prima facie case: the Court 
held that the prima facie case had been made out and expressed no 
concern that the plaintiff's conduct might render him "unqualified" 
for prima facie case purposes.110 
"Qualification" at the prima facie case stage, then, is a term of 
art in McDonnell Douglas: it includes some subset of the elements 
that make an applicant acceptable to the employer. The precise 
content of that subset, however, remains uncertain - both in Mc-
Donnell Douglas itself and in the district court cases. For exam-
169. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 806 n.21 {1972) (quoting Green v. 
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d 337, 353 {8th Cir. 1972)). 
170. 411 U.S. at 802. 
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ple,111 in Rodgers v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 112 Smithkline 
sought to fill an "associate lab technician" position in a laboratory 
that conducts clinical studies using pigs; the advertised job consisted 
solely of dirty animal-care tasks. Smithkline advertised the job and 
listed the required qualifications: "The successful candidate will be 
familiar with animal handling (livestock) and able to lift feedbags 
and restrain animals. Absence of known allergies to feed, animals 
or drugs is required. A high school diploma is also required." The 
plaintiff, Janet Rodgers, applied for the job and met the advertised 
qualifications. Smithkline turned her down: Smithkline wanted to 
hire someone who would not aspire to higher-level tasks, and as-
serted that Rodgers was overqualified and unlikely to be satisfied 
with the job. The court agreed that Rodgers was overqualified and 
therefore that she "did not meet the criterion for the position";173 
on that basis, the court held that Rodgers failed to prove her prima 
facie case. 
The court's prima facie case analysis departed from that of Mc-
Donnell Douglas in a significant way.114 In McDonnell Douglas, 
Green made out a prima facie case by showing that he met the ob-
jective qualifications for the job; the employer's prediction that 
Green would not have the attitude necessary for good performance 
was held relevant only at the rebuttal and pretext stages of the case. 
Why not the same treatment in Rodgers? In Rodgers, the court 
could just as easily have said that Rodgers was minimally qualified, 
and that Smithkline's decision that she was too likely to be dissatis-
fied with the job was irrelevant at the prima facie case stage. There 
is no reason why the prima facie case should encapsulate only the 
171. Finding contemporary examples of confusion as to the meaning of "being qualified" 
in hiring cases is renQered difficult by the scarcity of hiring cases in any sample of Title VII 
cases. As Donohue and Siegelman documented in their 1991 study of litigation of Title VII 
cases, termination cases outnumbered hiring cases by a ratio of 6 to 1 by 1985; indeed, the 
number of hiring cases had declined by 1985 from a peak reached in 1976. John J. Donohue 
& Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. 
L REv. 983, 1015-16 (1991). My sample of cases included only two hiring discrimination 
cases. 
172. 64 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 'll 42,981 (E.D. Pa.), affd. mem., 43 F.3d 1462 (3d Cir. 
1994). 
173. 64 Empl. Prac. Dec. 'l! 42,981 at 79,464. 
174. As stated in McDonnell Douglas and reiterated in Rodgers, the elements of a prima 
facie case are: membership in a protected application and qualification for the job; rejection 
despite qualifications. 411 U.S. at 802. The last "standard" element, that "the position re-
mained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of the complain-
ant's qualifications," 411 U.S. at 802, is not applicable to a case in which the employer in fact 
hired another candidate who was not a member of plaintiff's protected class for the single 
open position. In fact, the Rodgers case is a case in the posture Justice Stevens was con-
cerned about in his Burdine memoranda: a case in which a choice was made among diverse 
candidates vying for a single opening. 
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"minimal," objective requirements in McDonnell Douglas, but go 
beyond them in Rodgers.us 
b. The "Qualifications" Problem in Termination Cases. Most 
disparate treatment cases are termination cases,176 as my sample re-
flects. In most termination cases, the central issue in the case is the 
adequacy of the plaintiff's job performance. Take excessive absen-
teeism as an example. Suppose an employer claims it fired the 
plaintiff for excessive absenteeism, and the plaintiff denies the ab-
senteeism charge, shows that she was qualified for the job when she 
was hired and remains so now, and claims that her performance was 
adequate in all respects. If McDonnell Douglas-Burdine is to be 
useful in such a case, the framework must be relatively clear in de-
lineating the extent to which these different performance and quali-
fication issues are relevant at the prima facie case stage. In 
practice, no such clarity exists. 
Courts use many different definitions of "qualification" in ter-
mination cases, definitions with important differences in nuance. 
They include: "that she was doing her work well enough to meet 
the employer's legitimate expectations";177 "that he was qualified 
for the position he held";178 "that he was doing his job well enough 
to rule out the possibility that he was fired for inadequate job per-
formance";179 that "she 'possesses the basic skills necessary for per-
175. Third Circuit precedent on the consideration of subjective qualifications provided 
the court in Rodgers with little clear guidance. In Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-
Cohen, 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 88 (1993), which the Rodgers court 
relied upon for its statement of the elements of the prima facie case, the Third Circuit ex-
pressed the view that "[i]n Title VII cases involving a dispute over 'subjective' qualifications, 
we have recognized that the qualification issue should often be resolved in the second and 
third stages of the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine analysis, to avoid putting too onerous a bur-
den on the plaintiff in establishing a prima facie case." 983 F.2d at 523. In the Ezold case 
itself, a case involving that most highly subjective decision, promotion to partnership in a law 
firm, the Third Circuit found a prima facie case made out on several favorable evaluations 
and a "good" rating on an evaluation memo, and left all of the finer points of partnership 
potential - which turned on the firm's claim that "she did not possess sufficient legal ana-
lytic ability" to handle the responsibilities of a partner - to the later stages of the case. 983 
F.2d at 526. But then again, the Third Circuit in Ezold immediately thereafter stated that 
"we have refused to adopt a blanket rule" to the effect that a minimal view of "qualification" 
should apply at the prima facie case stage. 983 F.2d at 523. What the Third Circuit did not do 
was give any guidance on when "more" should be required. 
176. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 171, at 984 ("While most cases formerly attacked 
discrimination in hiring, today the vast majority of all litigation suits challenge discrimination 
in discharge."). 
177. Jarosz v. Seka Air Freight, Inc., No. 92 C 7246, 1994 WL 11649, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 
6, 1994). 
178. Lopez v. Schwan's Sales Enters., Inc., 845 F. Supp. 1440, 1445 (D. Kan. 1994). 
179. Mukherjee v. Sheraton Palace Hotel, No. C-93-2905 DU, 1994 WL 173889, at *3 
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 1994) (quoting Sengupta v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 804 F.2d 1072, 1075 
(9th Cir. 1986)). 
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formance of [the] job' ";180 or that plaintiff was "doing what [her 
employers] wanted her to do."181 Being "qualified for the position 
you hold" may not have anything to do with your actual perform-
ance in the job. If the qualifications for being a high school teacher 
include an education degree, student-teaching hours, and state cer-
tification, a poorly-performing teacher does not become "unquali-
fied for the position" through his poor performance. The school 
system must, instead, rely on something other than mere "qualifica-
tion" - in-class observations or test scores, for example - in eval-
uating him. The same can be said about "possessing the basic skills 
necessary for performance on the job." If the skills for being a 
firefighter are strength, speed, and a required level of literacy, the 
fact that a firefighter is lazy does not mean that he lacks the "basic 
skills" for performance: it simply means he is not using the skills he 
has. "Doing the job well enough" to avoid discharge is not the 
same as "meeting the employer's legitimate expectations": I sus-
pect that many employees do not meet their employer's "minimal 
expectations," but they are retained on the payroll because their 
employers fear that new hires might fall even further from the 
mark. 
In practice, matters only get worse. In most cases, the em-
ployer's stated justification for firing the plaintiff will be a specified 
performance deficiency. In such a case, the distinction among the 
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine "stages" is bound to break down.182 
Take as an example Mukherjee v. Sheraton Palace Hote/.183 
Mukherjee bussed tables in a hotel restaurant and had a series of 
disciplinary complaints and altercations with supervisors. The court 
dutifully stated the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework with 
its three separate steps. Its analysis, however, collapsed the three 
steps. The court stated the prima facie case standard as whether 
Mukherjee "was doing his job well enough to rule out the possibil-
ity that he was fired for inadequate job performance."184 The 
phrase demonstrates that the court tailored the prima facie case 
180. Saucier v. Edgewater Constr. Co., No. 92-CV-1111, 1994 WL 36363, at •6 (N.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 4, 1994) (quoting Owens v. New York City Haus. Auth., 934 F.2d 405, 409 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 502 U.S. 964 (1991)). 
181. Moffett v. Chicago Transit Auth., No. 90 C 4657, 1994 WL 127711, at ~ (N.D. Ill. 
Apr. 7, 1994). 
182. Clear examples in my sample are Warner v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., No. 92 
CIV. 3056 (JSM), 1994 WL 68226 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 1994); Iftekaruddin v. Xerox Corp., No. 
93 C 1455, 1994 WL 55675 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 1994); Stinneford v. Spiegel, Inc., 845 F. Supp. 
1243 (N.D. Ill. 1994). 
183. No. C93-2905 Dl.J, 1994 WL 173889 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 1994). 
184. 1994WL173889, at •4. 
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standard in anticipation of the employer's stated justification. The 
court then held that Mukherjee failed to meet that standard "since 
there is sufficient evidence that [he] was fired for inadequate job 
performance."185 The statement of Mukherjee's evidentiary show-
ing anticipated that inadequate job performance would be the em-
ployer's stated reason, and essentially concluded that the plaintiff 
produced insufficient evidence to prove that inadequate job per-
formance was a pretext for intentional discrimination. What, then, 
is the purpose of having a three step inquiry? 
Where qualification or performance are at issue, the cases re-
flect two possible ways to avoid collapsing the prima facie case and 
pretext stages of the analysis. One approach is to do what the 
Supreme Court essentially did in McDonnell Douglas: to segment 
the analysis so that the particular aspect of qualification or perform-
ance that the employer will draw into question is deemed irrelevant 
at the prima facie case stage. So, for example, in Jarosz v. Seko Air 
Freight, Inc., 186 the plaintiff was discharged for continuing a rela-
tionship with a former coworker who had become a competitor and 
was suspected of stealing trade secrets. The employer asserted that 
it had established a rule against employee contact with the competi-
tor, and that the employee's performance was inadequate because 
she had disobeyed the rule. The court decided that the rule viola-
tion should not be dealt with at the prima facie case stage, simply 
concluding that: "Defendant's allegation that Plaintiff defied De-
fendant's orders . . . is more appropriately introduced as a legiti-
mate reason for terminating Plaintiff rather than as evidence that 
Plaintiff was not meeting Defendant's reasonable performance 
expectations."187 · 
The other way courts have maintained the distinction between 
the prima facie case and pretext stages is by holding the element of 
performance at issue to be relevant at the prima facie case stage, 
but deeming it satisfactorily addressed by a weaker evidentiary 
showing than would be required at the final stage of the case. Lo-
pez v. Schwan's Sales Enterprises, Inc. 188 combined two ways of re-
185. 1994 WL 173889, at *4. 
186. Jarosz v. Seko Air Freight, Inc., No. 92 C 7246, 1994 WL 11649 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 
1994). 
187. Jarosz, 1994 WL 11649, at *4; see also Emerson v. Boeing Co., Civ. A. No. 92-1279-
MLB, 1994 WL 149191 (D. Kan. Apr. 1, 1994} (holding that in accord with Tenth Circuit law 
it is inappropriate to consider the misconduct that was the reason for the discharge - sexual 
harassment in violation of company rules - in deciding whether the employee was doing 
"satisfactory work"). 
188. 845 F. Supp. 1440 (D. Kan. 1994). 
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ducing the evidentiary burden. The court held that: "A plaintiff 
can sufficiently establish his qualifications in making a prima facie 
case by his own testimony ... or by showing that he continued to 
possess the same objective qualifications as when he was hired."189 
The decided cases also demonstrate other less formal means of 
keeping the stages of the case analytically distinct. For example, 
where a plaintiff's performance after a certain date is ultimately at 
issue in the case, the court might be satisfied with positive evalua-
tions before that date for purposes of making out a prima facie 
case.190 
But courts are not always willing to employ a weakened proof 
standard for "qualification" at the prima facie case stage. Courts 
often hold, for example, that the plaintiff's "own assessment of her 
abilities is not dispositive to establish a prima facie case" because 
"[t]he focus of the Title VII inquiry is on the perception of the deci-
sion maker," and thereby reject the chance to deal with the most 
subjective aspects of the employer's decisionmaking at the latest 
possible stage of the case.191 
c. The "Qualifications" Problem in Promotion Cases. My 
sample of summary judgment cases included six cases in which em-
ployees challenged an employer's failure to grant them promo-
tions.192 By and large, these six cases fall into the patterns 
discussed above. In some, the courts effectively deferred considera-
tion of the qualifications issue to the pretext stage, either by assum-
ing arguendo that the plaintiff was qualified for purposes of the 
prima facie case,193 or by simply declining to mention the prima 
189. 845 F. Supp. at 1445; see also Edwards v. Interboro Instit., 840 F. Supp. 222, 227 
(E.D.N.Y. 1994) ("[A]n assertion by the plaintiff that his work was satisfactory can be suffi-
cient" at the prima facie case stage, though it certainly would not be at the pretext stage if 
performance is called into question.); Saucier v. Edgewater Constr. Co., No. 92-CV-1111, 
1994 WL 36363 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 1994) (finding that an assertion by the plaintiff of her own 
satisfactory performance would be sufficient). 
190. Stewart v. Personnel Pool of Am., Inc., Civ. A. No. 92-2581, 1993 WL 525575, at •4, 
*9 (D.N.J. Dec. 16, 1993). 
191. Chilson v. Baltimore Sun Co., Civ. A. No. HAR 92-1131, 1994 WL 150925, at *4 (D. 
Md. Feb. 8, 1994). Chilson belies any notion that plaintiffs can make out a prima facie case 
through evidence at their disposal before discovery. If the qualification issue at the prima 
facie case stage turns on the employer's perception, it seems obvious that the testimony and 
records of the employer will form a necessary part of this aspect of the prima facie case. For 
another example of a court expressly rejecting a weakened evidentiary standard at the prima 
facie case stage, see Stoval v. Pinkerton Sec., Inc., No. C93-1640 EFL, 1994 WL 125202 (N.D. 
Cal. Apr. 5, 1994) (rejecting a prima facie case based on the plaintiff's demonstration that he 
still met the minimum qualifications for the job as they were defined when he was hired). 
192. See cases cited infra notes 193 to 196. 
193. Brundage v. National Broadcasting Co., No. 90 Civ. 1730 (MBM), 1994 WL 68502 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1994). 
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facie case requirement at all.194 In others, the court examined the 
issue of "qualification" for prima facie case purposes on a dimin-
ished evidentiary standard.19s 
One of the promotion cases, Profit v. Marriott Corp.,196 reflects 
a far more radic~ sidestepping of the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine 
structure. Profit, a black woman, was a hotel food service employee 
in a low-level position. She was supervised by a chef whose kitchen 
was segregated, who made clear that he did not want black women 
working in the kitchen, and who made race-based jokes, for exam-
ple, that perhaps she could cook "soul food." She sought a promo-
tion into a management position under the same chef, but was 
denied the position and was told to reapply after meeting attend-
ance standards and improving her performance ratings from "aver-
age" to "above average." The court dutifully recited the 
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework. It then held that "the at-
mosphere at the Long Island Marriott was sufficiently infused with 
racial and gender bias" so that bias "may have infected plaintiff's 
lateness record" - and, one assumes, her performance level as well 
- thereby precluding summary judgment.197 The court made no 
effort to relate this "infused atmosphere" to the stages of the 
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine analysis. 
194. LaPierre v. Benson Nissan, Inc., Civ. A. No. 92-3855, 1994 WL 149077 (E.D. La. 
Apr. 18, 1994); Lynch v. General Motors Corp., No. C.A. 90-11682-WF, 1994 WL 129573 (D. 
Mass. Feb. 18, 1994). In LaPierre, the court noted that "as to his qualifications for the posi-
tion, plaintiff offers nothing other than his own self-serving assertions that he was qualified." 
1994 WL 149077 at *3. Since this is a court that does not pennit self-serving assertions to 
anchor a prima facie case, the court should have found that the plaintiff did not satisfy the 
prima facie case requirement. But the court did not so hold, nor did it assume the existence 
of a prima facie case arguendo or move to the pretext stage as the basis for an alternative 
holding. Instead, the court was simply silent on the question of the prima facie case, advanc-
ing instead to the pretext stage - at which point the qualifications issue was again disposi-
tive. In Lynch, the court also skipped the prima facie case stage, despite the fact that the 
plaintiff's qualifications for the promotion were a key issue in the case. 
195. Martin v. City College, No. 91 Civ. 7089 (KMW), 1994 wL 142038 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 
20, 1994); Sloan v. Boeing Co., Civ. A. No. 92-1014-MLB, 1994 WL 149197 (D. Kan. Apr. 1, 
1994). In Martin, the plaintiff had qualified for the promotion on a probationary basis by 
taking a test. The court treated the successful test result as sufficient evidence of qualifica-
tion for prima facie case purposes, despite the claim that the plaintiff's work while on proba-
tion was inadequate. Martin, 1994 WL 142038, at *l-2. In Sloan, the court stated the 
plaintiff's "qualifications" - his experience, technical skills, training - and held that these 
meant that "plaintiff was sufficiently qualified for the promotions to at least raise a prima 
facie inference." Sloan, 1994 WL 149197, at *11. It did so, however, without any specific 
reference to what qualifications were required for the promotions at issue. With no specified 
minimum "qualification" threshold to judge Sloan's accomplishments and skills against, the 
conclusion that Sloan was "qualified" for prima facie case purposes is best understood as a 
reduction of the evidentiary burden at the prima facie case stage. 
196. No. 92 Civ. 2665 (JSM), 1994 WL 4272 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 1994). 
197. 1994 WL 4272, at *3. 
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The chef's segregated kitchen and his racist and sexist com-
ments are classic "pretext" evidence. In a strict rendering of Mc-
Donnell Douglas-Burdine, this evidence would not be material 
unless the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case.198 Given the 
interdependency of all of the evidence, the court in Profit realized 
that it made no sense to come to any judgment about whether the 
plaintiff had satisfied the "qualification" requirement of the prima 
facie case. Instead, the court simply ignored McDonnell Douglas-
Burdine altogether. 
These cases demonstrate that to the limited extent that McDon-
nell Douglas-Burdine constrains district court decisionmaking on 
the issue of "qualifications" at summary judgment, it detracts from 
the district court's ability to understand the issue in all its complex-
ity. If the district courts recite the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine 
proof structure but blend the prima facie case and pretext stages in 
practice, there is no purpose in requiring them to continue to recite 
the structure. Additionally, plaintiffs should not bear the risk that 
their district court - unlike the district court in Profit - will take 
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine at its word and strictly require them 
to prove "qualification" without recourse to "pretext" evidence. 
2. Evidence "Creating an Inference of Discrimination" at the 
Prima Facie Case Stage 
Some courts include in their statement of the prima facie case 
the independent requirement that the plaintiff prove "circum-
stances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. "199 That re-
quirement clearly tends, in practice, to break down the distinction 
between the prima facie case and the pretext stage of the case. 
Martin v. City College of New York200 typifies this approach. In 
that case, Martin, a black male of West Indian origin, claimed that 
he was demoted by his supervisors, blacks of southern American 
ancestry, for failing to discipline employees of African, West Indian, 
and Latino descent who - in Martin's opinion - were doing satis-
factory work. The evidence "giving rise to an inference of discrimi-
nation" was that Martin showed that he received negative 
performance evaluations only after he refused to discipline the em-
ployees. The court later found this evidence to be relevant to plain-
198. See infra text accompanying notes 226-27. 
199. As already noted, see supra text accompanying notes 58-65, Justice Powell included 
in the Burdine definition of the prima facie case what I called a "stealth" requirement that 
the evidence be sufficient to "create an inference of discrimination." 
200. Martin, 1994 WL 142038. 
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tiff's proof of pretext. This redundant use of evidence raises the 
question why there should be a division between prim.a facie and 
pretext "stages" of the case at all, once "circumstances creating an 
inference of discrimination" are included as part of the prim.a facie 
case standard.201 
a. Comparative Evidence. It is not uncommon for summary 
judgment courts to require comparative evidence - evidence that 
the employer treated like cases differently - as a way of enforcing 
the requirement that the prim.a facie case "be sufficient to create an 
inference of discrimination." They do so despite the fact that Mc-
Donnell Douglas-Burdine does not by its terms require compara-
tive evidence at all, let alone at the prim.a facie case stage. 
The courts that have so required do not agree as to how to im-
plement the requirement in practice. This uncertainty stems at least 
in part from the tendency of strict comparative-evidence require-
ments to break down formal distinctions between disparate treat-
ment and pattern-and-practice cases, and between the prim.a facie 
and pretext phases of the disparate treatment case. 
Some courts state a comparative-evidence standard but apply it 
without any cognizance of the function the requirement is supposed 
to serve. Take, for example, Jackson v. Good Lad Co.,202 in which 
the court required a plaintiff in a reduction-in-force case to show 
that "her co-workers, who were not a minority [sic], were not dis-
charged."203 The court proceeded to find that requirement met, but 
later noted that of the ten other employees who were fired, six were 
white, two were hispanic, one was asian, and one was black. Obvi-
ously, some of her nonminority co-workers were fired. The court 
claimed to use comparative evidence to create an inference of dis-
crimination, but the comparative evidence plainly did not support 
such an inference. 
201. Along the same lines, see, e.g., Saucier v. Edgewater Constr. Co., No. 92-CV-1111, 
1994 WL 36363, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 1994) (noting at the prima facie case stage that 
"plaintiff has come forth with nothing to show that it was not her job performance, but rather 
that it was her race, which was a factor in [the employer]'s eventual decision to terminate 
her" - an inquiry that is identical to the question of pretext); Katzev v. Catholic N.Y., No. 
92 CIV. 2664 (LMM}, 1994 WL 23072 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1994) (holding that evidence at 
prima facie case stage suggesting ''membership in the protected class was a factor" includes 
sex-related comments of a type ordinarily considered at the pretext stage); Cianfrano v. Bab-
bitt, 851 F. Supp. 41 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) (reciting prima facie case evidence establishing "cir-
cumstances surrounding [the] termination • • . from which a trier of fact could infer 
discrimination" that was essentially identical to the plaintiff's pretext evidence). 
202. No. 93-2362, 1994 WL 156930 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 28, 1994). 
203. 1994 WL 156930, at *2. 
2292 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 93:2229 
Other courts have required closer comparisons - often to the 
point of impossibility. In Chilson v. Baltimore Sun Co.,204 the plain-
tiff was fired because of a combination of factors. The court re-
quired that her comparative evidence point to employees "who had 
the combination of excessive absenteeism, poor performance, and 
insubordinate conduct that she manifested."2os The only compara-
tive cases that the court "counted" were those that contained all 
three factors relied upon by the employer. Some courts require the 
match to be even closer. According to the court in Magruder v. 
Runyon,206 
the plaintiff must show that the "comparables" are similarly-situated 
in all respects. Thus, to be deemed "similarly-situated", the individu-
als must ... have dealt with the same supervisor, have been subject to 
the same standards and have engaged in the same conduct without 
such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish 
their conduct or the employer's treatment of them for it.207 
Taken to the extreme, disparate treatment cases can become pat-
tern and practice cases, and the "comparative" data must be statisti-
cally significant for a prima facie case to be established.2os 
Serious problems inhere in requiring the plaintiff to produce 
comparative data at the prima facie stage of the case. First, to the 
extent that the prima facie case purports to consist of factual 
elements logically necessary for proof of discrimination, a 
204. Civ. A. No. HAR 92-1131, 1994 WL 150925 (D. Md. Feb. 8, 1994). 
205. 1994 WL 150925, at *4. 
206. 844 F. Supp. 696, 702 (D. Kan. 1994), affd., No. 94-3069, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 
12291 (10th Cir. May 22, 1995). 
207. 844 F. Supp. at 702 (citations omitted) (quoting Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 
577, 583 (6th Cir. 1992)). 
208. A startlingly clear example of this approach, drawn from outside my district court 
case sample, is the opinion of Judge Posner for the Seventh Circuit in Bush v. Common-
wealth Edison Co., 990 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1993): 
A plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination by showing that, in 
a large department, a coworker of another race was treated more favorably than •.• 
other coworkers of other races. Such a pattern, in which blacks sometimes do better 
than whites and sometimes do worse, being random with respect to race, is not evidence 
of racial discrimination .... 
Had [plaintiff's] counsel examined the work records of a random sample of Bush's 
coworkers during the period of his employment and found a statistically significant dis· 
parity between blacks and whites with respect to [defendant's] departing from its disci-
plinary norms whether in the direction of severity or leniency, Bush would have 
established a prima facie case of racial discrimination. 
900 F.2d at 931-32. No case in my sample went this far. The closest was the court in Coulter 
v. City of Berkeley, No. C-92-5062 MHP, 1994 WL 28040 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 1994), which 
rejected anecdotal evidence and required "a breaking out [of the] employees by race and 
gender in order to demonstrate that African American men were treated differently than 
other employees." 1994 WL 28040, at *4. The court held that, "[a]bsent such evidence, there 
can be no inference of discrimination." 1994 WL 28040, at *4. It was not clear whether a 
statistical analysis was intended. 
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comparative-evidence requirement does not fit. An employer faced 
with a unique set of facts, like a disciplinary violation or a perform-
ance-based problem that has never occurred before, might well 
make a decision to discharge or discipline a member of a protected 
group, and might well be influenced in significant part by that per-
son's gender or minority-group status.209 The same problem arises 
in the more typical case of an employee who has committed a 
unique combination of disciplinary infractions, or whose case in-
volves considerations that the employer has not faced before in 
otherwise comparable cases.210 In all of these cases, an absolute 
requirement of comparative data at the prima facie case stage 
would cut off potentially meritorious claims. 
Second, a comparative-evidence requirement inevitably tends to 
break down the distinction between the prima facie case stage and 
the later stages of the case. Meaningful comparative data demands 
relevant comparisons .. The most relevant comparisons relate to the 
alternative justifications that will be put in play through the evi-
dence. McDonnell Douglas-Burdine requires the employer to put 
its evidence forward only if the plaintiff satisfies the prima facie 
case requirement. It makes no sense, then, to require the plaintiff 
to choose comparison cases based on their relevance to the em-
ployer's not-yet-"articulated" justification. It would make far more 
sense for courts to consider the presence or absence of good com-
parative data as part of a review of the evidence as a whole, as one 
209. Suppose a new professor hires an African-American student as her first research 
assistant, and fires him because she is not satisfied with his performance. The decision to fire 
the research assistant rather than to try to teach him to do the-job better might well be based 
on a race-specific premise that the student cannot be taught to perform at the level she ex-
pects of her research assistants. If comparative data were required in all cases, then the 
professor could not be found liable until she hired her first poorly performing white research 
assistant and worked with him to improve his performance in lieu of firing him - even if the 
student had ample "pretext" evidence of the professor's discriminatory a~tudes. 
210. One of the cases in my sample appears to be such a case. In Elie v. K-Mart Corp., 64 
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 957 (E.D. La. 1994), a pregnant worker requested light duty 
and was placed in a light-duty job that required evening and weekend work. Day-care 
problems made it impossible for her to work nights, and she was eventually fired for absen-
teeism. As part of a prima facie case, the court required that the plaintiff prove that she 
"suffered from differential application of work or disciplinary rules." 64 Fair Empl. Prac. 
Cas. {BNA) at 958. The employer came forward with cases of other, nonpregnant employees 
who had been given light-duty assignments for medical reasons that included night and week-
end work. Apparently, none of these employees refused to work nights or weekends, and 
therefore none was fired. This doomed the plaintiff's case, because in the absence of refusals 
of night-weekend work, it was impossible to prove that nonpregnant employees received 
better treatment. The court seems to leave open the possibility of proof of a hypothetical 
negative: plaintiff was held to have failed to make out a prima facie case because no evi-
dence had been presented to show that any non-pregnant employee who was assigned to a 
new schedule for medical reasons "would not have been fired had they refused to work their 
new schedules." 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 959 (emphasis added). But it is difficult 
to see how the hypothetical negative could be established. 
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among many types of evidence that can support a disparate treat-
ment claim. This, however, requires side-stepping the formal re-
quirements of the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine approach. 
b. Replacement Evidence. Some courts require the plaintiff 
to prove as part of the prim.a facie case that the employer hired a 
person outside of the plaintiff's protected group in the plaintiff's 
stead. I will refer to this as an "outside-the-group replacement" re-
quirement.211 For a number of reasons, an outside-the-group re-
placement should not be viewed as a necessary element of proof of 
discrimination. 
It is easy to envision circumstances in which discrimination can 
take place without the hiring of an outside-the-group replacement. 
Take the example of an employer in a low-skill, high-turnover busi-
ness. Such an employer might decide, based on racial stereotypes, 
that black employees do not respond well to progressive discipline, 
and that it is more cost-effective to replace a black "bad apple" 
than to try to mend his ways.212 Such an employer might not be in 
the position to satisfy its true preference for white workers, perhaps 
because white workers are not available at the wage the employer 
can afford to pay. Instead, the employer would routinely replace 
black employees with new black employees, on the discriminatory 
assumption that it is cheaper to improve the black workforce by 
using turnover than by using progressive discipline. In such a case, 
there would be discrimination - the decision to replace black 
employees rather than to use progressive discipline would be ra-
cially motivated - but there would be no outside-the-group 
replacement. 
Employers can also discriminate by distinguishing among mem-
bers of a protected group.213 The facts of McDonnell Douglas pro-
211. In one such case in my sample, Emerson v. Boeing Co., Civ. A. No. 92-1279-MLB, 
1994 WL 149191 (D. Kan. Apr. 1, 1994), the court went so far as to cite McDonnell Douglas 
incorrectly for the existence of this "non-protected replacement" requirement and to ignore 
contrary circuit precedent. See Emerson, 1994 WL 149191, at *3, *6 n.5. 
212. For an excellent account of the attitudes of employers toward young black male 
workers, see Joleen Kirschenman & Kathryn M Neckennan, We'd Love To Hire Them, But 
••• , in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 203 (Christopher Paul Jencks & P.E. Peterson eds., 1991); 
see also Note, Invisible Man: Black and Male Under Title VII, 104 HARV. L. RBv. 749, 756-59 
(1991). 
213. The Supreme Court made allowances for certain types of "within-the-protected-
group" discrimination claims in the "sex-plus" theory it articulated in Phillips v. Martin Mari-
etta Corp. 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (holding that the refusal to hire women with pre-school age 
children constitutes impermissible sex discrimination, even though 75-80% of employees in 
the relevant position were women). But that theory has been sharply limited by the lower 
courts, see, e.g., Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975} (re-
jecting the broad view that "sex-plus" theory extends to include discrimination among mem-
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vide an example. Suppose that Green had been employed in an all-
black job classification.214 By custom and practice, his replacement 
would also have been black. Suppose, also, that the employer went 
out of its way to make sure that Green's replacement had no history 
of civil rights activity. When one employee in a protected group is 
replaced by another who has fewer of what the employer perceives 
as "bad" attributes of the group, a legal decision must be made as to 
whether the employer has violated Title VII. The attribute upon 
which the decision was based - political activity - purports to be 
racially "neutral."215 If, however, one takes notice of the fact that 
the civil rights movement was centrally concerned with the rights of 
blacks, discrimination against civil rights activists can be viewed as a 
form of race discrimination.216 Whatever the eventual conclusion, 
the issue should be resolved on its merits. It is inherently unsatisfy-
ing for fundamental definitional issues ab<?ut the nature of discrimi-
nation to be decided through technical discussions of whether the 
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine prima facie case requires an "outside-
the-group" replacement.211 
bers of the same sex on the basis of "any sexual stereotype"), and it is particularly difficult to 
apply in cases in which distinctions among members of a protected group are made in single-
sex job classifications. 
214. Cf. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). 
215. The neutrality would be lost, of course, if the employer readily rehired white civil 
rights activists, or dealt with Klan saboteurs more leniently than with civil rights saboteurs. 
216. For the argument that discrimination against traits or behaviors that are culturally 
linked to membership in a protected group constitutes discrimination against the group, see, 
e.g., Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspecdves on the lntersecdon of Race and Gender, 
1991 DuKE L.J. 365 (commenting on braided hair styles for black women); Juan F. Perea, 
Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluadng "Nadonal Origin" Discrimination Under ntle VII, 35 
WM. & MARYL. RE.v. 805 (1994) (arguing generally for the protection of ethnic traits under 
the rubric of national origin discrimination). But see Hazen Paper v. Biggins, 113 S. Ct. 1701 
(1993), dicussed at supra note 123. 
217. Indeed, for similar reasons, it makes little sense to have an absolute requirement, as 
McDonnell Douglas itself demanded, that the plaintiff demonstrate that the employer contin-
ued to seek a replacement. It is not uncommon for employers to announce a new position, 
only to withdraw the announcement when no "suitable" applicants come forward. Suppose 
an employer who has a taste for discrimination decides to fire a black secretary, and the 
employer needs to decide whether to seek a replacement. The employer has decided that he 
can afford to pay $6.00 an hour, which is low for the secretarial market. Suppose that the 
employer knows from experience that the only qualified applicants who come forward for 
secretarial jobs at that wage are members of minority groups. The employer has a choice -
raise the wage to a level high enough to clear the market for white workers, say, $8.00 an 
hour, or do without a secretary by substituting capital for labor: for example, by buying a 
computer or an answering machine. If the capital-substitution strategy is cheaper than pay-
ing the market-clearing wage for white workers, then the employer will decide against post-
ing the job, and will have done so for discriminatory reasons. Why, then, require the fired 
black employee to prove that the employer kept seeking applicants? 
Nor should courts permit the fact that the employer has decided to seek applicants with 
higher qualifications than the plaintiff's to defeat the claim as a matter of law. An employer 
might well decide, in the above hypothetical, that he would prefer to go up to $8.00 an hour, 
but will do so only if he can restructure the job so that fewer black applicants will be likely to 
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The ready response is that these hypotheticals describe rare cir-
cumstances, and that discriminatory employers will usually hire an 
outside-the-group replacement. The ready response, however, does 
not satisfy. If the prima facie case requires an outside-the-group 
replacement, and the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine structure ap-
plies, plaintiffs replaced by members of their own group lose at 
summary judgment, regardless of the quality of their pretext evi-
dence. Special proof structures should not prevent plaintiffs from 
attempting to prove difficult cases and they should not have to rely 
on the willingness of the district courts to deviate from the 
"outside-the-group" replacement rule only in seemingly meritori-
ous cases. 
c. The "Special Circumstance" of Reverse Discrimination. In 
the name of requiring plaintiffs to prove special circumstances giv-
ing rise to an inference of discrimination, courts often place height-
ened proof burdens on the prima facie case in reverse 
discrimination cases.21s For example, in Sloan v. Boeing Co.,219 the 
court stated that absent direct evidence, the white male plaintiff 
must, at the prima facie case stage, "establish background circum-
stances that support an inference that the defendant is one of those 
unusual employers who discriminates against the majority,"220 or, 
alternatively, prove that the employer would have treated plaintiff 
differently if plaintiff had not been a member of the dominant 
group. We find another version of a heightened standard in Switzer 
satisfy the job's requirements. If the employer, suspecting or knowing that blacks are under-
represented among graduates of secretarial schools, relists that job with a secretarial-school 
requirement, and can be proven to have done so for discriminatory reasons, there is no rea· 
son why the plaintiff should not be permitted to proceed with her proof. 
218. By reverse discrimination cases, I mean cases in which white (or male) plaintiffs 
claim that they are victims of race (or sex) discrimination. Some courts do not impose 
heightened requirements in such cases. In Cianfrano v. Babbitt, 851 F. Supp. 41 (N.D.N.Y. 
1994), a reduction-in-force case, for example, the court stated it to be the view in the Second 
Circuit that the "plaintiff's burden at the prima facie stage [is] de minimis" and found "cir-
cumstances ... from which a trier of fact could infer discrimination" from the fact that plain-
tiff had good performance evaluations, that his supervisor thought he was a "problem," and 
that a minority employee at a lower job grade was kept on the payroll. 851 F. Supp. at 46-47. 
No mention was made of any special requirement for reverse discrimination cases at the 
prima facie case stage. 
219. Civ. A. No. 92-1014-MLB, 1994 WL 149197 (D. Kan. Apr. 1, 1994). 
220. 1994 WL 149197, at *5 (quoting Notari v. Denver Water Dept., 971 F.2d 585, 589 
(10th Cir. 1992)). Interestingly, the Tenth Circuit presents this requirement as a modification 
of the prima facie case requirement that the plaintiff prove her membership in a protected 
group. This is odd, given that whites are members of a "protected group" under Title VII: 
Title VII protects against discrimination on the basis of race, rather than protecting members 
of specific historically oppressed races. MacDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp., 427 U.S. 273 
(1976). 
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v. Texas Commerce Bank.221 There, the court required the plaintiff 
to prove both that he was replaced by a black man and that whites 
were a minority in his company within his own job classification. 
As in the case of outside-the-group replacement requirements, 
these courts dealt with issues formalistically, obscuring rather than 
enlightening the discussion of the nature of discrimination. What is 
interesting about both Sloan and Switzer is that they involved em-
ployees for whom racial issues were undeniably present in the situa-
tions leading up to their discharge. In Sloan, the plaintiff claimed 
that the employer feared and therefore favored a litigious black fe-
male employee, and that he was discharged for imposing on her the 
discipline she deserved.222 In Switzer, the employer :fired the plain-
tiff in part because of his racially insensitive comments, including 
joking references to the Ku Klux Klan as a community organization 
and a memo suggesting that "inner city minorities" had difficulty 
dealing with breakdowns in the bank's automated systems.223 The 
real question in these cases is whether firing white employees for 
speaking or acting on the basis of what the employer finds to be 
racist views (Switzer) or for refusing to go along with what the em-
ployees perceive to be improper racial preferences (Sloan) consti-
tutes discrimination against them on the basis of race. So long as 
courts decide cases on the basis of McDonnell Douglas-Burdine 
formalism, this question is never even asked. 
Reliance on the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine approach may 
also lead courts to miss racial issues that appear in more subtle 
forms. In Wolfenbarger v. Boeing Co.,224 the employer fired the 
white plaintiff for filing a false police report against his white lead 
man. The plaintiff alleged reverse discrimination despite the fact 
that the supervisor who fired him was of his own race. He con-
tended that he filed the false report in retaliation for consistent har-
assment engaged in jointly by his white lead man and his litigious 
black union steward. He claimed that the reason the employer 
failed to stop ihe harassment was its fear that the black steward 
would accuse the employer of race discrimination if it took any ac-
tion against him, and that the employer's failure to act prompted 
him to retaliate by filing the false report. The court held that since 
the black steward was not involved in the false-report incident, the 
race of the steward and the employer's alleged favoritism toward 
221. 850 F. Supp. 544, 548 (N.D. Tex.), affd. without opinion, 42 F.3d 642 (5th Cir. 1994). 
222. 1994 WL 149197, at *5. 
223. 850 F. Supp. at 546, 548. 
224. Civ. A. No. 92-1117-MLB, 1994 WL 149187 (D. Kan. Apr. 1, 1994). 
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him were irrelevant to the case. In so doing, the court took a nar-
row view of the cir.cumstances that can create an inference of re-
verse discrimination by insisting that black-white conflict be the 
immediate cause of the conduct leading to the white plaintiff's dis-
charge. What the plaintiff attempted to demonstrate was a more 
subtle causal relationship between the employer's racially based re-
fusal to stop the harassment and his own ill-targeted - and illegal 
- act of retaliatory self-help. The question whether an employer's 
racially motivated refusal to discipline an employee can be the basis 
for liability when it contributes to the escalation of conflict between 
black and white employees is surely a difficult one. Again, the 
court's narrow application of its heightened prima facie case re-
quirement for reverse discrimination cases fails to move the court 
toward an answer to that substantive question. 
Reverse discrimination cases are not the only cases that present 
fact patterns that do not fit the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine mold. 
Structurally, the Wolfenbarger case resembles Profit v. Marriott 
Corp., the case of a kitchen worker seeking a promotion from a 
racist chef.225 The court in Profit recognized that it could not look 
at the plaintiff's·performance evaluations as if they stood alone in 
time and space, uninfluenced by the racist atmosphere of the 
kitchen. The court in Wolfenbarger failed to recognize that the 
plaintiff's filing of a false police report must not be viewed in isola-
tion, but must instead be seen as the culmination of a story in which 
racial fears and favoritism were alleged to play a central role. The 
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine structure threatened to stand in the 
way of understanding in Profit. It succeeded in Wolfenbarger. 
3. The Legal Consequences of a Failed Prima Facie Case 
Under contemporary summary judgment practice, a defendant 
can challenge the sufficiency of the plaintiff's evidence regarding 
any required element of the plaintiff's cause of action. In the con-
ventional application of summary judgment principles to McDon-
nell Douglas-Burdine cases, the prima facie case is treated as a 
required "element" of the case, and the plaintiff's failure to create a 
genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of a prima facie 
case entitles the defendant to summary judgment.226 Furthermore, 
225. No. 92 Civ. 2665, 1994 WL4272 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 1994); see supra text accompanying 
notes 196-98. 
226. Some courts have held that all a plaintiff needs to do to resist summary judgment is 
to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of a prima facie case. See, e.g., 
Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publishing Co., 9 F.3d 913, 921 (11th Cir.1993}; Hillebrand v. M-
Tron Indus., Pa.7 F.2d 363, 364-65 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1004 (1989); Lowe v. 
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the prim.a facie case is not simply one "element" among many. The 
prim.a facie case is given priority: McDonnell Douglas-Burdine 
calls for a hierarchized approach to the evidence, with the prim.a 
facie case as primary. Only if the prim.a facie case is proved does 
the plaintiff's pretext evidence become relevant.~7 
For all the reasons discussed thus far, however, it should come 
as no surprise that despite the hierarchized approach called for by 
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine, district courts are at times reluctant 
to predicate the grant of summary judgment on the plaintiff's fail-
ure to make out a prim.a facie case. District courts will often rule 
on the inadequacy of the plaintiff's pretext evidence, without having 
first determined that the plaintiff has made out a prim.a facie 
case.228 In some of these cases, the court assumes without deciding 
that a prim.a facie case has been made, and goes on to hold the 
plaintiff's pretext evidence too weak to survive summary judg-
ment.229 This is most likely to happen when the case raises novel 
City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1009 (9th Cir. 1986). But that view is inconsistent with the 
basic rules of summary judgment practice. 
If the employer makes a properly supported summary judgment motion, the plaintiff has 
the burden of showing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact on each element of 
the case on which the plaintiff has the burden of proof at trial. Under McDonnell Douglas-
Burdine, the plaintiff has the burden of proving both the prima facie case and pretext. See 
infra text accompanying notes 226-27. Even under the rule sought by the plaintiff in Hicks, 
the plaintiff would have the burden of proving pretext. The only difference would be that the 
plaintiff's pretext burden would be met on summary judgment by evidence that did no more 
than create a genuine issue as to the truthfulness of the employer's stated justification. Ac-
cordingly, it is not surprising to see that most courts have held that the plaintiff cannot sur-
vive summary judgment merely by creating a genuine issue of material fact as to the 
existence of a prima facie case, but must also create a genuine issue of material fact as to 
pretext. Thus, the plaintiff's "payoff" for having made out a prirna facie case is not great at 
summary judgment. See, e.g., Goldman v. First Natl. Bank, 985 F.2d 1113, 1118 & n.4 (1st 
Cir. 1993); White v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 985 F.2d 434, 436 (8th Cir. 1993); White v. 
Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 815 F. Supp. 1016, 1018 (S.D. Tex. 1993) ("[I]n the context of a 
summary judgment proceeding, plaintiff is required at least to raise a genuine issue of fact 
regarding pretext."). The exception, of course, is the case in which the employer's summary 
judgment motion is limited to the cl~ that the plaintiff has failed to make out a prirna facie 
case. 
227. So, for example, if the plaintiff has an effective challenge to the employer's stated 
ground for its action, and also has evidence of racist statements by the employer about other 
employees and of a statistical pattern of discrimination, an inflexible adherence to the Mc-
Donnell Douglas-Burdine proof structure would hold that evidence irrelevant if there is in-
sufficient support for the required elements of the prirna facie case. This example is to be 
distinguished from a case in which the plaintiff has "direct evidence" of discrimination - in 
which case, the plaintiff is not required to proceed under the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine 
proof structure at all. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985). For a 
discussion of "direct evidence," see infra note 290. 
228. See, e.g., Elie v. K-Mart Corp., No. Civ. A. 93-2362, 1994 WL 50250 (E.D. La. Feb. 
11, 1994); Coulter v. City of Berkeley, No. C-92-5082 MHP, 1994 WL 28040 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 
20, 1994). 
229. See, e.g., Jackson v. Good Lad Co., No. 93-2362, 1994 WL 156930 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 28, 
1994); MacFarland v. Corestates Bank, N.A., No. Civ. A. 92-6985, 1994 WL 70005 (E.D. Pa. 
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issues at the prima facie case stage, but can be disposed of conven-
tionally by shifting focus to the pretext stage.23o More frequently, 
the court finds that the plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie 
case, but goes on to hold in the alternative that the defendant 
would be entitled to summary judgment on the issue of pretext.231 
There are two possible explanations for the district courts' pro-
pensity to evaluate all of the evidence, at least in cases that show 
signs of merit.232 One is purely pragmatic. The district courts may 
simply be inclined to resolve summary judgment motions in the 
manner that makes it most likely that their judgments will survive 
appellate review. If difficult legal issues apse at the prima facie 
case stage or if the prima facie case evidence is close to the suffi-
ciency line, it is far easier for a court to examine all the evidence 
than to follow the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine hierarchized ap-
proach and risk reversal. 
The other possible reason is both more conceptual and more 
fundamental. I have demonstrated the Supreme Court's long-
Feb. 28, 1994); Panis v. Mission Hills Bank, N.A., Civ. A. No. 92-2391-EE0, 1994 WL 185984 
(D. Kan. Apr. 5, 1994), affd., No. 94-3132, 1995 WL 456215 (10th Cir. July 31, 1995). 
230. In MacFarland, the question avoided was whether discrimination against a woman 
returning from maternity leave counts as pregnancy discrimination. MacFarland, 1994 WL 
70005, at *5. In Panis, the plaintiff was a female bank officer whose husband, a bank officer 
at another bank, was indicted for fraud; plaintiff was then fired because of the risk that cus-
tomers would lose confidence in her bank because of her marriage. The court assumed a 
prima facie case arguendo, thereby avoiding the question of whether woman fired because of 
her husband's misconduct is a member of a protected class for Title VII purposes. Panis, 
1994 WL 185984, at *9. 
231. See, e.g., Barth v. CBIS Fed., Inc., 849 F. Supp. 864 (E.D.N.Y.), affd. mem, 43 F.3d 
1458 (2d Cir. 1994); Mukherjee v. Sheraton Palace Hotel, No. C-93-2905 DLJ, 1994 WL 
173889 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 1994), affd. per curiam, No. 94-15876, 1995 WL 11101 (9th Cir. 
Jan. 10, 1995); Emerson v. Boeing Co., No. Civ. A. 92-1279-MLB, 1994 WL 149191 (D. Kan. 
Apr. 1, 1994), affd. per curiam, No. 94-3125, 1995 WL 265932 (10th Cir. May 8, 1995); Stin-
neford v. Spiegel, Inc., 845 F. Supp. 1243 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Magruder v. Runyon, 844 F. Supp. 
696 (D. Kan.1994), affd., No. 94-3069, 1995 WL 311740 (10th Cir. May 22, 1995); Chilson v. 
Baltimore Sun Co., No. Civ. A. HAR 92-1131, 1994 WL 150925 (D. Md. Feb. 8, 1994); Katzev 
v. catholic N.Y., No. 92 Civ. 2664 (LMM), 1994 WL 23072 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1994); Edwards 
v. lnterboro Inst., 840 F. Supp. 222 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). 
232. For evidence that practitioners are fully aware that the courts often balance the evi-
dence even when they state their findings in McDonnell Douglas-Burdine terms, see Stephen 
Forman & V. Daniel Palumbo, Summary Judgment in Employment Cases: ls the Trilogy Tak-
ing Hold?, in A.L.1.-A.B.A. CoURSE OF STUDY: ADVANCED EMPLOYMENT LAw AND Lm-
GATION, (1989), available in WESTLAW, C463 ALI-ABA 35, at *54. 
[C]ourts are engaging in a balancing act, weighing the evidence that a plaintiff puts for-
ward in his or her prima facie case together with any evidence of pretext against the 
strength of the articulated legitimate reason for the job action and its accompanying 
support. The stronger the evidence submitted to establish a prima facie case, or the 
weaker the articulated reasons for the job action, the more likely the court will accept 
evidence as showing pretext. Where evidence of the prima facie case is weak or the 
articulated reasons for the job action are strongly supported, a court will be less likely to 
accept evidence as establishing pretext. 
Id. 
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standing inability to agree on a prim.a facie case standard that ade-
quately distinguishes between cases in which an inference of inten-
tional discrimination can and cannot reasonably be drawn. I have 
also shown how difficult it has been for the district courts to use the 
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine prim.a facie case standard. In light of 
these abiding problems, it would be an act of misplaced concrete-
ness to permit the failure to prove a prim.a facie case to bear great 
legal weight. The district courts are in the best position to be aware 
of the limits of the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine prim.a facie case. 
Their willingness to ignore McDonnell Douglas-Burdine in practice 
may be our best evidence of that awareness. 
The district courts' willingness at times to consider all the evi-
dence on a motion for summary judgment despite the McDonnell 
Douglas framework does not mean that the McDonnell Douglas-
Burdine prim.a facie case requirement is a "wash," a legal rule that 
is hapless but harmless. As the previous section shows, the McDon-
nell Douglas-Burdine structure can impoverish courts' understand-
ing of the evidence, and decrease the likelihood that courts will 
recognize the novel legal issues about the nature of discrimination 
that are so often presented by the evidence even in seemingly rou-
tine cases. Furthermore, the district courts may be prepared to 
"cheat" by considering pretext evidence to bolster a weak prim.a 
facie case only in what they perceive to be extraordinary cases, 
leaving many other potentially meritorious claims in the grasp of 
strict application of the contrary rule. That is a risk not worth 
taking. 
B. The Employer's Rebuttal on Summary Judgment 
In the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine proof structure, the "rebut-
tal" or "intermediate" stage of the case occurs after the plaintiff has 
proved a prim.a facie case. The employer must then "articulate" a 
"legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the adverse employment 
action.233 If the employer fails to do so, the plaintiff wins as a mat-
ter of law.234 Hicks holds that the employer's rebuttal consists of all 
of the evidence of record that tends to support legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reasons for the adverse decision. Hicks thereby col-
lapses the "rebuttal case" into the case as a whole.235 But because 
Hicks nominally continues to use the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine 
233. Texas Dept of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). 
234. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. 
235. Indeed, it might very well be that the plaintiff will include evidence of the em-
ployer's "official" justification in his or her initial presentation of the evidence at trial, as the 
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three-part proof structure, post-Hicks summary judgment courts 
still speak in terms of the employer's bearing a distinct burden at a 
"rebuttal" stage of the case.236 
1\vo recent Supreme Court cases make clear that the employer's 
intermediate burden is so light as to be trivial. The Court held in 
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins that the employer can rely on a reason 
that is illegal under another body of law.237 The Court also held in 
Purkett v. Elem238 that even a facially "implausible," "silly," "fan-
tastic," or "superstitious" reason meets the rebuttal burden.239 The 
predicate for introducing evidence to disprove it - meaning that the first the factfinder hears 
of the employer's "stated reason"· might well be from the plaintiff's witnesses. 
236. Whether an employer even needs to meet this intermediate burden in its summary 
judgment motion depends on the breadth of the employer's attack on the plaintiff's case. An 
employer moving for summary judgment solely on the basis of identified inadequacies in the 
plaintiff's prima facie case need not make a rebuttal case at all, because the rebuttal require-
ment is imposed only once the plaintiff proves a prima facie case. See, e.g., Torre v. Feder-
ated Mut. Ins. Co., 854 F. Supp. 790 (D. Kan. 1994); Taylor v. Cummins Atl., Inc., 852 F. 
Supp. 1279 (D. S.C. 1994), affd. per curiam on other grounds, No. 94-1596, 1995 WL 88957 
(4th Cir. Mar. 6, 1995), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L. W. 3069 (U.S. July 3, 1995) (No. 95-
55) (finding for defendant when summary judgment motion challenged only the adequacy of 
the prima facie case); Dibiase v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 847 F. Supp. 341 (E.D. Pa. 
1994), revd. on other grounds, 48 F.3d 719 (3d Cir. 1995); Direnzo v. General Elec. Co., No. 
Civ. A. 92-6177, 1993 WL 534227 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 1993) (deciding case on summary judg-
ment for the employer at the prima facie case stage, with no discussion of rebuttal at all). 
Only if the employer's motion includes an overall challenge to the plaintiff's ability to prove 
intentional discrimination must the employer's motion meet the rebuttal requirements of 
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine. 
It is exceedingly rare for an employer to fail to satisfy its intermediate burden on sum-
mary judgment. Only one case in my sample involved such a failure, and it was a case of a 
sloppy attorney meeting a punctilious court. See Dickson v. Amoco Performance Prods., 
Inc., 845 F. Supp. 1565 (N.D. Ga. 1994). Moreover, the consequences of failure are mild. 
When the employer moves for summary judgment and fails to make out its rebuttal case for 
purposes of summary judgment, the result is not judgment as a matter of law for the plaintiff. 
It is merely the denial of summary judgment - perhaps without prejudice to the filing of a 
future motion that does a better job of jumping through the hoops. That possibility was 
offered to the defendant in Dickson, but no subsequent decision is reported. 845 F. Supp. at 
1571. Of course, if the plaintiff were to move for summary judgment on the ground that the 
evidence is insufficient to permit the employer to meet its rebuttal burden, the story would be 
different. But the rebuttal burden at trial is sufficiently light that such motions are rarely, if 
ever, filed. 
237. 113 S. Ct. 1701 (1993). In Hazen Paper, the plaintiff used as evidence of age discrim-
ination the fact that he was in close proximity to fully vesting in his pension at the time he 
was fired. Discrimination against employees because of their proximity to vesting is a viola-
tion of § 510 of ERISA. The Court stated that the pension and age discrimination claims 
were not identical, and in so doing the Court explained that a motivation that is unlawful 
under § 510 could nonetheless constitute a "legitimate" reason for purposes of McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine. 113 S. Ct. at 1707. For additional discussion of Hazen Paper, see supra 
note 123. 
238. 115 s. Ct. 1769 {1995). 
239. In teaching, I use the examples of an employer who fires an employee because she 
reminds him of his mother and of an employer who fires an employee because his astrologer 
tells him to do it. In Purkett, it was the fact that a prospective juror had a mustache and 
beard and therefore "looked suspicious." Purkett arose not under Title VII, but under the 
Court's peremptory challenge jurisprudence. In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the 
Court adopted McDonnell Douglas-Burdine analysis as the method of proof in peremptory 
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Supreme Court's cases presently constrain the employer's justifica-
tion in only two ways. The employer cannot rely on a reason that 
facially violates the statute under which the plaintiff has sued,240 
and the employer cannot meet its intermediate burden with after-
acquired evidence.241 
Purkett and Hazen Paper point toward the resolution of the one 
rebuttal-stage question that emerged from my sample of district 
court cases: whether an employer can rely on a "legitimate, dis-
criminatory reason" that was factually ill-founded. A typical exam-
ple is Emerson v. Boeing Co.,242 where the employer discharged the 
plaintiff for sexually harassing co-employees, and the plaintiff 
sought to prove at the rebuttal stage of the case that the charge of 
harassment was false. Another example is Stein v. New York State 
Department of Motor Vehicles, 243 where the plaintiff entered a 
guilty plea to charges of making personal telephone calls on his em-
ployer's phone line and allegedly was fired for the same offense, 
challenge cases. There is every reason to think that the Court will extend its holding in 
Purkett to the employment discrimination context Indeed, the Purkett Court relied on Hicks 
as its sole authority for the following key passage: 
At [the third and final] stage, implausible or fantastic justifications may (and probably 
will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination. But to say that a trial judge 
may choose to disbelieve a silly or superstitious reason at step 3 is quite different from 
saying that a trial judge must terminate the inquiry at step 2 when the race-neutral rea-
son is silly or superstitious. The latter violates the principle that the ultimate burden of 
persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of 
the strike. 
115 S. Ct at 1771. 
In assessing whether criticisms of McDonnell Douglas-Burdine in employment discrimi-
nation cases are relevant to Batson cases, it is important to note the very significant differ-
ences between the two types of cases. Batson cases have no pretrial phase: no pleading, no 
discovery, no pretrial memoranda. They therefore present none of the usual methods for 
"smoking out" evidence and narrowing disputed issues. For that reason alone, it is danger-
ous to simply transfer doctrine from the one setting to the other. But that has not stopped 
courts from doing so. 
240. The defendant in a race discrimination suit could not state a reason that is facially 
racially discriminatory, for example. It is unclear, however, whether a race-discrimination 
defendant could point to sex discrimination as the reason for its actions in a case in which the 
plaintiff failed to include a charge of sex discrimination in her EEOC charge and is therefore 
procedurally barred from amending her pleadings to include allegations of sex 
discrimination. 
241. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. fr79 (1995). In "after-
acquired evidence" cases, the employer presents as a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory" reason 
a justification for the adverse decision that it only discovered after the decision was made. 
But courts are instructed to consider the after-acquired evidence in fashioning remedies. 115 
S. Ct at 885-86. For an argument that after-acquired evidence should not be considered at 
the remedial stage of the case, see Cheryl Krause Zemelman, Note, The After-Acquired Evi-
dence Defense to Employment Discrimination Claims: The Privatization of Title VII and the 
Contours of Social Responsibility, 46 STAN. L. REv. 175 (1993). 
242. No. Civ. A. 92-1279-MLB, 1994 WL 149191 (D. Kan. Apr. 1, 1994), affd. per curiam, 
No. 94-3125, 1995 WL 265932 (10th Cir. May 8, 1995). 
243. 841 F. Supp. 42 (N.D.N.Y. 1993), affd. mem, 54 F.3d 766 (2d. Cir. 1995). 
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and the plaintiff wanted to prove in his Title VII case that he was 
innocent of the criminal charge. 
After Purkett and Hazen Paper, it is clear that the Court would 
conclude that the employer's reason would satisfy the employer's 
intermediate burden notwithstanding the plaintiff's offer to prove 
the defendant wrong. Indeed, Burdine and Hicks signal the same 
result. Burdine holds that it 'is inappropriate at the rebuttal stage to 
ask whether the employer actually relied on its stated reason.244 It 
would seem equally inappropriate at the rebuttal stage to get at that 
same question by asking whether the employer based its decision 
on sufficient facts. Hicks demonstrates that McDonnell Douglas-
Burdine distinguishes between wrongful dismissals and discrimina-
tory dismissals.245 In this view, the actual truth or falsehood of the 
employer's accusation relates to the question of liability only indi-
rectly. If the employer makes a race-blind or gender-blind decision 
on the basis of incorr~ct information, the result is arbitrariness, not 
discrimination - unless the employer had a discriminatory reason 
(conscious or unconscious) for being willing to act on incorrect in-
formation.246 Whether the employer had a discriminatory motive is 
quintessentially an inquiry for the final stage, rather than the rebut-
tal stage, of the case. 
Despite the clear signals that the correctness and good faith of 
the employer's stated justification should be examined at the final 
stage of the case rather than at the rebuttal stage, the district court 
cases in my sample do not consistently follow this rule.247 The re-
luctance of some district courts to embrace the inevitable is not sur-
prising. It makes perfect sense to resist the application of doctrines 
that rob the rebuttal stage of the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine in-
quiry of any real meaning. 
C. The Pretext Stage on Summary Judgment 
The Hicks decision focused on interpreting the "pretext stage" 
- in other words, the final stage - of the McDonnell Douglas-
Burdine proof structure. Hicks stands for the proposition that the 
244. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 248. 
245. The question always lurks, however, whether the employer would have been as 
sloppy in its investigation had a white employee been accused of harassment. 
246. See Lawrence, supra note 7. 
247. The courts in my sample are divided as to whether "good faith" is an issue for the 
rebuttal stage or the pretext stage of the case. The court in Emerson, deals with the issue at 
the rebuttal stage of the case. Emerson, 1994WL149191, at *3-*4. For the courts in Sloan v. 
Boeing, No. Civ. A. 92-1014-MLB, 1994 WL 149197 (D. Kan. Apr. 1, 1994), and Stein, 841 F. 
Supp. at 42, the issue is one for the pretext stage. 
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plaintiff who does no more at the pretext stage than show that the 
defendant's explanation is "not worthy of credence" is not entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. But Hicks has left the courts in 
complete disarray as to what the plaintiff needs to do to prove pre-
text and, in particular, what the plaintiff needs to do to resist a mo-
tion for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of pretext. 
1. The Availability of Summary Judgment at the Pretext Stage 
Some courts read Hicks as casting doubt on whether an em-
ployer can ever obtain summary judgment once a case reaches the 
pretext stage.248 This uncertainty stems from the Court's repeated 
statements in Hicks that once the case reaches the pretext stage, the 
trier of fact must decide the question of intentional discrimina-
tion.249 In Hicks, however, the Court made these statements in the 
context of a fully tried case. It was the plaintiff who wanted judg-
ment as a matter of law, in order to stop the factfinder from consid-
ering the full range of the evidence, including evidence 
undercutting the inference of intentional discrimination. The Court 
said only that this effort to block consideration of all the evidence 
must fail. The Court did not purport to limit the availability of 
summary judgment to either party upon consideration of all of the 
evidence relevant to pretext. Indeed, the Court stressed in Hicks 
that once a McDonnell Douglas-Burdine case reaches the pretext 
stage, it is to be treated like any other civil case. Nothing in Hicks 
remotely suggests that the Court is of the general view that ques-
tions of intent cannot be resolved through summary judgment. 
2. Evaluating Pretext Evidence 
The Court in Hicks stated that once the employer meets its re-
buttal burden, the only remaining issue in the case is whether the 
plaintiff has proved intentional discrimination by a preponderance 
of all the evidence. For a court evaluating a paper record on a de-
fense motion for summary judgment, the closely related question is 
whether the evidence of discrimination is sufficient to permit a rea-
sonable factfinder to reach a pro-plaintiff verdict. These would 
248. Saucier v. Edgewater Constr. Co., No. 92-CV-1111, 1994 WL 36363, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 4, 1994); Moisi v. College of the Sequoias Community College Dist., 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 165 
(Ct. App. 1993). 
249. See, e.g., Saucier, 1994 WL 36363, at *4 n.11 ("Thus it appears at first glance that 
perhaps this final part of the Hicks analysis does not come into play on a summary judgment 
motion where the court is deciding issues as a matter of law and not resolving factual is-
sues."); see also Moisi, 25 Cal Rptr. 2d at 172 (embracing view that Hicks means that employ-
ers cannot get summary judgment once the case reaches the pretext stage). 
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seem to be questions about evidentiary standards for factfinders 
and summary judgment courts, questions that have little to do with 
the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine proof structure. But post-Hicks 
debate on proof of discrimination at the pretext stage of the case 
has been cast not in terms of generally applicable norms of eviden-
tiary sufficiency, but instead in the formal terms of McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine.25o Stated in the language of McDonnell Doug-
las-Burdine, the debate turns on the legal significance of the "com-
bined evidence" - that is, of the plaintiff's proof of a prim.a facie 
case and disproof of the employer's stated explanation. 
Several answers to this question are possible after Hicks. One 
might hold that the factfinder always has the discretion to find in-
tentional discrimination on the basis of the "combined evidence" -
and that as a result the "combined evidence" is sufficient as a mat-
ter of law to resist summary judgment - but that the inference of 
intentional discrimination is merely permissive. I shall call this the 
"judgment for plaintiff always permitted" position. Alternatively, 
one might conclude that the "combined evidence" is strong enough 
to support a permissive inference of discrimination - and to defeat 
summary judgment - only in some circumstances. I shall call this 
the "judgment for plaintiff sometimes permitted" position. For ex-
ample, one might conclude that the factfinder is permitted to draw 
the pro-plaintiff inference only if it is convinced that the employer's 
stated reason was a lie, but not if it believes that the employer 
merely failed to prove its case. Finally, one might conclude that the 
"combined evidence" standing alone is never sufficient to resist 
summary judgment - the "judgment for defendant required" 
position.251 
250. Here is a sampling of the questions courts in my sample have asked: Is "disbelief of 
defendants' articulated reason coupled with [the] prima facie case ••• enough to allow the 
factfinder to draw the inference of discrimination"? Jackson v. Good Lad Co., No. 93-2362, 
1994 WL 156930, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 28, 1994). Can the plaintiff at the pretext stage rely on 
a "restatement of her prima facie case"? MacFarland v. Corestates Bank, N.A., No. Civ. A. 
92-6985, 1994 WL 70005, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 1994). Or must the plaintiff "put forth 
affirmative evidence" of intentional discrimination? Stinneford v. Spiegel, Inc., 845 F. Supp. 
1243, 1247 (N.D. Ill. 1994). When an employer has identified specific reasons for the em-
ployee's discharge, is the plaintiff permitted to introduce pretext evidence that does not re-
spond to the employer's identified reasons? See Birks v. First Evergreen Corp., No. 92 
(6589), 1994 WL 36884, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 1994); Stewart v. Personnel Pool of Am., Inc., 
Civ. A. No. 92-2581, 1993 WL 525575, at *6 & n.5 (D.NJ. Dec. 16, 1993), affd. mem, 30 F.3d 
1488 (3d Cir. 1994). 
251. The leading study of the legal issue described here adopts the vocabulary of "pretext 
only" and "pretext plus" to describe the positions taken by the courts. See Lanctot, supra 
note 23. I decline to use this vocabulary because (a) it begs the question of what "pretext" 
means in legal terms, and (b) it fails to distinguish between important variants of the polar 
positions. See, e.g., id. at 116-17 (in describing the "pretext-only" position, failing to distin· 
guish between what I call the "judgment for plaintiff always permitted" position and the 
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The circuits have not come to agreement on this issue,2s2 and 
the Supreme Court will inevitably need to resolve it. It is not my 
goal to advocate for the adoption of one or another of the rival 
possible positions. It is, instead, to show that the reasons for the 
confusion are fundamental ones, and that reliance on McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine obscures rather than enlightens the evaluation of 
the evidence. 
Let us begin by posing three situations in which the question 
might arise. In the first situation, the "combined evidence" stands 
alone. In the second situation, the "combined evidence" is supple-
mented with reasonably persuasive additional evidence that tends 
to support the employer's denial of discrimination. In the last situa-
tion, the "combined evidence" is supplemented by evidence that 
the plaintiff offered to support the discrimination claim, but no rea-
sonable factfinder could believe the evidence. There are sufficient 
differences within and among these situations to defy any effort to 
employ a uniform rule. 
a. When the "Combined Evidence" Stands Alone. The Hicks 
majority opinion at times reads as an attempt to signal approval of 
the "judgment for plaintiff always permitted" position for cases in 
which the "combined evidence" is the only evidence.253 The opin-
ion, however, equivocates on the issue, also suggesting an intent to 
adopt the "judgment for plaintiff sometimes permitted" position. 
We are told that "[t]he factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put for-
ward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief ~ accompanied by a 
suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of the 
prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination."254 This 
"judgment for the plaintiff required" position). Needing something in addition to ''pretext" 
can mean needing additional evidence; but it can also mean needing the factfinder to be 
willing to state (even without additional evidence) that it has in fact taken the step of infer-
ring that intentional discrimination has taken place. A useful vocabulary must facilitate 
rather than cloud these distinctions. Cf. Kandel, supra note 154 (presenting a different, but 
similarly ambiguous, vocabulary). 
252. For a good discussion of the post-Hicks circuit split, see Jody H. Odell, Comment, 
Between Pretext Only and Pretext Plus: Understanding St Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks and 
its Application to Summary Judgment, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1251 (1994). 
253. 1\vice the Hicks majority goes out of its way to say that the factfinder is permitted to 
find for the plaintiff on no more than proof of the prima facie case and disbelief of the 
plaintiff's reasons. We are told that "rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons will per-
mit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination, and the Court of 
Appeals was correct when it noted that, upon such rejection, '[n]o additional proof of dis-
crimination is required.'" Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749 (quoting Hicks v. St Mary's Honor Ctr., 
970 F.2d 487, 493 (8th Cir. 1992)). In a nearby footnote, the majority reiterates that "rejec-
tion of the defendant's proffered reasons is enough at law to sustain a finding of discrimina-
tion." 113 S. Ct. at 2750 n.4. 
254. 113 S. Ct. at 2749 (emphasis added). 
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might well mean that Hicks permits the factfinder to find for the 
plaintiff on the basis of the "combined evidence" only if it suspects 
"mendacity," which, the Court reminds us, cannot be presumed: 
"[T]here is no justification for assuming (as the dissent repeatedly 
does) that those employers whose evidence is disbelieved are per-
jurers and liars. "255 
The Court is unclear as to the proper resolution even of cases in 
which there is evidence from which it is reasonable to suspect men-
dacity. The Court states that disbelief plus suspicion of mendacity 
"may . . . suffice" to support a verdict for the plaintiff. Does that 
mean it always will suffice as a matter of law? Much of the drama 
in the Hicks case rotates around the meaning of the word "may" 
when used in the Burdine dictum - where, in the end, "may" may 
have meant "do it and it will suffice as a matter of law," but the 
Court refused to give the word legal effect.256 
The Court's failure to achieve clarity reflects the fact that it is by 
no means clear under current summary judgment standards that the 
"judgment for plaintiff always permitted" position is uniformly cor-
rect, even when the "combined evidence" stands alone. It is the 
role of the "combined evidence" to prove that discrimination might 
have taken place and that the employer's stated reason does not 
account for its adverse actions. There may be cases in which the 
"combined evidence" goes the plaintiff's way, but a judgment for 
the plaintiff would still be legally questionable. The "combined evi-
dence" will be sometimes strong and sometimes weak. A legal rule 
based on having jumped the hurdles of McDonnell Douglas-
Burdine would tend to mask this variability. 
Suppose that an employer posted a promotion opportunity with 
certain qualification requirements, received a number of applica-
tions from female employees, and then reposted the position with 
new qualification requirements that were harder for women to 
meet. A female applicant for the promotion sues, and claims that 
she was qualified for the position as posted, and that the employer's 
real reason for changing the job qualifications was the fact that it 
did not want a woman in the job. Suppose that the plaintiff's prima 
facie case evidence is borderline - a reasonable factfinder could 
just barely conclude that the plaintiff was qualified for the position 
as originally posted, by making a number of far-flung albeit margin-
ally reasonable inferences from the plaintiff's evidence. Suppose 
255. 113 S. Ct. at 2754. 
256. See supra text accompanying note 127. 
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also that a reasonable factfinder could also just barely disbelieve the 
employer's explanation for having redefined the position by resolv-
ing all closely contested inferences against the employer. It is by no 
means certain that a summary judgment court, looking at the "com-
bined evidence" cumulatively, would view a pro-plaintiff verdict as 
reasonable under these circumstances - given the Supreme 
Court's instruction that summary judgment courts are to consider 
whether the "caliber and quantity" of the plaintiff's evidence is ad-
equate to meet the plaintiff's proof burden at trial,2s1 as well as its 
admonition that "[a] plaintiff cannot resist summary judgment 
merely by discrediting the defendant's testimony."258 A court 
might well conclude that, given how marginal each element of the 
"combined evidence" is in this example, the combined likelihood 
that the employer had discriminatory motives and that the plaintiff 
was qualified for the job as originally posted is too small to survive 
summary judgment. 
b. When Defendant's Additional Evidence Is Persuasive. To 
explain its rejection of the "judgment for plaintiff required" posi-
tion, the Hicks majority provides an example of a case in which the 
employer's stated reason is disbelieved, but other strong evidence 
indicates that discrimination did not occur: · 
Assume that 40% of a business' work force are members of a particu-
lar minority group, a group which comprises only 10% of the relevant 
labor market. ·An applicant, who is a member of that group, applies 
for an opening for which he is minimally qualified, but is rejected by a 
hiring officer of that same minority group, and the search to fill the 
opening continues.259 
The majority uses this example to underscore that it would be a 
"mockery of justice" for this "other utterly compelling evidence 
that discrimination was not the reason ... [to] be excluded from the 
jury's consideration," merely because the jury has chosen not to be-
lieve the employer's explanation.260 But one must ask whether it is 
consistent with contemporary summary judgment standards to per-
257. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986); see also 477 U.S. at 266-
67 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
258. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-56. 
259. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2750. 
260. 113 S. Ct. at 2751 n.5. The evidence in this example might be viewed as strong either 
because it is so compelling that it must be believed, or because, when viewed in the context of 
the case, the evidence supports an inference of nondiscrimination that is far stronger than the 
inference of discrimination the "combined evidence" creates. It is impossible to know which 
of these possibilities Justice Scalia had in mind. For a good account of why the particular 
evidence in the hypothetical may not be "utterly compelling" at all, see Calloway, supra note 
28, at 1004-06. 
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mit the factfinder to ignore such "utterly compelling evidence" by 
finding for the plaintiff solely on the basis of the "combined 
evidence." 
Under Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio 
Corp.,261 courts are instructed that a party cannot resist summary 
judgment with nothing more than "implausible" inferences from 
the evidence.262 Furthermore, it was clear even before Matsushita 
that courts have the power to determine which inferences the jury 
may reasonably draw from the evidence.263 A court exercising that 
power will not always conclude that it is permissible to draw the 
inference of discrimination from the "combined evidence" when 
the record contains strong contrary evidence. Once again, a rule 
based on treating the "combined evidence" as legally adequate to 
resist summary judgment would at times mandate results different 
from those reached through fact-sensitive application of prevailing 
summary judgment norms. 
c. When Plaintiff's Additional Evidence Is Unpersuasive. The 
plaintiff in Hicks did not merely rest on the "combined evidence"; 
instead, he introduced additional evidence to show that his dis-
charge was part of a pattern of discriminatory discharges. The dis-
trict court did not believe this evidence; indeed, it found that some 
of the evidence proffered by Hicks more strongly supported the in-
ference that no discrimination took place. For example, Hicks re-
lied on the firing of twelve black employees six months before his 
discharge, but the fact that all but one of the fired employees were 
replaced by black applicants convinced the district court that these 
firings were not discriminatory.264 
When a plaintiff introduces additional evidence of discrimina-
tion that is unconvincing, the factfinder may well legitimately see 
261. 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
262. 475 U.S. at 593. It has been suggested that Matsushita is of greatest relevance to 
antitrust cases. See SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 156, at 62-64; see also Lam v. University 
of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1563 n.22 (9th Cir. 1994). This is because the Matsushita Court noted 
that "antitrust law limits the range of permissible inferences from ambiguous evidence in a 
[Sherman Act] § 1 case," 475 U.S. at 587, and the "implausibility" in economic terms of the 
inference the nonmovant wished to draw in Matsushita was thus a matter of concern under 
substantive antitrust law. But in its later decision in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical 
Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992), the Court denied that Matsushita erected a uniquely heavy 
burden for parties resisting summary judgment in antitrust cases, instead explaining that 
"Matsushita demands only that the nonmoving party's inferences be reasonable, a require-
ment that was not invented, but merely articulated, in that decision," and that applies to all 
summary judgment cases. Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 468. 
263. See Daniel P. Collins, Note, Summary Judgment and Circumstantial Evidence, 40 
STAN. L. REv. 491, 491-92 (1988). 
264. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1249 (E.D. Mo. 1991). 
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the plaintiff as worse off than he would have been had no additional 
evidence been put forward. When additional evidence is lacking, 
the factfinder might imagine that there is a universe of facts "out 
there" that would support the conclusion that discrimination took 
place, but that they had not been introduced at trial for some good 
reason - fellow employees' fear of testifying on the plaintiff's be-
half, for example. When the plaintiff takes the step of bringing the 
facts "out there" into the courtroom, however, the factfinder who is 
unconvinced by the additional evidence might well have her confi-
dence shaken. Her knowledge that the best of the facts "out there" 
do not support the inference would weaken the inference she other-
wise might have been willing to draw from her disbelief of the em-
ployer. It might even be possible for the plaintiff's additional 
evidence to fail so severely as to render it unreasonable for the fact-
finder to continue to draw an inference of discrimination from the 
"combined evidence." Again, a rule assigning a fixed legal conse-
quence to variable evidence seems ill-advised. 
These examples demonstrate that disparate treatment cases dif-
fer from each other in the strength of their evidence, and that 
"rules" are likely to misfire when they are based upon the assump-
tion that cases are equally strong once all the relevant McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine hurdles have been jumped. It is the evolving law 
of summary judgment, linked to the insights evidence law provides 
on the drawing of inferences, that is best equipped to handle the 
issues raised at the pretext "stage." McDonnell Douglas-Burdine 
serves only to obscure them. 
D. Conclusion 
The crucial question after Hicks is whether, and how well, the 
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine proof structure shapes pretrial deci-
sionmaking, specifically at the summary judgment stage. My an-
swer is: not much and not well. Disparate treatment cases are 
problematic because they require factfinders to decide questions of 
motive on the basis of circumstantial evidence. If we thought Mc-
Donnell Douglas-Burdine would make the task easier, we were 
wrong. The time has come to put false appearances aside and to 
reorient the discourse on disparate treatment cases accordingly. 
m. A CALL FOR ABANDONING McDONNELL 
DOUGLAS-BURDINE 
Precision of legal rule, maximum precision, utter precision, has danced 
like a will o' the wisp before legal thinkers as an ideal to be attained, or 
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if not attained, then approached. The precision desired has aimed at 
two goals now familiar to us: guidance, and limitation. . . . Now it 
happens that no man has yet been able to build categories to neatly and 
significantly box the multiple conflicts and relations with which men of 
law must deal . . . . But it happens also that law is a highly practical 
institution, and that lawmen manage, one way or another, to square 
their activities measurably with the life around them, no matter what 
ideology they may be using; lawmen will not be faithful to an ideology 
which will not do their work. Still, if the dominant ideology is faulty as 
a tool for coping with life, then law and people suffer; they suffer to the 
degree that the lawmen's practical and implicit corrections are delayed 
or are inadequate. . . . For there are few troubles with the work or 
theory of any lawman for which some other lawman has not by now 
found a shrewd, practical correction. The difficulty with jurisprudence 
has been not poverty, but scattering of the profusion of its wealth. Its 
best, gathered together, makes a rather noble showing.265 
Perhaps as lawyers in the post-Realist legal world, we should 
know better than to think any rule works "the way it was supposed 
to" - at least without the constant small on-the-ground revisions 
that do their work by masking the fact that they are happening at 
all. One might argue, in this light, that McDonnell Douglas-
Burdine is best left alone. One cannot pretend that it adequately 
guides and limits lower court decisionmaking. It does not, however, 
seem to have impeded courts in the average, workaday case. They 
handle their disparate treatment caseload by using McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine where it fits and by "fudging" McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine when it does not.266 One way or the other, the 
work gets done. 
But when Karl Llewellyn, whom I quote above, lauds the "elas-
ticity" of rules, their "touch of open-endedness and of guidance for 
handling the novel," he speaks of "direction of such guidance from 
within the rule to the purpose of the rule" - of "the path of princi-
ple, not only of expansion by way of principle, but of whittling or of 
modification by way of principle."267 The elasticity in McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine is of another, less noble sort. 
The problem with. McDonnell Douglas-Burdine is that it lacks 
the core of principle to which a Llewellyn would look for interpre-
tive guidance. True, the earlier cases in the McDonnell Douglas-
Burdine line contain readily quotable passages explaining the need 
265. Karl Llewellyn, Rule of Thumb and Principle, in W1il.IAM L. TWINING, THE KARL 
LLEWELLYN PAPERS 81, 81-82 (1968). 
266. "Fudging" is the tenn my research assistant, Carol Banta, used for the process of 
reciting McDonnell Douglas-Burdine but ignoring it to the extent necessary to make sense of 
the facts. 
267. Llewellyn, supra note 265, at 94-95. 
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to eradicate discrimination. But the same cases contain passages, 
less quotable but more closely tied to the Court's actual holding, 
that articulate a need to protect management prerogative against 
undue incursions.26s To make matters worse, a close analysis of 
Burdine and Aikens, both from within their four comers and 
through the lens of the Marshall Papers, reveals that the opinions' 
ambiguity reflects a consistent unwillingness on the part of the 
Court to act on the problems it saw in McDonnell Douglas-
Burdine. The Court has created rule-like formulations, with the 
hope that the lower courts will bend them correctly, without any 
principled guidance. This is not the "elasticity" Llewellyn 
celebrates.269 
In short, the status quo is unsatisfactory. After Hicks, the time 
is ripe to search for alternatives. 
A. Surveying the Alternatives 
The mildest alternative - tinkering with McDonnell Douglas-
Burdine - cannot solve the problem.210 Easing the plaintiff's 
prima facie case burden in light of the Court's rejection of the 
"judgment for plaintiff required" approach would only serve to con-
vince the courts that the prima facie case is worth so little that the 
"combined evidence" is never sufficient to support a judgment for 
the plaintiff. Making either the plaintiff's prima facie case burden 
or the employer's rebuttal burden more stringent will not work be-
cause doing so simply will result in eliminating any distinction be-
tween the three "stages" of the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine 
framework. The internal tension within McDonnell Douglas-
Burdine - its simultaneous requirement that plaintiffs be given the 
benefit of the doubt but also that they maintain the burden of per-
suasion throughout the case - has resulted in failure after more 
than twenty years of fine tuning. There is little reason to expect 
268. The same problem exists in tbe Supreme Court's key cases on union-management 
relations under federal labor law. See JAMES B. ATLESON, v ALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN 
AMERICAN LABOR LAW 111-42 (1983). 
269. Perhaps in its early years, McDonnell Douglas-Burdine was useful as what Professor 
Sunstein calls an "incompletely theorized agreement," an outcome the Court was able to 
reach despite deep disagreements on questions of abstract principle, and that, for a time, 
became part of tbe uncontested foundation for further decisionmaking. Sunstein, supra note 
53. But such agreements have little continuing persuasive value once "tbe uncontested back-
ground is drawn into sharp question." Id. at 1766. 
270. See Blumrosen, supra note 98, at 1059-61 (arguing tbat "tbe underlying difficulty 
witb the McDonnell Douglas formula" involves "more than tinkering can correct," and pre-
ferring a "decision by tbe trier of fact as to whetber, on all tbe evidence, tbe personnel action 
was influenced by illicit considerations"). 
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that future incremental changes will produce any better results. 
More broadly based reform must be sought. 
One possible reform approach could focus on the policy-level 
deficiency in McDonnell Douglas-Burdine: the Court's unwilling-
ness to provide a sufficiently strong statement of pro-plaintiff intent 
to justify permitting plaintiffs to win intentional discrimination 
cases on evidence that would be inadequate to prove intent in ordi-
nary civil cases. The boldest way to address this proof gap would be 
to replace the intent standard in individual discrimination cases 
with a just-cause standard for all employment decisions adverse to a 
member of a traditionally disadvantaged group. A more moderate 
alternative would be to maintain the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine 
proof structure, admit that the "combined evidence" does not suf-
fice to prove discrimination as an evidentiary matter, but nonethe-
less clearly specify that it shall be deemed sufficient as a matter of 
policy. 
It seems clear to me, however, that neither of these steps will be 
taken, and not only for reasons of partisan politics. I have no doubt 
that the first alternative would immediately and, I think, fairly, be 
characterized as a special group preference akin to affirmative ac-
tion.211 Anyone looking closely at its more moderate cousin would 
see the family resemblance.212 
As I argued in Part I, Title VII is a single body of law that ap-
plies to all protected groups, in all parts of the country, in all types 
and stages of employment. A mandatory presumption that an em-
ployment decision adverse to a member of a traditionally disadvan-
taged group is discriminatory if it is not made for just cause is not 
only a poor evidentiary fit with this highly variable situation,273 as I 
have already argued in Part I. For many of the same reasons, ac-
271. Cf. David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness,.1986 SuP. Cr. REV. 99; Sunstein, 
supra note 97, at 2418 ("[T]he distinction between affinnative action and antidiscrimination 
is thin in principle" insofar as the latter renders unlawful "statistical generalizations of the 
sort that employers, customers, and others rely on all the time."). 
272. For a refreshingly honest identification of presumptions in favor of black plaintiffs in 
individual intentional discrimination cases as a defensible (and desirable) fonn of race-con-
scious remedy, see J. Skelly Wright, Color-Blind Theories and Color-Conscious Remedies, 47 
U. Cm. L REv. 213, 223-24 (1980). Judge Wright understood that a presumption of 
discrimination 
give[s] the black applicant preferential treatment - "simply because he is black[.]" In 
effect, the qualified black applicant is given an entitlement to employment, denied to 
similarly qualified white applicants. The qualified white applicant, denied a job on the 
basis of some irrational or bigoted decision of the employer, is relegated to his luck. 
Given the subjective nature of the employment decision, the law must prefer the black 
applicant because he is black in order to ensure that employers do not discriminate 
against him because he is black. 
273. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 97 to 100. 
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cording just-cause protection only to members of protected groups 
would threaten to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the entire enter-
prise of antidiscrimination law. 
Even now, women and members of minority groups have a dis-
parate treatment cause of action available to them under Title VII 
that white men generally lack. But that regime has been largely 
immune from the criticisms leveled at affirmative action, precisely 
because the individual plaintiff is required to prove discriminatory 
intent. This immunity would surely disappear under a regime in 
which women and members of minority groups had just-cause pro-
tection on the job, but white men did not. To see why, one need 
only imagine the response of white male employees to the following 
scenario. 1\vo employees, black and white, are fired by their white 
supervisor at the same time for the same alleged misconduct -
misconduct eventually found insufficient to constitute just cause for 
discharge. Only the black employee has a cause of action, and, 
since discriminatory intent is irrelevant, the fact that a white em-
ployee received exactly the same arbitrary treatment in the same 
incident does not stand in the way of his claim. The black employee 
is reinstated; the white employee has no cause of action at all.274 I 
doubt that we could reach a society-wide agreement on the legiti-
macy of such an outcome.21s 
Furthermore, it is important to consider the likely effect of a 
just-cause-only-for-women-and-minorities rule on employer behav-
ior. Even under existing legal rules, the Title VII causes of action 
274. Unless, of course, the new legal regime were interpreted to protect whites who are 
mistreated in the same fashion as blacks, on the theory that the white employee must be 
presumed to have been so mistreated to make it easier for the employer to go after the black 
employee, who must be presumed to have been the employer's true target. 
275. This does not mean that only proof of discriminatory intent can lead to fully legiti-
mate outcomes. Take the example of disparate impact litigation, the legitimacy of which 
Congress implicitly reaffirmed in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See supra note 3. To a large 
extent, all employees benefit when arbitrary screening devices are successfully challenged. 
When a disparate impact plaintiff class successfully challenges an arbitrary screening device, 
employers generally abandon the device altogether, rather than merely ceasing to use it for 
members of the successful plaintiffs' protected group - since to do otherwise would consti-
tute the facially discriminatory use of different screening devices for different groups. It is 
true that retrospective remedies - backpay and reinstatement- will be limited to members 
of the plaintiff class. But at the very least, white (or male) employees who re-apply for jobs 
will have their new applications considered under the new rules, and will therefore benefit 
from the litigation. And the exclusion of whites (or men) from retrospective relief will at 
least be justified by proof that the test or practice at issue had a proven adverse impact on 
members of the plaintiffs' protected group. I note, however, that the assertion that proof of 
adverse impact itself constitutes proof of employer discrimination is subject to challenge, see 
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 1002-03, 1004-05 (1988) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring), is not beyond challenge, and that it is therefore not safe - even after the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 - to take the perceived legitimacy of disparate impact litigation for 
granted. 
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available to female and minority employees are a disincentive to 
the hiring of marginally qualified Title VII-protected applicants be-
cause it is more difficult to discipline or fire them once they are 
hired.276 That disincentive effect would markedly increase if em-
ployers' inability to prove just cause were deemed as dispositive -
rather than merely suggestive - of discriminatory intent. 
One could, perhaps, avoid these problems by abandoning the 
discourse of discrimination for individual cases altogether and mov-
ing instead to a system of just-cause protection for all employees in 
the workplace. If in fact arbitrary treatment disproportionately af-
fects members of protected groups, they will disproportionately 
benefit from such a system.277 Just-cause legislation might well 
have a broader base of public support than antidiscrimination legis-
lation. Think of the "Just-Cause Act" as the equivalent of the So-
cial Security System, and of Title VII as the equivalent of Aid for 
Families with Dependent Children. More broadly based programs 
command broader political support in this country, precisely be-
cause their opponents cannot cast them in racial terms.21s 
From the standpoint of civil rights, the problem with just-cause 
legislation as an alternative to antidiscrimination legislation is that 
it would work too well. Given the expense and difficulty of proving 
intentional discriinination, the existence of a just-cause alternative 
would be tempting. Fewer discrimination cases would be brought, 
and the public would perceive that discrimination was declining. 
Even if all the practical ends of antidiscrimination laws could be 
served by uniform just-cause protection in the workplace, impor-
tant symbolic an<;l pedagogic ends would be lost. The silencing of 
276. See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 171, at 1024. 
277. This may be one reason that black nonunion workers are more likely than white 
nonunion workers to be in favor of unionization. See, e.g., Ronnie Silverblatt & Robert J. 
Amann, Race, Ethnicity, Union Attitudes, and Voting Predilections, 30 INDUS. REL. 271, 277 
(1991). 
278. See MARGARET WEIR, Pm.mes AND Joss: THE BOUNDARIES OF EMPLOYMENT 
POLICY IN nm UNITED STATES 62-98 (1992); Sunstein, supra note 97, at 2454-55 ("It is ironic 
but true that a third stage of civil rights policy, directed most self-consciously against race and 
gender caste, might also be self-consciously designed - for reasons of policy and principle -
so as to avoid race- and gender-specificity."). 
Of course, broad just-cause protection might elicit broader opposition from the business 
community - particularly because opposition would not be perceived as race-based. The 
business community would likely be willing to support just-cause legislation as an alternative 
to antidiscrimination litigation only if the latter became overly burdensome, and, even then, 
only if the new just-cause system was guaranteed to be Jess costly, both in terms of litigation 
costs and remedial costs. Cf. Theodore J. St Antoine, The Making of the Model Employment 
Termination Act, 69 WASH. L. REv. 361, 367 (1994) (explaining that the original impetus for a 
uniform Jaw creating a degree of just-cause protection was "a concern that the courts were 
improperly breaching the wall of at-will employment"); Edelman et al., supra note 96 (dis-
cussing employer fears of wrongful discharge litigation). 
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potentially valid claims of intentional discrimination - albeit for 
benign reasons - would thus not be a benefit of a shift to a uniform 
just-cause system ; it would, rather, be a troubling by-product of the 
shift. Recall Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co. 279 In Goodman, the 
union, concerned that the employer was hostile to race-
discrimination grievances brought under the collective bargaining 
agreement's antidiscrimination provision, declined to bring race-
discrimination grievances but was successful in resolving the com-
plaints of some black employees by using other contract provisions 
- for example, by challenging discriminatory scheduling as a viola-
tion of the contract's scheduling clause rather than of its antidis-
crimination provision.280 This recharacterization, the Court held, 
constitutes discrimination - even if the union secured exactly the 
same relief for the grievant as it would have obtained by grieving 
the company's violation of the contract's antidiscrimination 
clause.281 We should remember, with the Court in Goodman, that 
we still need to confront the sad lessons we learn about our society 
when a plaintiff successfully proves that intentional discrimination 
has occurred. Greater protection of job rights through the use of 
just-cause standards is, to my mind, a worthwhile goal in its own 
right. But individual discrimination claims should always be avail-
able so that the reality of intentional discrimination is not swept 
under the legal rug.282 
B. The Case for an Open-Ended Intentional Discrimination 
Standard 
If McDonnell-Douglas cannot be improved by tinkering at the 
margins and if we cannot eliminate either individual discrimination 
claims or the intent requirement, the best remaining alternative is 
to retain a cause of action for intentional discrimination but aban-
don the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine proof structure once and for 
all, at all stages of the case.283 Then it would be clear that the only 
279. 482 U.S. 656 (1987). 
280. In Goodman, the union also failed to pursue many discrimination grievances that 
could not be brought under other provisions. But the Court held that the union's conduct 
was improper even in the cases in which the grievant obtained a remedy through recourse to 
other race-neutral contract provisions. 
281. 482 U.S. at 668. 
282. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAsr DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
CoURT AT THE BAR OF PoIII1cs 272 (1962) ("The goals we acknowledge determine the 
direction in which our society moves."). 
283. Aikens did, of course, attempt to eliminate the use of McDonnell Douglas-Burdine 
as a factfinding method at trial. But notwithstanding Aikens, McDonnell Douglas-Burdine 
continues to have tenacious roots in trial practice: it is quite conventional for post-Aikens 
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relevant question at trial would be whether the plaintiff has proven 
intentional discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Since the function of the summary judgment court is to examine the 
sufficiency of the evidence for trial in light of the questions the jury 
will be asked of the evidence at trial, the only question on summary 
judgment would be the sufficiency of all the evidence to support a 
finding of intentional discrimination by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. Far more would be gained than lost by substituting an open-
ended standard for the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine rule,284 
Eliminating the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine proof structure 
would discourage the Supreme Court from making what appear to 
be uniform "rules" that do not have uniform effects "on the 
ground." The Supreme Court's decision to dodge the important 
task of determining the content of the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine 
prima facie case has led to extraordinary variability in the actual 
content of the prima facie case in the lower courts. The Supreme 
Court has not, however, been the least bit shy in making rules about 
the legal significance of the proven prima facie case. When those 
rules are applied "uniformly" to what is in fact a highly nonuniform 
set of case-by-case decisions about what the prima facie case must 
contain, the result is a nonuniformity that goes unrecognized by the 
Court. 
Suppose, for example, that the Court were to grant certiorari to 
clarify the circuit conflict Hicks has created. Suppose the Court, 
citing to Hicks, were to stress the weakness of the plaintiff's re-
quired prima facie showing, and to hold, for this reason, that tlie 
"combined evidence" standing alone is never sufficient to support a 
judgment for the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff must always intro-
district courts to state their post-bench-trial findings of fact and conclusions of law in Mc-
Donnell Douglas-Burdine tenns,just as the district court did in Hicks. Some courts also use 
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine as the basis for jury instructions. See, e.g., Cabrera v. 
Jakabovitz, 24 F.3d 372, 381 n5 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 205 (1994). This is a dis-
turbing prospect, given the likelihood that juries will be unnecessarily confused by instruc-
tions about "prima facie cases" and "burden shifts." See, e.g., Gehring v. Case Corp. 66 Fair 
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1373 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2612 (1995); Cabrera, 24 
F.3d at 380-81; see also 3 DEV11T ET AL., supra note 49, at§ 104.01 cint. (declining to use 
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine in instructing juries in 42 U.S.C. § 1981 cases "for reasons of 
clarity," and agreeing with court in Grebin v. Sioux Falls Indep. Sch. Dist., 779 F.2d 18, 20 
(8th Cir. 1985), that the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine " 'ritual' is not well suited as a detailed 
instruction to the jury"); MICHIGAN STANDARD JURY INSTRUcnONS (CIVIL) § 105.01 (2d ed. 
1991) (deciding "not to develop .•• instructions [for disparate treatment cases] around the 
McDonnell Douglas model"). 
284. For discussions of the rule/standard distinction, see Duncan Kennedy, Form and 
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685 (1976); MARK KELMAN, A 
GUIDE TO CRmcAL LEGAL STUDIES 45-47 (1987} (responding to Kennedy). For a discus-
sion of the concept in the Title VII context, see Rutherglen, supra note 17, at 75. 
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duce additional evidence of discrimination to prevail. In so doing, 
the Court w<;mld be doing what it has always done: it would base its 
decision solely on what it has said in the past about McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine, rather than upon an understanding of how dis-
trict courts use McDonnell Douglas-Burdine. In some district court 
decisions, the prima facie case is so watered down that it exhausts 
very little of the evidence at the plaintiff's command. Where the 
prima facie case standard is weak, there might be good reason to 
require additional evidence, and the requirement could easily be 
met. But some courts interpret the prima facie case so broadly that 
most of the plaintiff's evidence is held relevant at the prima facie 
case stage - as a result of which it is hard to imagine any pro-
plaintiff evidence that could be "added" at the final stage of the 
case. What most characterizes the prima facie case in the district 
courts is its variability. If uniformity cannot successfully be im-
posed, the intellectually honest - and legally safe - alternative is 
to eliminate the Court's temptation to make bad law by acting as 
though uniformity exists. 
Abandoning McDonnell Douglas-Burdine would also en-
courage innovation in the conceptualization of intentional discrimi-
nation. McDonnell Douglas-Burdine purports .to be procedural, 
but it implies a substantive decision about the nature of intentional 
discrimination. Under McDonnell Douglas-Burdine, one must 
prove that the employer had a discriminatory motive for a specific 
adverse employment action. There are situations, however, in 
which protected-group status is an inseparable part of the events 
leading up to an adverse decision, which we perhaps should be pre-
pared to call "intentional discrimination" despite the fact that their 
fact patterns do not fit the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine mold.285 
As I have demonstrated, a court must swim against the McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine current if the employer clearly fired the plaintiff 
for reasons of "inadequate performance" but the court senses that 
the employer's evaluation of the plaintiff's performance might have 
been tainted by unconscious discriminatory values, preferences, or 
perceptions.286 The court must depart from the McDonnell 
285. For example, the existence of the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework might 
have had the effect of blinding co'urts to the possibility of dual or mixed motivation, see 
David A. Drachsler, Burdens of Proof in Retaliatory Adverse Action Cases Under Title VII, 
35 LAB. LJ. 28 (1984). 
286. Indeed, I think of Price Waterhouse as perpetuating rather than ending the confusion 
regarding what constitutes a "mixed motive" claim. The Price Waterhouse facts, to my mind, 
raise neither a "mixed motive" claim nor a McDonnell Douglas-Burdine claim. The plaintiff 
in Price Waterhouse was perceived as having personality problems, and her personality was 
treated as a nondiscriminatory motive for her discharge. But seen in context, Price 
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Douglas-Burdine pattern to an even greater extent if the plaintiff 
claims that her performance was indeed substandard but it was the 
pressure of working in a discriminatory environment that made it 
so.287 Perhaps trading McDonnell Douglas-Burdine for a more 
open-textured method of proof would, thanks to the alchemy 
through which procedure is transformed into substance, result in a 
more open-textured definition of intentional discrimination as well. 
I have argued that abandoning McDonnell Douglas-Burdine 
would have several important advantages: it would increase intel-
lectual honesty, deter the creation of dangerous pseudo-uniform 
rules, and encourage a more subtle and creative understanding of 
discrimination in its many forms. No legal change, however, is 
without its potential disadvantages. It is to these I now tum. 
First, abandoning McDonnell Douglas-Burdine would not en-
tirely free individual intentional discrimination litigation from reli-
ance on special proof structures. The reason is that there are at 
present two special proof structures for individual intentional dis-
crimination cases: McDonnell Douglas-Burdine and the "mixed 
motive" framework first announced in Price Waterhouse v. Hop-
kins288 and later modified in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.289 Under 
Waterhouse's assessment of her personality was part and parcel of what the Court found to 
be its sexually discriminatory views on the proper way to be a female partner. It is artificial 
to view gender and personality as separate motives in Price Waterhouse. See also Blumoff & 
Lewis, supra note 9, at 49 ("[I]n multiple-cause tort cases the court assumes independence 
among events; it assumes that two independent acts join to produce one harm. If racial and 
gender stereotyping are pervasive, it is not at all clear that one should assume sufficient 
independent 'legitimate' employer motivation."). 
W. See, e.g., Avery v. Delchamps Inc., 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 577 (E.D. La. 
1994). 
288. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). There was no majority opinion in Price Waterhouse. Under the 
approach Justice O'Connor adopted in her concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse, a mixed 
motive plaintiff must prove by "direct evidence" that discrimination was a "substantial fac-
tor" in the adverse decision. 490 U.S. at 265. Once that showing is made, the plaintiff 
prevails unless the employer meets the burden of persuading the factfinder "that it is more 
likely than not that the decision would have been the same absent consideration of the illegit-
imate factor." 490 U.S. at 276. Justice O'Connor's opinion is generally treated as stating the 
law of the case. See Jyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1183 {2d Cir.) (noting, in 
disagreement, that "(d]espite the inarguable fact that only four justices in Price Waterhouse 
would have imposed a 'direct evidence' requirement for 'mixed-motives' cases, most circuits 
have engrafted this requirement into caselaw"), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 82 (1992). Under the 
approach of Justice Brennan's plurality opinion, there is no "direct evidence" requirement, 
and the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer once the plaintiff proves that discrimina-
tion "played a motivating part" in the adverse decision. 490 U.S. at 1794. 
289. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (Supp. IV 1992). Under the statute, the plaintiff must first 
prove that discrimination was a "motivating factor." The statute is silent as to whether that 
proof must be made through the use of direct evidence. Once the plaintiff so proves, the 
defendant's liability is established. The defendant can, however, sharply limit the plaintiff's 
remedy by persuading the factfinder that "[it] would have taken the same action in the ab-
sence of the impermissible motivating factor." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1992). 
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the present system, courts find it quite difficult to determine 
whether a case falls within McDonnell Douglas-Burdine, the mixed 
motive framework, or both.290 Similar problems will remain so long 
290. For Justice O'Connor, the problem was solved by imposing a "direct evidence" re· 
quirement in mixed motive cases. That solution has been much criticized, both before and 
after Price Waterhouse. See, e.g., Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 9, at 57; Charles A. Edwards, 
Direct Evidence of Discriminatory Intent and the Burden of Proof: An Analysis and Critique, 
43 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1 (1986); Charles Sullivan, Accounting for Price Waterhouse: Prov-
ing Disparate Treatment Under Title VII, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 1107 (1991); Michael A. 
Zubrensky, Note, Despite the Smoke, There Is No Gun: Direct Evidence Requirements in 
Mixed-Motives Employment Law After Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 46 STAN. L. REv. 959 
(1995). The criticisms are well-founded. 
"Direct evidence" is a misnomer for the kind of evidence that is treated as "direct" for 
the purpose of mixed motive cases. Direct evidence is generally defined as evidence that 
establishes a fact at issue without the need for the drawing of inferences. Sullivan, supra, at 
1118-19. In disparate treatment cases, the fact at issue is discriminatory intent. It is question-
able whether evidence is "direct" in this sense even in the rare case where the decisionmaker 
told the plaintiff at the time of the adverse decision that the decision was being made because 
of race, gender, or so forth. To find discrimination, one must infer that the decisionmaker 
understood his own motives and reported them accurately to the plaintiff (rather than using 
discrimination as an excuse to hide an even more embarrassing motive). But given how rare 
admissions of this sort are, many courts interpret the term "direct evidence" to mean high-
quality circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., Hook v. Ernst & Young, 28 F.3d 366, 373 (3d Cir. 
1994) ("Whether a pretext or a mixed-motives case has been presented depends on the kind 
of circumstantial evidence the employee produces.") (emphasis added); Ostrowski v. Atlantic 
Mut. Ins. Cos., 968 F.2d 171, 182 (2d Cir. 1992) (requiring circumstantial evidence "tied di-
rectly to the alleged discriminatory animus"). A typical formulation is that "direct evidence" 
for mixed motive cases must be "conduct or statements by persons involved in the decision-
making process that may be viewed as directly reflecting the alleged discriminatory attitude." 
Starceski v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d 1089, 1096 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Ostrowski, 
968 F.2d at 182). The claim is made that this evidence "leads not only to a ready logical 
inference of bias, but also to a rational presumption that the person expressing bias acted on 
it." 54 F.3d at 1097. This claim merely underscores the fact that the use of such evidence to 
prove discrimination requires the drawing of two important (and disputable) inferences: that 
the decisionmaker spoke or acted in accord with his true opinions, and that he acted because 
of his discriminatory attitude, rather than for other reasons. See Sullivan, supra, at 1118-19. 
Furthermore, the boundaries between circumstantial evidence that is and is not strong 
enough to satisfy the ( quasi-)direct evidence requirement are hardly clear. See also Tyler, 958 
F.2d at 1183 ("[T]he various circuits have about as many definitions for 'direct evidence' as 
they do employment discrimination cases."). In any event, to privilege "direct" over "cir-
cumstantial" evidence is generally in tension with standard evidentiary practice. See Ed-
wards, supra, at 14-16; see also 3 DEVITT ET AL., supra note 49, at § 72.03; lA JoHN HENRY 
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TruArs AT COMMON LAW § 24, at 944-52 (1983). It is even less 
justifiable to privilege one type of circumstantial evidence over all others. 
Finally, the new "mixed motives" provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not on its 
face contain a direct evidence requirement. See supra note 289. Unless a direct evidence 
requirement is to be read into the statute, as some courts have done on the basis of ambigu-
ous legislative history, see, e.g., Maidenbaum v. Bally's Park Place, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 1254, 
1261 n.11 (D.NJ. 1994) (citing H.R. REP. No. 40(1), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 3, at 45, re-
printed in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 586), the statute precludes Justice O'Connor's case-sorting 
strategy. 
If mixed motive cases are not held to require direct evidence, however, it is even more 
difficult to distinguish between mixed motive cases and "ordinary" cases. Justice Brennan, 
who rejected the direct evidence requirement, denied that doing so would cause difficulties. 
He was drawing on the experience of the courts with the mixed motive scheme in constitu-
tionally based discrimination cases under Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 
274 (1977), and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Haus. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), 
under which there is no direct evidence requirement. See, e.g., Jirau-Bemal v. Agrait, 37 F.3d 
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as a distinction must be made between mixed motive cases and "or-
dinary," non-mixed motive cases. But this is not a reason to retain 
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine. It is merely a reason for ongoing 
reform.291 
The second potential problem is the possibility that the absence 
of the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine proof structure will make in-
tentional discrimination ·more difficult to litigate. McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine was long understood as necessary to smoke out 
evidence and to guide the factfinder in drawing inferences of dis-
crimination from circumstantial evidence. We have already seen, 
however, that the "necessity" argument fails: discrimination plain-
tiffs narrow the issues for trial through the use of the normal rules 
1, 3 (1st Cir. 1994); Clark v. Library of Congress, 750 F.2d 89, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Lee v. 
Russell County Bd. of Educ., 684 F.2d 769, 774 (11th Cir. 1982). Under the constitutional 
scheme set forth in those cases, however, the proof scheme is unitary for all cases, and proof 
of discrimination is largely unstructured. The major distinction between mixed motive cases 
and McDonnell Douglas-Burdine cases - that in one type of case the burden of persuasion 
shifts to the employer, but in the other it does not - does not exist in the constitutional 
setting. Nor, therefore, does the need to make determinations as to which proof theory (or 
theories) the evidence supports. 
291. The reform I would endorse would be to use what is now the mixed motive frame-
work as a unitary framework for all individual cases of intentional discrimination. Under 
such a reform - which could be implemented with no change whatsoever in the statutory 
language - the defendant would be held liable whenever the plaintiff proves by direct and-or 
circumstantial evidence that race, sex, or so forth was a motivating factor in the employer's 
decisionmaking. The defendant could then limit the plaintiff's remedy by persuading the 
factfinder that it would have made the same decision in the absence of discrimination. Under 
this proof model, there would no longer be a reason to distinguish between "mixed motive" 
cases and "ordinary" cases. This would follow the model of proof in constitutional cases 
under Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 252, as well as in cases of anti-union discrimination 
under the National Labor Relations Act, see Wright Line, 251 N.LR.B. 1083 (1980), enfd., 
662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982), where it has long been clear 
that a National Labor Relations Board finding that anti-union animus was a motivating fac-
tor in the employer's decisionmaking can be based on circumstantial as well as direct evi-
dence. See, e.g., Avecor, Inc. v. NLRB, 931 F.2d 924, 928-29 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 
502 U.S. 1048 (1992); Zubrensky, supra note 290, at 982. 
A unitary framework would be particularly helpful now that jury trials are available for 
Title VII intentional discrimination cases, because it would avoid the need to confuse the jury 
by instructing it on both the "mixed motive" theory and the "ordinary" theory - with their 
different distributions of the burden of persuasion - in cases in which the evidence supports 
both. See Rutherglen, supra note 17, at 64 (raising "[t]he practical question ••• whether 
juries can make any sense out of the distinction between pretext and mixed motivation"). 
Language requiring the jury to determine that discrimination was a "motivating factor" or 
"played a role" in a decision will allow ample room for juries creatively to understand the 
many ways in which discrimination appears and influences employment results. But see Paul 
J. Gude!, Beyond Causation: The Interpretation of Action and the Mixed Motives Problem in 
Employment Discrimination Law, 70 TEXAS L. REv. 17 (1991) (arguing that the law should 
prohibit discriminatory acts, not acts "caused" by discriminatory "motives" or "intents," and 
that causal language is a barrier to proper understanding of discrimination claims). 
Unity could, of course, also be attained by eliminating the mixed motive theory. That 
option, however, is rendered unavailable - and rightly so - by Congress's clear assertion 
through the Civil Rights Act of 1991 that Title VII is violated whenever discrimination is a 
motivating factor in an adverse employment decision. 
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of civil procedure, not by relying on McDonnell Douglas-Burdine. 
Furthermore, McDonnell Douglas-Burdine is as likely to stand in 
the way of drawing inferences of discrimination as to encourage it. 
An open-ended discrimination standard would encourage a holistic 
approach to factfinding, as opposed to McDonnell Douglas-Bur-
dine's hierarchized one. This would likely be of special benefit to 
factfinding in jury trials. Despite Aikens's admonition that the Mc-
Donnell Douglas-Burdine proof structure is irrelevant to fully tried 
cases, many courts continue to refer to its elements in jury instruc-
tions.292 Such legally complex instructions are hinderances to juror 
decisionmaking: psychological studies show that juries understand 
complex facts better than complex law.293 I suspect that even 
courts would benefit from transferring their attention from the 
proof structure to the evidence itself. 
Nor is there reason to fear the third potential problem with 
abandoning McDonnell Douglas-Burdine: namely, that it will serve 
to immunize intentional discrimination cases from judicial review. 
Appellate courts are perfectly capable of reviewing district court 
summary judgment determinations, if they choose to do so, even 
without McDonnell Douglas-Burdine. Indeed, the greater risk is 
that appellate courts will attempt to expand their own role by estab-
lishing "rules" about the kinds of evidence that will and will not 
suffice to prove intentional discrimination as a matter of law. 
Courts have made such decisions even working within the structure 
of McDonnell Douglas-Burdine by declaring, for example, that 
"stray remarks" of a sexist or racist nature cannot be used to prove 
intentional discrimination at the pretext stage of the case. The 
temptation to do so may be even greater absent McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine.294 
292. Their need to do so stems from the need, in many cases, to instruct the jury both on 
McDonnell-Douglas Burdine and on "mixed motive" as alternative theories - which is diffi-
cult to do in nontechnical terms, given the technical nature of the distinction. For the dan-
gers inherent in instructing juries on alternative theories with different burdens of proof, see 
Barbara D. Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in Crimi-
nal Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299, 1311 n.47 (1977). 
293. See Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are 'llvelve Heads Better Than One? LAw & CONTEMP. 
PRoBs. Autumn 1989, at 205, 217, 218-23; Alan Reifman et al., Real Jurors' Understanding of 
the Law in Real Cases, 16 LAw & HUMAN BEHAV. 539, 540 (1992). For a convincing argu-
ment that jurors make sense of the record by constructing stories rather than by applying 
legal rules, see Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision 
Making, 51 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PsYCH. 242 (1986). 
294. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Esselte Pendafiex Corp., 50 F.3d 507, 512-13 (8th Cir. 1995); 
cf. Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1991) (stating strong inference that when same 
person who hires you fires you a few months later, discrimination was not a determining 
factor). This kind of lawmaking is ill advised, in my view, because it cannot hope to take into 
account the different contexts in which the evidence may appear. 
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The problem with such decisions is that they ignore the fact that 
evidence takes its meaning from context. "Stray remarks" of a dis-
criminatory nature may mean very little when the plaintiff's case is 
otherwise extremely weak. But if the plaintiff's case appears to 
have some merit in other respects, or if the remarks corroborate 
other evidence of racial or gender tension in the workplace, it 
would be inappropriate categorically to ignore the remarks.29s Ap-
pellate courts should not respond to the demise of McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine by imposing a new set of shortcuts that will stand 
in the way of evaluating the evidence as a whole -· nor should dis-
trict courts be relied upon creatively to subvert such rules when 
they interfere with sensible practice on the ground. Judicial drift 
back in the direction of "hard and fast" rules may be inevitable, but 
abandoning McDonnell Douglas-Burdine will make it easier to de-
tect and to critique. 
My main hesitation in advocating the dismantling of the Mc-
Donnell Douglas-Burdine proof structure concerns not the practi-
cal dimension, but rather the symbolic. What would it mean to 
declare, after all this time, that there are no preferential rules for 
individual discrimination cases - that the law will evaluate these 
discrimination claims like any other civil claims, with no societal 
thumb on the scale? But, to answer a question with a question, 
what is the symbolic significance of acting as though there are pref-
erential standards for disparate treatment cases when, in fact, after 
Hicks, there are none? The claim that we have "special" rules for 
intentional discrimination cases creates a false "sense of closure"296 
- a false belief that the law has already taken extraordinary steps 
to assist Title VII plaintiffs. Perhaps it is better to let the cold winds 
of litigation blow. At least the cold air will be clear. 
295. Cf. Carter v. Duncan-Huggins, Ltd., 727 F.2d 1225, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (reversing 
jury instruction stating that "an isolated racial joke or slur told by another employee, even if 
told in the presence of a supervisor and no matter how tasteless, is not evidence of race or 
color discrimination by the employer"). 
296. Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673, 715, 717 (1992). 
The notion that we have "special rules" for discrimination claimants also fosters the sense of 
despondency that "we have already tried special rules; if they haven't succeeded, nothing 
will." 
